Law Commons^™

Statutory Constraints And Constitutional Decisionmaking, Anthony O'Rourke

Anthony O'Rourke

Although constitutional scholars frequently analyze the relationships between courts and legislatures, they rarely examine the relationship between courts and statutes. This Article is the first to systematically examine how the presence or absence of a statute can influence constitutional doctrine. It analyzes pairs of cases that raise similar constitutional questions, but differ with respect to whether the court is reviewing the constitutionality of legislation. These case pairs suggest that statutes place significant constraints on constitutional decisionmaking. Specifically, in cases that involve a challenge to a statute, courts are less inclined to use doctrine to regulate the behavior of nonjudicial officials. …

King V. Burwell And The Rise Of The Administrative State, Ronald D. Rotunda

Ronald D. Rotunda

The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) is a complex law totaling nearly a thousand pages in length. The litigation now before the Supreme Court in King v. Burwell presents, on the surface, a simple issue of statutory interpretation. However, that surface has a very thin veneer. If the Court allows administrators carte blanche to change the very words of a statute, we will have come a long way towards governance by bureaucrats. Over the years, Congress has delegated many of its powers, but it has never delegated the power to raise taxes or spend tax subsidies in ways …

As 24.25.065, A Statute Devolved From Aristotle's Rhetoric, Peter J. Aschenbrenner

Peter J. Aschenbrenner

The legislative council shall annually examine, AS 24.20.065(a) provides in paraphrase, published opinions of state courts that rely on state statutes if the opinions indicate unclear or ambiguous statutes. Our Constitutional Logic examines the collaboration theory of lawmakers, on the codelaw and caselaw side of the ledger.

As 24.25.065, A Statute Devolved From Aristotle's Rhetoric, Peter J. Aschenbrenner

Peter J. Aschenbrenner

The legislative council shall annually examine, AS 24.20.065(a) provides in paraphrase, published opinions of state courts that rely on state statutes if the opinions indicate unclear or ambiguous statutes. Our Constitutional Logic examines the collaboration theory of lawmakers, on the codelaw and caselaw side of the ledger.

Interpreting Force Authorization, Scott Sullivan

Scott Sullivan

Is The Supreme Court Disabling The Enabling Act, Or Is Shady Grove Just Another Bad Opera?, Robert J. Condlin

Robert J. Condlin

After seventy years of trying, the Supreme Court has yet to agree on whether the Rules Enabling Act articulates a one or two part standard for determining the validity of a Federal Rule. Is it enough that a Federal Rule regulates “practice and procedure,” or must it also not “abridge substantive rights”? The Enabling Act seems to require both, but the Court is not so sure, and the costs of its uncertainty are real. Among other things, litigants must guess whether the decision to apply a Federal Rule in a given case will depend upon predictable ritual, judicial power grab, …

The Mask Of Virtue: Theories Of Aretaic Legislation In A Public Choice Perspective, Donald J. Kochan

Donald J. Kochan

Holdings, Dicta, And The Paradigms Of Precedent, Randy J. Kozel

Randy J Kozel

In United States v. Windsor, the Supreme Court invalidated a key provision of the federal Defense of Marriage Act. In doing so, it raised significant questions about the power of states to limit the institution of marriage to opposite-sex couples. That issue was not presented in Windsor itself, but Windsor’s reasoning and rhetoric have already begun to play a pivotal role in ensuing challenges to state laws. Determining the future effects of Windsor, or of any other Supreme Court decision, requires defining the scope of judicial precedent. One account of precedent is restrictive: Only a court’s holdings must …

Direct Democracy And Hastily Enacted Statutes, John C. Nagle

John Copeland Nagle

No abstract provided.

The Supreme Court, Cafa, And Parens Patriae Actions: Will It Be Principles Or Biases?, Donald G. Gifford, William L. Reynolds

William L. Reynolds

The Supreme Court will hear a case during its 2013-2014 term that will test the principles of both its conservative and liberal wings. In Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp., Justices from each wing of the Court will be forced to choose between the modes of statutory interpretation they usually have favored in the past and their previously displayed pro-business or anti-business predispositions. The issue is whether the defendant-manufacturers can remove an action brought by a state attorney general suing as parens patriae to federal court. Beginning with their actions against tobacco manufacturers in the mid-1990s, state …

Against Constitutional Mainstreaming, Bertrall L. Ross

Bertrall L Ross

Courts interpret statutes in hard cases. Statutes are frequently ambiguous, and an enacting legislature cannot foresee all future applications of a statute. The Supreme Court in these cases often chooses statutory interpretations that privilege the values that it has emphasized in its recent constitutional jurisprudence. In doing so, the Court rejects alternative interpretations that are more consistent with the values embodied in more recently enacted statutes. This is constitutional mainstreaming—an interpretive practice that molds statutes toward the Court’s own preferred values and away from values favored by legislative majorities.

In addition to providing a novel descriptive framework for what the …

Severability Of Statutes, Tom Campbell

Tom Campbell

Courts legislate when they engage in "severability analysis", allowing part of a law to continue in force, after having struck down other parts as unconstitutional. This is flawed for the same reason that the legislative veto and the executive line-item veto are flawed. All involve creating a legislative outcome without the joint approval of both houses and the executive. The practice derives from an analogy to contract enforcement, where a court will try to preserve part of a contract when the rest is unenforceable. However, the analogy is imperfect because Congress and the state legislature remain in a position to …