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Full-Text Articles in Law

Supplemental Jurisdiction Over Claims By Plaintiffs In Diversity Cases: Making Sense Of 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (B), Darren J. Gold Jun 1995

Supplemental Jurisdiction Over Claims By Plaintiffs In Diversity Cases: Making Sense Of 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (B), Darren J. Gold

Michigan Law Review

This Note examines the language and legislative history of section 1367(b) and proposes a uniform test for determining the circumstances in which subsection (b) authorizes the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction. Part I of this Note explains the doctrines of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction and examines how the Supreme Court's decision in Finley v. United States called these doctrines into question. Part II examines the language and legislative history of section 1367 and concludes that the statute only prohibits the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over claims by plaintiffs in diversity cases when doing so would permit plaintiffs to circumvent the complete …


The Federal Arbitration Act And Individual Employment Contracts: A Better Means To An Equally Just End, William F. Kolakowski Iii Jun 1995

The Federal Arbitration Act And Individual Employment Contracts: A Better Means To An Equally Just End, William F. Kolakowski Iii

Michigan Law Review

This Note argues that courts should adopt a narrow reading of the employment contract exception to the FAA, thus making arbitration agreements in most individual employment contracts enforceable under the Act. Part I argues that a textual analysis of the FAA supports a narrow interpretation of the exception. Because some courts and commentators have argued that the text favors a broad interpretation, Part II examines the legislative history of the exception and demonstrates that no firm conclusions can be drawn about congressional intent regarding the exception's scope. Finally, Part III demonstrates that a narrow reading of the exception best serves …


Comparison Of The Interpretation Of Statutes And Collective Bargaining Agreements: Grasping The Pivot Of Tao, A, James E. Westbrook Apr 1995

Comparison Of The Interpretation Of Statutes And Collective Bargaining Agreements: Grasping The Pivot Of Tao, A, James E. Westbrook

Missouri Law Review

There has been an explosion in writing about statutory interpretation in recent years. Legal scholars have responded to theoretical writing about interpretation in general and to articles and judicial opinions by judges with an impressive array of articles and books. The purpose of this Article is to reflect on some of the common assumptions and interpretive practices of arbitrators in the light of this writing about statutory interpretation.


The Single-Scheme Exception To Criminal Deportations And The Case For Chevron's Step Two, David A. Luigs Mar 1995

The Single-Scheme Exception To Criminal Deportations And The Case For Chevron's Step Two, David A. Luigs

Michigan Law Review

This Note applies the two-step Chevron analysis to the single-scheme exception and argues that courts should reject the BIA's single-act test. In applying Chevron, this Note uses the narrow controversy over the proper interpretation of the single-scheme exception as a window on the larger ambiguity that plagues the Supreme Court's Chevron jurisprudence. This Note suggests an answer to a broader issue that has remained unclear under the Supreme Court's precedents: how courts should review agency interpretations at Chevron's second step.


Are Trojan Horse Union Organizers "Employees"?: A New Look At Deference To The Nlrb's Iterpretation Of Nlra Section 2(3), Jonathan D. Hacker Feb 1995

Are Trojan Horse Union Organizers "Employees"?: A New Look At Deference To The Nlrb's Iterpretation Of Nlra Section 2(3), Jonathan D. Hacker

Michigan Law Review

This Note takes a different approach to interpreting section 2(3). Although this Note agrees that section 2(3) neither clearly includes nor clearly excludes trojan horse organizers, it also argues that the definition of employee under section 2(3) must be determined by looking to common law principles of agency. In other words, the question whether courts should defer to the Board's interpretation of section 2(3) does not turn on statutory ambiguity. Rather, courts have a continuing duty to ensure that the Board interprets employee consistently with common law agency principles. Nevertheless, the correct interpretation of employee under agency principles ultimately turns …


Key Tronic Corporation V. United States: Recovery Of Attorney's Fees In Private Cost-Recovery Actions Under Cercla, Albertina D. Susco Jan 1995

Key Tronic Corporation V. United States: Recovery Of Attorney's Fees In Private Cost-Recovery Actions Under Cercla, Albertina D. Susco

Villanova Environmental Law Journal (1991 - )

No abstract provided.