Law Commons^™

Interpretation As Statecraft: Chancellor Kent And The Collaborative Era Of American Statutory Interpretation, Farah Peterson

Maryland Law Review

No abstract provided.

Is The Supreme Court Disabling The Enabling Act, Or Is Shady Grove Just Another Bad Opera?, Robert J. Condlin

Faculty Scholarship

After seventy years of trying, the Supreme Court has yet to agree on whether the Rules Enabling Act articulates a one or two part standard for determining the validity of a Federal Rule. Is it enough that a Federal Rule regulates “practice and procedure,” or must it also not “abridge substantive rights”? The Enabling Act seems to require both, but the Court is not so sure, and the costs of its uncertainty are real. Among other things, litigants must guess whether the decision to apply a Federal Rule in a given case will depend upon predictable ritual, judicial power grab, …

Ocasio V. United States: Why The Hobbs Act Punishes Co-Conspirator Extortion, Joshua T. Carback

Maryland Law Review Online

No abstract provided.

Yates V. United States: Floundering About In The Choppy Waters Of Statutory Interpretation, Lindsay Defrancesco

Maryland Law Review

No abstract provided.

Regulation By Amicus: The Department Of Labor's Policy Making In The Courts, Deborah Thompson Eisenberg

Faculty Scholarship

This Article examines the practice of “regulation by amicus”: that is, an agency’s attempt to mold statutory interpretation and establish policy by filing “friend of the court” briefs in private litigation. Since the United States Supreme Court recognized agency amicus interpretations as a source of controlling law entitled to deference in Auer v. Robbins, agencies have used amicus curiae briefs—in strategic and at times aggressive ways—to advance the political agenda of the President in the courts.

Using the lens of the U.S. Department of Labor’s amicus activity in wage and hour cases, this Article explores the tension between the …

The Supreme Court, Cafa, And Parens Patriae Actions: Will It Be Principles Or Biases?, Donald G. Gifford, William L. Reynolds

Faculty Scholarship

The Supreme Court will hear a case during its 2013-2014 term that will test the principles of both its conservative and liberal wings. In Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp., Justices from each wing of the Court will be forced to choose between the modes of statutory interpretation they usually have favored in the past and their previously displayed pro-business or anti-business predispositions. The issue is whether the defendant-manufacturers can remove an action brought by a state attorney general suing as parens patriae to federal court. Beginning with their actions against tobacco manufacturers in the mid-1990s, state …

A Case Study In The Superiority Of The Purposive Approach To Statutory Interpretation: Bruesewitz V. Wyeth , Donald G. Gifford, William L. Reynolds, Andrew M. Murad

Faculty Scholarship

This Article uses the Supreme Court’s 2011 decision in Bruesewitz v. Wyeth to examine the textualist or “plain meaning” approach to statutory interpretation. For more than a quarter-century, Justice Scalia has successfully promoted textualism, usually associated with conservatism, among his colleagues. In Bruesewitz, Scalia, writing for the majority, and his liberal colleague Justice Sotomayer, in dissent, both employed textualism to determine if the plaintiffs, whose child was allegedly harmed by a vaccine, could pursue common-law tort claims or whether their remedies were limited to those available under the no-fault compensation system established by the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act. Despite …

The Importance Of Being Ambiguous: Substantive Canons, Stare Decisis, And The Central Role Of Ambiguity Determinations In The Administrative State, Brian G. Slocum

Maryland Law Review

No abstract provided.

No Two-Stepping In The Laboratories: State Deference Standards And Their Implications For Improving Chevron Doctrine, Michael Pappas

Faculty Scholarship

This article examines the deference standards that the various states apply to agency statutory interpretation and analyzes the implications for the federal Chevron doctrine. First, the article surveys state standards for reviewing agencies' statutory interpretation, finding that none of the state standards exactly follows the federal Chevron test but that state standards fall into one of four categories ranging from "strong deference" to "de novo with deference discouraged." The article then examines four particular state standards in depth, discovering that states tend to use the same methods, tools, and processes for statutory interpretation despite the different announced degrees of deference. …

Judicial Deference To Administrative Agencies And Its Limits, Graham G. Martin, David A. Super

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Administrative Practice As A Guide To Judicial Interpretation Of Statutes - Bouse V. Hutzler

Maryland Law Review

No abstract provided.