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Full-Text Articles in Law

Is The Chief Justice A Tax Lawyer?, Stephanie Hoffer, Christopher J. Walker Oct 2015

Is The Chief Justice A Tax Lawyer?, Stephanie Hoffer, Christopher J. Walker

Christopher J. Walker

King v. Burwell is a crucial victory for the Obama Administration and for the future of the Affordable Care Act. It also has important implications for tax law and administration, as explored in the other terrific contributions to this Pepperdine Law Review Symposium. In this Essay, we turn to another tax-related feature of the Chief Justice’s opinion for the Court: It is hard to ignore the fingerprints of a tax lawyer throughout the opinion. This Essay focuses on two instances of a tax lawyer at work.

First, in the Chief’s approach to statutory interpretation one sees a tax lawyer as …


Take It To The Limit: The Illegal Regulation Prohibiting The Take Of Any Threatened Species Under The Endangered Species Act, Jonathan Wood Aug 2015

Take It To The Limit: The Illegal Regulation Prohibiting The Take Of Any Threatened Species Under The Endangered Species Act, Jonathan Wood

Jonathan Wood

The Endangered Species Act forbids the “take” – any activity that adversely affects – any member of an endangered species, but only endangered species. The statute also provides for the listing of threatened species, i.e. species that may become endangered, but protects them only by requiring agencies to consider the impacts of their projects on them. Shortly after the statute was adopted, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and National Marine Fisheries Service reversed Congress’ policy choice by adopting a regulation that forbids the take of any threatened species. The regulation is not authorized by the Endangered Species Act, but …


Inside Agency Statutory Interpretation, Christopher J. Walker May 2015

Inside Agency Statutory Interpretation, Christopher J. Walker

Christopher J. Walker

The Constitution vests all legislative powers in Congress, yet Congress grants expansive lawmaking authority to federal agencies. As positive political theorists have long explored, Congress intends for federal agencies to faithfully exercise their delegated authority, but ensuring fidelity to congressional wishes is difficult due to asymmetries in information, expertise, and preferences that complicate congressional control and oversight. Indeed, this principal-agent problem has a democratic and constitutional dimension, as the legitimacy of administrative governance may well depend on whether the unelected bureaucracy is a faithful agent of Congress. Despite the predominance of lawmaking by regulation and the decades-long application of principal-agent …


Everything Is Presumed In Texas, Benjamin Walther Jan 2015

Everything Is Presumed In Texas, Benjamin Walther

Benjamin Walther

As this Article will reveal, the Fifth Circuit has traditionally been loath to apply the presumption against preemption in most cases. Texas courts, on the other hand, have consistently employed a particularly strong application of the presumption to all types of preemption cases. This inconsistency between these two jurisdictions creates an incentive for forum shopping. Generally, the courts rely on a defendant’s ability to remove a case to the federal courts to counteract the plaintiff’s exclusive power to decide the forum. This ability, however, is not available to a defendant within the context of preemption cases. As such, there is …


Criminal Constitutional Avoidance, William W. Berry Iii Feb 2013

Criminal Constitutional Avoidance, William W. Berry Iii

William W Berry III

Just two terms ago in United States v. Skilling, the Supreme Court used the avoidance canon in response to a void-for-vagueness challenge to the federal criminal fraud statute. As explained below, the Court severely restricted the statute’s meaning, limiting its proscription against “deprivation of honest services” to bribery and kickbacks.

This article argues that, contrary to the Court’s decision in Skilling, the canon of constitutional avoidance is inappropriate in void-for-vagueness cases. This is because such cases do not present a statutory ambiguity that requires choosing between competing meanings or interpretations. Instead, void-for-vagueness challenges concern statutes that either have …


Retaliatory Disclosure: When Identifying The Complainant Is An Adverse Action, Jamie Darin Prenkert, Julie Manning Magid, Allison Fetter-Harrott Jan 2013

Retaliatory Disclosure: When Identifying The Complainant Is An Adverse Action, Jamie Darin Prenkert, Julie Manning Magid, Allison Fetter-Harrott

Jamie D Prenkert

Sometimes the possibility of being publicly identified as a complainant will be enough to discourage a person from complaining. That is especially true when being identified as a complainant exposes her to a greater likelihood of reprisal. This paper addresses the circumstances when such publicity can be deemed materially adverse, such that it ought to be sufficient to support a claim of retaliation. We focus on the particular context of claims of employment discrimination, especially pursuant to Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. When an employee or applicant for employment files a charge of discrimination with the Equal …


A Multiple Choice Legislative Certification Procedure: Asking Congressional Preferences In Statutory Interpretation, Danieli Evans Sep 2012

A Multiple Choice Legislative Certification Procedure: Asking Congressional Preferences In Statutory Interpretation, Danieli Evans

Danieli Evans

In response to failed efforts at enhancing judicial-legislative collaboration, I propose a procedure that would enable the Court to take account of congressional preferences in a pending statutory interpretation decision, without requiring Congress to amend the ambiguous law. In “hard cases” the Court could certify, through a fast-track procedure, a question presenting Congress with two multiple choices that the Court predetermines to be viable readings of the statute. This procedure avoids constitutional problems because congressional input is voluntary and non-binding for both branches, and judicial constraint enforces rule of law and constitutional values.


Purposeless Construction, David M. Driesen Aug 2012

Purposeless Construction, David M. Driesen

David M Driesen

This Article critiques the Supreme Court’s tendency to embrace “purposeless construction”— statutory construction that ignores legislation’’ underlying goals. It constructs a new democratic theory supporting purposeful construction, defined as an approach to construction that favors construction of ambiguous text to advance a statute’s underlying goal. That theory maintains that statutory goals, especially those set out in the legislative text or frequently proclaimed in public, tend to reflect public values to a greater extent than other statutory provisions. Politicians carefully choose goals for statutes that “sell” the statute to the public. In order to do this, they must announce goals for …


Textualism And Obstacle Preemption, John D. Ohlendorf Aug 2012

Textualism And Obstacle Preemption, John D. Ohlendorf

John D Ohlendorf

Commentators, both on the bench and in the academy, have perceived an inconsistency between the Supreme Court’s trend, in recent decades, towards an increasingly formalist approach to statutory interpretation and the Court’s continued willingness to find state laws preempted as “obstacles to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress,” — so-called “obstacle preemption.” This Article argues that by giving the meaning contextually implied in a statutory text ordinary, operative legal force, we can justify most of the current scope of obstacle preemption based solely on theoretical moves textualism already is committed to making.

The Article …


The Uneasy Case For The Affordable Care Act, Stephen E. Sachs Jan 2012

The Uneasy Case For The Affordable Care Act, Stephen E. Sachs

Stephen E. Sachs

The constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act is sometimes said to be an "easy" question, with the Act's opponents relying more on fringe political ideology than mainstream legal arguments. This essay disagrees. While the mandate may win in the end, it won't be easy, and the arguments against it sound in law rather than politics. Written to accompany and respond to Erwin Chemerinsky's essay in the same symposium, this essay argues that each substantive defense of the mandate is subject to doubt. While Congress could have avoided the issue by using its taxing power, it chose not to do so. …


Timber Piracy, Statutory Interpretation, And Legislative Intent: The Louisiana Supreme Court’S Decision In Sullivan V. Wallace, Mirais Holden Nov 2011

Timber Piracy, Statutory Interpretation, And Legislative Intent: The Louisiana Supreme Court’S Decision In Sullivan V. Wallace, Mirais Holden

Mirais Holden

The Louisiana legislature imposes punitive treble damages on timber pirates, those who cut or remove timber from land belonging to another. For many years in Louisiana, it was unclear whether those same treble penalties applied to co-owners of land who sell timber of which they only own a part, without the consent of their fellow co-owners, in a blatant attempt to steal the full profit for themselves. In a historical circuit split, one Louisiana circuit held that the treble damage statute did apply to timber-pirating co-owners, while another Louisiana circuit held that it did not. The author of this case …


Religious Freedom In Private Lawsuits: Untangling When Rfra Applies To Suits Involving Only Private Parties, Sara Lunsford Kohen Aug 2011

Religious Freedom In Private Lawsuits: Untangling When Rfra Applies To Suits Involving Only Private Parties, Sara Lunsford Kohen

Sara Kohen

Religious Freedom in Private Lawsuits: Untangling When RFRA Applies to Suits Involving Only Private Parties, for publication discusses when courts should apply the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”) in cases in which the federal government is not a party. Congress passed RFRA in reaction to the Supreme Court’s decision in Employment Division v. Smith. The Court held in Smith that the Constitution does not require religious exemptions from neutral, generally applicable laws—those that do not target religion and cover non-religious conduct to the same extent as religious conduct. By contrast, RFRA allows a federal law to substantially burden a religious …


Can The “Formidable Shield” Last: A Re-Examination Of Copyright Law As A Means To Control Uncopyrighted Gray Market Goods, Ya Xia Aug 2011

Can The “Formidable Shield” Last: A Re-Examination Of Copyright Law As A Means To Control Uncopyrighted Gray Market Goods, Ya Xia

Ya Xia

To fight against gray market goods, the trademark law leaves certain trademark owners uncovered, who then turn to copyright law for help. It is lawful in the U.S. for copyright owners to stop importation and distribution of uncopyrighted goods through attaching copyrighted accessories. Such practices have been rendered unlawful in Australia and denounced by the Supreme Court of Canada. The paper aims to discuss the illegitimacy under the U.S. law through both the statutory interpretation approach and the copyright misuse approach.


Unconscious Bias In Legal Interpretation, Anup Malani, Ward Farnsowrth, Dustin Guzior Mar 2011

Unconscious Bias In Legal Interpretation, Anup Malani, Ward Farnsowrth, Dustin Guzior

Anup Malani

What role do policy preferences play when a judge or any other reader decides what a statute or other legal text means? Most judges think of themselves as doing law, not politics. Yet the observable decisions that judges make often follow patterns that are hard to explain by anything other than policy preferences. Indeed, if one presses the implications of the data too hard, it is likely to be heard as an accusation of bad faith—a claim that the judge or other decision-maker isn’t really earnest in trying to separate preference from judgment. This does not advance the discussion, and …


Why Agency Interpretations Of Ambiguous Statutes Should Be Subject To Stare Decisis, Harold (Hank) Greenberg Jan 2011

Why Agency Interpretations Of Ambiguous Statutes Should Be Subject To Stare Decisis, Harold (Hank) Greenberg

Harold (Hank) Greenberg

Agencies’ interpretations of ambiguous statutes under Chevron are not subject to a rule of stare decisis. Agencies may interpret and later reinterpret ambiguous statutes without settling the statute’s meaning. This article shows that this regime permits agencies to “interpret” law in legally unprincipled and inconsistent ways and prevents administrative statutes from meaningfully constraining agency policymaking. This article concludes that a rule of stare decisis should govern agencies’ interpretations of ambiguous statutes just as it governs judicial holdings. Taking seriously Chevron’s recognition of agencies’ power to interpret law, the conventional justifications for stare decisis – separation of powers, legislative supremacy, and …


Impeding Reentry: Agency And Judicial Obstacles To Longer Halfway House Placements, S. David Mitchell Aug 2010

Impeding Reentry: Agency And Judicial Obstacles To Longer Halfway House Placements, S. David Mitchell

S. David Mitchell

Over 700,000 prisoners were released into their communities in 2008, at least 50,000 of those from federal custody. Once an obscure cause, nearly everyone agrees that prisoner reentry – the process by which former prisoners return to their community as free citizens – is of national importance. Absent adequate attention to transitional services, ex-offenders are often homeless, unemployed, and suffer from untreated substance abuse addictions. Accordingly, President Obama and his two predecessors have devoted considerable attention to the issue. Congress passed the Second Chance in 2007, amending two federal statutes, sections 3624(c) and 3621(b) and giving inmates a longer time …


The Hypocrisy Of The Acquiescence Canon, Blair C. Warner Mar 2010

The Hypocrisy Of The Acquiescence Canon, Blair C. Warner

Blair C Warner

The Court applies the acquiescence canon to infer that an agency or judicial statutory interpretation is correct when followed by Congressional inaction. This Article will argue that this practice is based on a number of faulty assumptions. Moreover, the canon is applied inconsistently and creates perverse incentives for the legislature. The Article will then explore the Court’s guidance to lower courts against deriving similar inferences from the denial of certiorari, a similar form of inaction. Drawing parallels between Congress and the Court, and noting the many reasons why conclusions should not be drawn from apparent inactivity, this Article will conclude …


A Consequential Approach To Interpretation And Interpretive Risk: Rethinking Judicial Intervention From Contracts To The Chrysler Bankruptcy, J. P. Kostritsky Mar 2010

A Consequential Approach To Interpretation And Interpretive Risk: Rethinking Judicial Intervention From Contracts To The Chrysler Bankruptcy, J. P. Kostritsky

Juliet P Kostritsky

Abstract When contracts remain ambiguous or incomplete, courts and scholars must confront the inevitable question of when intervention in private contracts is justified. To deal with the unresolution or residual uncertainty, the Austrian economists and the new textualists suggest that any intervention would be a fool’s errand. Their position amounts to an unvarying posture that any party asking for an additional term or a broad interpretation will always lose. Recognizing that there is an interpretive risk in all contracts, the court should adopt an interpretive methodology that parties would be willing to adopt and that would enhance the willingness of …


A Consequential Approach To Interpretation And Interpretive Risk: Rethinking Judicial Intervention From Contracts To The Chrysler Bankruptcy, Juliet P. Kostritsky Jan 2010

A Consequential Approach To Interpretation And Interpretive Risk: Rethinking Judicial Intervention From Contracts To The Chrysler Bankruptcy, Juliet P. Kostritsky

Juliet P Kostritsky

Abstract When contracts remain ambiguous or incomplete, courts and scholars must confront the inevitable question of when intervention in private contracts is justified. To deal with the unresolution or residual uncertainty, the Austrian economists and the new textualists suggest that any intervention would be a fool’s errand. Their position amounts to an unvarying posture that any party asking for an additional term or a broad interpretation will always lose. Recognizing that there is an interpretive risk in all contracts, the court should adopt an interpretive methodology that parties would be willing to adopt and that would enhance the willingness of …


Administrative Law In The Roberts Court: The First Four Years, Robin K. Craig Sep 2009

Administrative Law In The Roberts Court: The First Four Years, Robin K. Craig

Robin K. Craig

Given Justice David Souter’s retirement in the summer of 2009, the four U.S. Supreme Court terms that began in October 2005 and ended in June 2009 constitute a first distinct phase of the Roberts Court. During those first four terms, moreover, the Court decided a number of cases relevant to the practice and structure of administrative law.

This Article provides a comprehensive survey and summary of the Supreme Court’s administrative-law-related decisions issued during this first phase of the Roberts Court. It organizes those decisions into three categories. Part I of this Article discusses the Supreme Court decisions that affect access …


Ambiguity About Ambiguity: An Empirical Inquiry Into Legal Interpretation, Anup Malani Mar 2009

Ambiguity About Ambiguity: An Empirical Inquiry Into Legal Interpretation, Anup Malani

Anup Malani

Most scholarship on statutory interpretation discusses what courts should do with ambiguous statutes. This paper investigates the crucial and analytically prior question of what ambiguity in law is. Does a claim that a text is ambiguous mean the reader is uncertain about its meaning? Or is it a claim that readers, as a group, would disagree about what the text means (however certain each of them may be individually)? This distinction is of considerable theoretical interest. It also turns out to be highly consequential as a practical matter.

To demonstrate, we developed a survey instrument for exploring determinations of ambiguity …


Looking For Fair Use In The Dmca's Safety Dance, Ira Nathenson Jan 2009

Looking For Fair Use In The Dmca's Safety Dance, Ira Nathenson

Ira Steven Nathenson

Like a ballet, the notice-and-take-down provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA") provide complex procedures to obtain take-downs of online infringement. Copyright owners send notices of infringement to service providers, who in turn remove claimed infringement in exchange for a statutory safe harbor from copyright liability. But like a dance meant for two, the DMCA is less effective in protecting the "third wheel," the users of internet services. Even Senator John McCain - who in 1998 voted for the DMCA - wrote in exasperation to YouTube after some of his presidential campaign videos were removed due to take-downs. McCain …


John Mccain's Citizenship: A Tentative Defense, Stephen E. Sachs Aug 2008

John Mccain's Citizenship: A Tentative Defense, Stephen E. Sachs

Stephen E. Sachs

Sen. John McCain was born a U.S. citizen and is eligible to be president. The most serious challenge to his status, recently posed by Prof. Gabriel Chin, contends that the statute granting citizenship to Americans born abroad did not include the Panama Canal Zone, where McCain was born in 1936. When Congress amended the law in 1937, he concludes, it was too late for McCain to be "natural born." Even assuming, however, that McCain's citizenship depended on this statute - and ignoring his claim to citizenship at common law - Chin's argument may be based on a misreading. When the …


Why Arbitrate? The Questionable Quest For Efficiency In Hallstreet Street Associates, Llc V. Mattel, Inc., 550 U.S. __ (2008), David K. Kessler Jul 2008

Why Arbitrate? The Questionable Quest For Efficiency In Hallstreet Street Associates, Llc V. Mattel, Inc., 550 U.S. __ (2008), David K. Kessler

David K Kessler

The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) makes arbitration agreements between private parties legally enforceable. The policy favoring arbitration underlying the FAA has been justified as serving two ends: it protects freedom of contract, and it creates an efficient alternative dispute resolution system. Previous decisions by the Court have indicated a belief that, when those two goals come into conflict, the result that preserves freedom of contract should prevail. In Hallstreet Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., however, a recent case involving the Federal Arbitration Act, the Court's decision preserved perceived efficiency at the expense of freedom of contract. The Court held that …


The Problematic Nature Of Contractionist Statutory Interpretations, Brian G. Slocum May 2008

The Problematic Nature Of Contractionist Statutory Interpretations, Brian G. Slocum

Brian G. Slocum

The main thesis of Daniel B. Rodriguez and Barry R. Weingast's recent article, The Paradox of Expansionist Statutory Interpretations, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1207 (2007), is important: the voting decisions of legislators can be influenced by the activist statutory interpretations of courts. Specifically, the authors demonstrate that the broad interpretations of progressive legislation made by courts in the 1960s and 1970s undermined the legislative deals struck between ardent supporters of progressive legislation and the moderate legislators necessary for passage of the statutes. Although these expansionist interpretations broadened the reach of important progressive legislation, they had the effect of discouraging …


Hamdan V. Rumsfeld: A Legislative History Smorgasbord, John J. Miller Mar 2008

Hamdan V. Rumsfeld: A Legislative History Smorgasbord, John J. Miller

John J. Miller II

The Supreme Court in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld denied the government’s motion to dismiss the habeas appeal of Hamdan, bin Laden’s driver, who was being held at Guantanamo Bay. The majority, led by Justice Stevens, determined that the recently passed Detainee Treatment Act (DTA), which eliminated federal court jurisdiction to hear habeas appeals from detainees held at Guantanamo Bay, did not apply to pending cases, like Hamdan’s. This interpretation was supposedly strongly buttressed by the legislative history of the DTA. This essay outlines the arguments of the opponents and proponents of the use of legislative history, and then juxtaposes these arguments …


Searching For Chevron In Muddy Watters: The Roberts Court And Judicial Review Of Agency Regulations, Ann Graham Jan 2008

Searching For Chevron In Muddy Watters: The Roberts Court And Judicial Review Of Agency Regulations, Ann Graham

ann graham

SEARCHING FOR CHEVRON IN MUDDY WATTERS: THE ROBERTS COURT AND JUDICIAL REVIEW OF AGENCY REGULATIONS

Ann Graham

Abstract

In April 2007, the U.S. Supreme Court delivered its opinion in Watters v. Wachovia. The majority opinion did not invoke the classic administrative law analysis prescribed by the Two-Step Chevron Doctrine, which for more than twenty years has been the foundation of determining judicial deference to agency regulations. The Watters case presented a golden opportunity to clarify the Chevron Doctrine. Instead of taking that expected path, the Supreme Court dodged Chevron altogether – raising serious issues about why and what may be …


Why John Mccain Was A Citizen At Birth, Stephen E. Sachs Jan 2008

Why John Mccain Was A Citizen At Birth, Stephen E. Sachs

Stephen E. Sachs

Senator John McCain was born a citizen in 1936. Professor Gabriel J. Chin challenges this view in this Symposium, arguing that McCain’s birth in the Panama Canal Zone (while his father was stationed there by the Navy) fell into a loophole in the governing statute. The best historical evidence, however, suggests that this loophole is an illusion and that McCain is a "natural born Citizen" eligible to be president.


Why Supreme Court Justices Cite Legislative History: An Empirical Investigation, David S. Law, David Zaring Jan 2008

Why Supreme Court Justices Cite Legislative History: An Empirical Investigation, David S. Law, David Zaring

David S. Law

Much of the social science literature on judicial behavior has focused on the impact of ideology on how judges vote. For the most part, however, legal scholars have been reluctant to embrace empirical scholarship that fails to address the impact of legal constraints and the means by which judges reason their way to particular outcomes. This Article attempts to integrate and address the concerns of both audiences by way of an empirical examination of the Supreme Court’s use of a particular interpretive technique – namely, the use of legislative history to determine the purpose and meaning of a statute. We …


Toward Normative Rules For Agency Interpretation: Defining Jurisdiction Under The Clean Water Act, Robert R.M. Verchick Jan 2004

Toward Normative Rules For Agency Interpretation: Defining Jurisdiction Under The Clean Water Act, Robert R.M. Verchick

Robert R.M. Verchick

Wetlands advocates, from environmentalists to duck hunters, dodged a bullet last year when the Bush Administration dropped plans to narrow its jurisdiction over streams and wetlands. The decision marked a key chapter in a story that began in 2001, when the Supreme Court invalidated part of the Migratory Bird Rule, a regulation that for many years had supported federal protection over some intrastate wetlands. The Court's broad rejection of this narrow rule sent federal jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act into a tailspin. The decision opened debates about tributaries and intermittent streams in the Southwest. It also appeared to narrow …