Law Commons^™

The Stare Decisis "Exception" To The Chevron Deference Rule, Rebecca White

Scholarly Works

In this article, the author discusses how Chevron intersects with one important competing norm - stare decisis. Stare decisis counsels the Court to adhere to its own decisions, particularly statutory ones, absent substantial justification for departure. To what extent should stare decisis apply when an agency's interpretation of a statute, otherwise deserving of deference under Chevron, conflicts with a prior interpretation of the statute by the Supreme Court?

This article suggests the following answer: If the Court's prior opinion upheld the agency's interpretation as one reasonable reading of the statute, but not the only one possible, and the agency thereafter …

Modern Statutes, Loose Canons, And The Limits Of Practical Reason: A Response To Farber And Ross, Edward L. Rubin

Vanderbilt Law Review

Daniel Farber' and Stephen Ross, in separate contributions to this Symposium, raise the most crucial question in modern statutory interpretation, a question that exposes the profound triviality of the canons of statutory construction that Karl Llewellyn so effectively attacked. Ross points out that the legislature can control, or at least attempt to control, the judicial use of the canons by the way it drafts the statute and by effective use of supplementary materials such as mark-ups, committee reports, and floor debates. Farber, in his critique of formalism, demonstrates that formalist interpretation is an impediment to effective statutory drafting. Inherent in …

Where Have You Gone, Karl Llewellyn? Should Congress Turn Its Lonely Eyes To You?, Stephen F. Ross

Vanderbilt Law Review

Over forty years ago, in the Symposium we commemorate today, Professor Karl Llewellyn wrote a devastating critique of the canons of statutory construction. For virtually every canon of construction, he demonstrated that there was another canon that could be employed to reach the opposite result. His point was not to be critical, but to argue proscriptively that the process of statutory construction requires an interpretation in light of a judicial determination of "some assumed purpose."'

Other commentators, both before and after the publication of Llewellyn's magnificent contribution to the Vanderbilt Law Review, have taken a different approach. These observers have …

The Canons Of Statutory Construction And Judicial Preferences, Jonathan R. Macey, Geoffrey P. Miller

Vanderbilt Law Review

A regrettable side-effect of Karl Llewellyn's interesting critique of the canons of statutory construction was that intellectual debate about the canons was derailed for almost a quarter of a century. In his critique, Professor Llewellyn purported to show that the canons of statutory construction were useless as rules for guiding decisions. His claim, that every canon could be countered by an equal and opposite counter- canon, transformed the canons from exalted neutral principles into "conclusory explanations appended after the fact to justify results reached on other grounds."

This Article's first goal is to demonstrate that Karl Llewellyn's critique was largely …

The Canons Of Statutory Construction And Judicial Constraints: A Response To Macey And Miller, Lawrence C. Marshall

Vanderbilt Law Review

Professors Jonathan Macey and Geoffrey Miller claim to have set out to provide a positivist explanation for why judges ever invoke canons in the course of interpreting statutes.' In truth, though, their question is a far broader one. What they really seek to explain is why judges ever use any interpretive tools in the course of interpreting statutes. Why, Macey and Miller want to know, don't judges simply decide what result in the case will best promote a good outcome on the grounds of public policy, intrinsic fairness, economic efficiency or wealth maximization? This question is perplexing to Macey and …

Where Have You Gone, Karl Llewellyn - Should Congress Turn Its Lonely Eyes To You, Stephen F. Ross

Journal Articles

The purpose of this paper is to explore what, if anything, Congress should do about the canons of statutory construction to prevent judges who are more conservative (or perhaps, in a future era, more progressive) than the majority of the legislature from employing those canons to distort or frustrate legislative policy preferences.

Reforming The Law Of Gratuitous Transfers: The New Uniform Probate Code, John H. Langbein, Lawrence W. Waggoner

Articles

In the mid-1980s the Uniform Law Commission undertook a landmark revision of the American law of gratuitous transfers. These reforms culminated in a drastically revised Uniform Probate Code ("UPC"). The revisions inspired the Albany Law Review to organize this symposium issue for the purpose of examining the 1990 UPC. In this introductory paper, we point to the main themes of the reform movement, discuss some of the traits and constraints of the uniform law process, and comment on some of the suggestions and insights that appear in the symposium articles.

Immunity Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: Interpretive Approach And The Search For The Legislative Will, David J. Achtenberg

Faculty Works

The Supreme Court has long struggled with immunity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 is the principal statutory vehicle used to remedy constitutional violations committed by state and local officials. Expansion or contraction of official immunity under the statute effectively decreases or increases officials' incentives to avoid those violations. A broader immunity doctrine will lead to more constitutional violations. However, it will also lead to a greater willingness to attempt potentially useful innovations whose constitutionality has not yet been determined. A narrower immunity doctrine will reduce the number of constitutional violations. However, it will reduce officials' willingness to experiment. …