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Articles 1 - 15 of 15
Full-Text Articles in Law
The Paradoxical Impact Of Scalia's Campaign Against Legislative History, Stuart Minor Benjamin, Kristen M. Renberg
The Paradoxical Impact Of Scalia's Campaign Against Legislative History, Stuart Minor Benjamin, Kristen M. Renberg
Cornell Law Review
Beginning in 1985, Judge and then Justice Antonin Scalia advocated forcefully against the use of legislative history in statutory interpretation. Justice Scalia's position, in line with his textualism, was that legislative history was irrelevant and judges should avoid invoking it. Reactions to his attacks among Justices and prominent circuit judges had an ideological quality, with greater support from ideological conservatives. In this Article, we consider the role that political party and timing ofjudicial nomination played in circuit judges' use of legislative history. Specifically, we hypothesize that Republican circuit judges were more likely to respond to the attacks on legislative history …
Chevron Is A Rorschach Test Ink Blot, Jack M. Beermann
Chevron Is A Rorschach Test Ink Blot, Jack M. Beermann
Faculty Scholarship
I agree with Alan Morrison that, in some circumstances, courts should defer to legal determinations made by administrative agencies. I disagree, however, with Alan’s view that Chevron provides a suitable framework for such deference. It really boils down to my disagreement with the first sentence of Alan’s article: “In Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., the Supreme Court unanimously adopted an approach to interpreting federal statutes under which the courts are required to give substantial deference to the interpretations by the administrative agencies that enforce them.”1 In fact, the Supreme Court adopted nothing in Chevron related to …
Making The Peg Fit The Hole: A Superior Solution To The Inherant Problems Of Incorporated Definitions, Lindsey P. Gustafson
Making The Peg Fit The Hole: A Superior Solution To The Inherant Problems Of Incorporated Definitions, Lindsey P. Gustafson
University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review
No abstract provided.
Introduction To The Micro-‐‑Symposium On Scalia & Garner's “Reading Law”:The Textualist Technician, Karen Petroski
Introduction To The Micro-‐‑Symposium On Scalia & Garner's “Reading Law”:The Textualist Technician, Karen Petroski
All Faculty Scholarship
Recently, the Green Bag issued a call for short (1,000 words) essays on Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts, by Antonin Scalia and Bryan Garner. We sought “[a]ny theoretical, empirical, or practical commentary that will help readers better understand the book.” The result is this micro-symposium. Our call drew dozens of micro-essays, some thought-provoking, some chuckle-prompting, and some both. Blessed with an abundance of good work but cursed by a shortage of space, we were compelled to select a small set – representative and excellent – of those essays to publish in the Green Bag and its sibling publication, …
On Reading The Language Of Statutes (Book Review), Linda D. Jellum
On Reading The Language Of Statutes (Book Review), Linda D. Jellum
University of Massachusetts Law Review
Linda D. Jellum reviews Lawrence M. Solan, The Language of Statutes: Laws and Their Interpretation (The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2010), ISBN-13: 978-0-226-76796-3.
Using Ethics Codes To Reinforce Lessons Of Statutory Interpretation, Edward R. Becker
Using Ethics Codes To Reinforce Lessons Of Statutory Interpretation, Edward R. Becker
Articles
To increase my students' exposure to statutory interpretation, I assign them early in the second semester to argue a motion to disqualify counsel based on imputed disqualification under Michigan's ethics ruls. Interpreting ethics rules involves many of the same "pure" statutory interpretation techniques I introduced the previous semester, and the students appear to easily make any needed translations. This exercise also helps prepare students to interpret other quasi-legislative authorities like court or evidentiary rules, administrative codes, and municipal ordinances.
The Role Of Purposivism In The Delegation Of Rulemaking Authority To The Courts, Michael Rosensaft
The Role Of Purposivism In The Delegation Of Rulemaking Authority To The Courts, Michael Rosensaft
ExpressO
The courts are often used by Congress as a “political lightning rod,” when Congress cannot decide how to resolve an issue. Congress relies on administrative agencies for their expertise, and it also makes sense for Congress to delegate some rulemaking authority to the courts, relying on a court’s expertise in developing caselaw in an incremental basis. However, this authority should not be lightly implied. A court can tell that Congress has delegated rulemaking authority to it when the purpose of the statute is clear and the text is broadly worded. It thus makes sense in these cases that purposivism should …
Legislative History And Statutory Interpretation: The Supreme Court And The Tenth Circuit, Fritz Snyder
Legislative History And Statutory Interpretation: The Supreme Court And The Tenth Circuit, Fritz Snyder
Faculty Law Review Articles
The author analyzed all the U.S. Supreme Court cases and all the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals cases for the calendar year 1995 to see how heavily legislative history was used to interpret statutes. The author begins this article by discussing the different theories of statutory interpretation, noting how legislative history fits into the picture and observing the reliance on dictionaries for interpreting words and phrases. The author also looks to see what use is being made of administrative interpretations of statutes and how that ties in with legislative history. Finally, the author looks at how U.S. Supreme Court justices …
Law And Linguistics: Is There Common Ground?, William D. Popkin
Law And Linguistics: Is There Common Ground?, William D. Popkin
Articles by Maurer Faculty
No abstract provided.
Controlling Inadvertent Ambiguity In The Logical Structure Of Legal Drafting By Means Of The Prescribed Definitions Of The A-Hohfeld Structural Language, Layman E. Allen, Charles S. Saxon
Controlling Inadvertent Ambiguity In The Logical Structure Of Legal Drafting By Means Of The Prescribed Definitions Of The A-Hohfeld Structural Language, Layman E. Allen, Charles S. Saxon
Articles
Two principal sources of imprecision in legal drafting (vagueness and ambiguity) are identified and illustrated. Virtually all of the ambiguity imprecision encountered in legal discourse is ambiguity in the language used to express logical structure, and virtually all of· the imprecision resulting is inadvertent. On the other hand, the imprecision encountered in legal writing that results from vagueness is frequently, if not most often, included there deliberately; the drafter has considered it and decided that the vague language· best accomplishes the purpose at hand. This paper focuses on the use of some defined terminology for minimizing inadvertent ambiguity in the …
That Obscure Object Of Desire: Hermeneutics And The Autonomous Legal Text, Paul Campos
That Obscure Object Of Desire: Hermeneutics And The Autonomous Legal Text, Paul Campos
Publications
No abstract provided.
Book Review, Paul Campos
Law And Language: The Role Of Pragmatics In Statutory Interpretation, M. B.W. Sinclair
Law And Language: The Role Of Pragmatics In Statutory Interpretation, M. B.W. Sinclair
Articles by Maurer Faculty
In everyday conversation social conventions constrain our speech and aid understanding of the speech of others. These social conventions have been analyzed by the philosopher H.P. Grice and others. Professor Sinclair explores the applicability of such conventions to statutes and thereby derives a set of pragmatic rules of statutory construction. These rules explain some of the intuitions underlying "canons of construction" and their limitations and provide a basis for understanding and for criticizing some important judicial decisions.
Statutory Interpretation: The Uses And Anatomy Of Context, Reed Dickerson
Statutory Interpretation: The Uses And Anatomy Of Context, Reed Dickerson
Articles by Maurer Faculty
Every communication that is generated by a written instrument consists of two elements which must be considered in arriving at the meaning of the communication. Those elements are: (1) the written vehicle itself, and (2) its surrounding context. The surrounding context which thus completes the communication consists only of those underlying cultural aspects which, when considered in relation to the written vehicle, are: (1) relevant to the written vehicle, (2) reliable, (3) shared by the author and the audience, and (4) relied on by both author and audience to complete the communication. The author suggests that those cultural elements which …
Cooperative Action For Improved Statutory Interpretation, Frank Edward Horack Jr.
Cooperative Action For Improved Statutory Interpretation, Frank Edward Horack Jr.
Articles by Maurer Faculty
No abstract provided.