Law Commons^™

Supplemental Jurisdiction Over Claims By Plaintiffs In Diversity Cases: Making Sense Of 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (B), Darren J. Gold

Michigan Law Review

This Note examines the language and legislative history of section 1367(b) and proposes a uniform test for determining the circumstances in which subsection (b) authorizes the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction. Part I of this Note explains the doctrines of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction and examines how the Supreme Court's decision in Finley v. United States called these doctrines into question. Part II examines the language and legislative history of section 1367 and concludes that the statute only prohibits the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over claims by plaintiffs in diversity cases when doing so would permit plaintiffs to circumvent the complete …

The Federal Arbitration Act And Individual Employment Contracts: A Better Means To An Equally Just End, William F. Kolakowski Iii

Michigan Law Review

This Note argues that courts should adopt a narrow reading of the employment contract exception to the FAA, thus making arbitration agreements in most individual employment contracts enforceable under the Act. Part I argues that a textual analysis of the FAA supports a narrow interpretation of the exception. Because some courts and commentators have argued that the text favors a broad interpretation, Part II examines the legislative history of the exception and demonstrates that no firm conclusions can be drawn about congressional intent regarding the exception's scope. Finally, Part III demonstrates that a narrow reading of the exception best serves …

Comparison Of The Interpretation Of Statutes And Collective Bargaining Agreements: Grasping The Pivot Of Tao, A, James E. Westbrook

Missouri Law Review

There has been an explosion in writing about statutory interpretation in recent years. Legal scholars have responded to theoretical writing about interpretation in general and to articles and judicial opinions by judges with an impressive array of articles and books. The purpose of this Article is to reflect on some of the common assumptions and interpretive practices of arbitrators in the light of this writing about statutory interpretation.

The Single-Scheme Exception To Criminal Deportations And The Case For Chevron's Step Two, David A. Luigs

Michigan Law Review

This Note applies the two-step Chevron analysis to the single-scheme exception and argues that courts should reject the BIA's single-act test. In applying Chevron, this Note uses the narrow controversy over the proper interpretation of the single-scheme exception as a window on the larger ambiguity that plagues the Supreme Court's Chevron jurisprudence. This Note suggests an answer to a broader issue that has remained unclear under the Supreme Court's precedents: how courts should review agency interpretations at Chevron's second step.

Are Trojan Horse Union Organizers "Employees"?: A New Look At Deference To The Nlrb's Iterpretation Of Nlra Section 2(3), Jonathan D. Hacker

Michigan Law Review

This Note takes a different approach to interpreting section 2(3). Although this Note agrees that section 2(3) neither clearly includes nor clearly excludes trojan horse organizers, it also argues that the definition of employee under section 2(3) must be determined by looking to common law principles of agency. In other words, the question whether courts should defer to the Board's interpretation of section 2(3) does not turn on statutory ambiguity. Rather, courts have a continuing duty to ensure that the Board interprets employee consistently with common law agency principles. Nevertheless, the correct interpretation of employee under agency principles ultimately turns …

Key Tronic Corporation V. United States: Recovery Of Attorney's Fees In Private Cost-Recovery Actions Under Cercla, Albertina D. Susco

Villanova Environmental Law Journal

No abstract provided.

With The Legislature's Permission And The Supreme Court"S Consent, Common Law Social Host Liability Returns To Minnesota, Michael K. Steenson

Faculty Scholarship

In 1990, the Minnesota Legislature amended the Civil Damage Act to allow for common law tort claims against persons 21 years old or older who knowingly provide alcohol to a person under 21 years of age. The 1990 amendment is unique because the legislature in effect appears to be releasing its stranglehold on liquor liability law, permitting the courts to apply common law negligence principles under the defined circumstances, but without providing any guidelines as to how the common law remedy should be formulated. The interpretive problems the amendment creates will eventually have to be resolved by the courts. The …

The Limited Relevance Of Plain Meaning, Stephen F. Ross

Journal Articles

In this essay, the author takes the position that linguists' principal expertise - ascertaining how language is used by ordinary speakers of English - is often of little value in interpreting controversial non-criminal federal statutes. Although linguistic techniques might still aid in understanding their meaning, the author's thesis is that extrinsic evidence that is known and accessible to this small sub-community - such as legislative history, established norms of construction, and other evidence about the context in which the legislation arose - is more likely than linguistic analysis to help an outside judge shed light on what Congress meant and …

The Modern Parol Evidence Rule And Its Implications For New Textualist Statutory Interpretation, Stephen F. Ross, Daniel Trannen

Journal Articles

Part I of this article focuses on the history of parol evidence in contract interpretation, describing both Williston's and Corbin's definition and application of the parol evidence rule. With the adoption of the UCC and the Second Restatement, we suggest that Corbin's position-that expansion of admissibility of parol evidence will more accurately reflect the drafters' manifest intentions and minimize the judge's personal biases-has been accepted by experts and legislators alike. In Part II, we summarize the use of legislative history in statutory interpretation, focusing on the rise of the New Textualism and its critique of the use of legislative history …

This Is Not A Sentence, Paul F. Campos

Publications

No abstract provided.

The "Language Of Law" And "More Probable Than Not": Some Brief Thoughts, Kent Greenawalt

Faculty Scholarship

By far the most testy moments of the conference arose out of the following problem. The Supreme Court had interpreted "knowingly" in a criminal statute regulating interstate commerce of child pornography to cover the age of participants, even though the placement of knowingly" in the statutory provision would, according to standard usages of English grammar, lead to its not being applied to that element of the crime. All participants at our conference fairly quickly acknowledged the following two truths: (1) the Court's construction did not fit ordinary English grammar, and (2) there might be appropriate (legal) reasons why statutory construction …

With Malice Toward Some: United States V. Kirby, Malicious Prosecution, And The Fourteenth Amendment, David J. Achtenberg

Faculty Works

In 1869, the Supreme Court treated United States v. Kirby as a simple case. In 1994, it treated Albright v. Oliver as a case divorced from history. Understanding the factual complexity of Kirby provides the historical framework missing from Albright and casts new light on the issue of whether the Fourteenth Amendment forbids malicious prosecution.

United States v. Kirby appeared straightforward. John W. Kirby was indicted for interferring with the United States mail by detaining a mail agent, Dr. Cyrus W. Farris, and a mail steamer. John Kirby's defense was simple. He was the sheriff of Gallatin County, Kentucky. The …

Severability In Statutes And Contracts, Mark L. Movsesian

Faculty Publications

Established doctrine on the severability of unconstitutional statutory provisions has drawn criticism on almost every conceivable basis. Commentators have condemned severability doctrine as too malleable and as too rigid; as encouraging judicial overreaching and as encouraging judicial abdication. They have criticized the doctrine's reliance on legislative intent and its disregard of legislative intent; its excessive attention to political concerns and its inattention to political concerns; its lack of any coherent explanation.

The reasons for this lingering controversy are easy to discern. One is purely pragmatic. "We live in an age of statutes." Legislation provides our primary source of law in …

Law And Linguistics: Is There Common Ground?, William D. Popkin

Articles by Maurer Faculty

No abstract provided.

Book Review. Dynamic Statutory Interpretation By William N. Eskridge, Jr., William D. Popkin

Articles by Maurer Faculty

No abstract provided.