Law Commons^™

The Rhetorical Canons Of Construction: New Textualism's Rhetoric Problem, Charlie D. Stewart

Michigan Law Review

New Textualism is ascendant. Elevated to prominence by the late Justice Antonin Scalia and championed by others like Justice Neil Gorsuch, the method of interpretation occupies an increasingly dominant place in American jurisprudence. Yet, this Comment argues the proponents of New Textualism acted unfairly to reach this lofty perch. To reach this conclusion, this Comment develops and applies a framework to evaluate the rhetoric behind New Textualism: the rhetorical canons of construction. Through the rhetorical canons, this Comment demonstrates that proponents of New Textualism advance specious arguments, declare other methods illegitimate hypocritically, refuse to engage with the merits of their …

High-Stakes Interpretation, Ryan D. Doerfler

All Faculty Scholarship

Courts look at text differently in high-stakes cases. Statutory language that would otherwise be ‘unambiguous’ suddenly becomes ‘less than clear.’ This, in turn, frees up courts to sidestep constitutional conflicts, avoid dramatic policy changes, and, more generally, get around undesirable outcomes. The standard account of this behavior is that courts’ failure to recognize ‘clear’ or ‘unambiguous’ meanings in such cases is motivated or disingenuous, and, at best, justified on instrumentalist grounds.

This Article challenges that account. It argues instead that, as a purely epistemic matter, it is more difficult to ‘know’ what a text means—and, hence, more difficult to regard …

The Scrivener’S Error, Ryan D. Doerfler

Northwestern University Law Review

It is widely accepted that courts may correct legislative drafting mistakes, i.e., so-called scrivener’s errors, if and only if such mistakes are “absolutely clear.” The rationale is that if a court were to recognize a less clear error, it might be “rewriting” the statute rather than correcting a technical mistake.

This Article argues that the standard is much too strict. The current rationale ignores that courts can “rewrite,” i.e., misinterpret, a statute both by recognizing an error and by failing to do so. Accordingly, because the current doctrine is designed to protect against one type of mistake (false positives) but …

Where Have You Gone, Karl Llewellyn - Should Congress Turn Its Lonely Eyes To You, Stephen Ross

Stephen F Ross

The purpose of this paper is to explore what, if anything, Congress should do about the canons of statutory construction to prevent judges who are more conservative (or perhaps, in a future era, more progressive) than the majority of the legislature from employing those canons to distort or frustrate legislative policy preferences.

Reaganist Realism Comes To Detriot, Stephen Ross

Stephen F Ross

Part I of this article discusses Detroit Newspapers and explains how in deferring to the Attorney General's interpretation of the Newspaper Preservation Act, Judge Silberman disregarded every applicable technique of statutory interpretation typically used to resolve the issue. Indeed, each of these techniques suggests that Attorney General Meese's interpretation of the Act was incorrect. This part of the article also demonstrates why deference to Meese was particularly inappropriate in light of the generally accepted justifications for judicial deference to administrative interpretations of statutes.

Part II explains that Detroit Newspapers is one of several opinions by conservative Reagan judicial appointees that …

Beyond Severability, Lisa Marshall Manheim

Articles

Severability is a wrecking ball. Even the most cautious use of this doctrine demolishes statutes in contravention of legislative intent and without adequate justification. It does so through the imposition of an artificially restrictive framework: one that requires that courts respond to a statute’s constitutional flaw by disregarding that statute either in whole or in part. In the last few years alone, this framework has flattened the Voting Rights Act, threatened the Bankruptcy Code, and nearly toppled the Affordable Care Act.

Yet courts apply severability reflexively, never demanding justification for its destructive treatment. Scholars, meanwhile, assiduously debate the particulars of …

Federal Securities Fraud Litigation As A Lawmaking Partnership, Jill E. Fisch

All Faculty Scholarship

In its most recent Halliburton II decision, the Supreme Court rejected an effort to overrule its prior decision in Basic Inc. v. Levinson. The Court reasoned that adherence to Basic was warranted by principles of stare decisis that operate with “special force” in the context of statutory interpretation. This Article offers an alternative justification for adhering to Basic—the collaboration between the Court and Congress that has led to the development of the private class action for federal securities fraud. The Article characterizes this collaboration as a lawmaking partnership and argues that such a partnership offers distinctive lawmaking advantages. …

It Is Logic Rather Than Whom You Trust: A Rejoinder To Prof. Cohen, Douglas A. Kahn

Articles

This article is the continuation of an exchange that has taken place between Prof. Stephen B. Cohen and me concerning the validity of criticisms leveled by Chief Justice John Roberts on an opinion by then-Judge Sonia Sotomayor writing for the Second Circuit in the case of William L. Rudkin Testamentary Trust v. Commissioner. While affirming the Second Circuit’s decision, Chief Justice Roberts, writing for a unanimous Supreme Court, criticized and rejected Justice Sotomayor’s construction of the relevant statutory provision. In an article in the August 3, 2009, issue of Tax Notes, Cohen defended Justice Sotomayor’s construction of the statute and …

The Insurance Policy As Statute, Jeffrey W. Stempel

Scholarly Works

Insurance policies are classified as a subspecies of contract. Although the taxonomy is correct, rigid adherence to this classification system limits the legal system's ability to deal with some of the most problematic and frequently litigated questions of insurance coverage. Restricting conception of insurance policies to the contract model unduly limits analysis of the meaning and function of the policies. In addition, restricting characterization of insurance as a matter of “contract” does not necessarily produce swift, inexpensive, efficient, or uniform decisions (to say nothing about accuracy, justice, or fairness). Within contract law, scholars, and courts differ over the respective primacy …

Confirmatory Legislative History , James J. Brudney

Faculty Scholarship

Textualists and intentionalists regularly lock horns over the proper approach to construing statutory language regarded as inconclusive. The interpretive debate seems less contentious, however, when the words of the law are deemed clear. There may be reasonable disagreement as to whether the text at issue in a particular controversy has a plain meaning, but if it does then that meaning arguably preempts further inquiry. Since 1990, Supreme Court majority opinions are replete with declarations such as: "Given [a] straightforward statutory command, there is no reason to resort to legislative history"; or "we do not resort to legislative history to cloud …

Rudkin Testamentary Trust -- A Response To Prof. Cohen, Douglas A. Kahn

Articles

In the August 3 issue of Tax Notes, Prof. Stephen Cohen wrote an article about Justice Sonia Sotomayor’s opinions in three tax cases. Of those three cases, only the opinion she wrote in William L. Rudkin Testamentary Trust v. Commissioner, 467 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2006), Doc 2006- 21522, 2006 TNT 203-4, is worthy of comment. Although the Second Circuit’s decision in that case was affirmed by the Supreme Court under the name Knight v. Commissioner, the construction of the critical statutory language that Justice Sotomayor adopted was rejected and criticized by Chief Justice Roberts, writing for a unanimous court. …

Representation Reinforcement: A Legislative Solution To A Legislative Process Problem, Anita S. Krishnakumar

Faculty Publications

One of the most valuable—and disturbing—insights offered by public choice theory has been the recognition that wealthy, well-organized interests with narrow, intense preferences often dominate the legislative process while diffuse, unorganized interests go under-represented. Responding to this insight, legal scholars in the fields of statutory interpretation and administrative law have suggested that the solution to the problem of representational inequality lies with the courts. Indeed, over the past two decades, scholars in these fields have offered up a host of John Hart Ely-inspired representation reinforcing "canons of construction," designed to encourage judges to use their role as statutory interpreters to …

The Upc Addresses The Class-Gift And Intestacy Rights Of Children Of Assisted Reproduction Technologies, Lawrence W. Waggoner, Sheldon F. Kurtz

Articles

Editor's Synopsis: Recent years' advances in assisted reproduction technology have enabled the conception of children in ways in addition to the traditional way. The Uniform Probate Code was amended last year to address the status of children born from assisted reproductive technologies for intestacy and class-gift purposes. This article discusses the relevant UPC provisions and offers several hypothetical cases to show how they operate. The article concludes expressing the hope that states will consider the new UPC approach.

Is The Report Of Lazarus's Death Premature? A Reply To Cameron And Postlewaite, Douglas A. Kahn

Articles

Over a year ago, Ms. Faith Cuenin and I wrote an article in this Review (which I hereafter refer to as the "2004 Article") about the tax treatment of guaranteed payments under section 707(c) that are made in kind.' We concluded that a partnership does not recognize gain or loss on the making of a guaranteed payment with appreciated or depreciated property. We also concluded that the partner's basis in the property received will equal its fair market value at the time of payment, and that the payment does not affect the partner's outside basis in his partnership interest except …

From Presumed Fathers To Lesbian Mothers: Sex Discrimination And The Legal Construction Of Parenthood, Susan E. Dalton

Michigan Journal of Gender & Law

In Part I of this article, Dalton briefly reviews the way legal scholars commonly define sex-based discrimination, particularly as it pertains to issues of reproduction. Part II is a brief historical review of legal constructions of parenthood. In Part III, Dalton examines two legal concepts: retroactive legitimation and presumed fatherhood. Both concepts were introduced in 1872 and each independently encouraged judges to think of fatherhood as consisting of two distinct spheres, the biological and the social. She then traces the legal development of these concepts through a series of presumed father, retroactive legitimation, and putative father cases. In Part IV …

Recalibrating Federal Judicial Independence Symposium: Perspectives On Judicial Independence: Accountability And Separation Of Power Issues, James J. Brudney

Faculty Scholarship

It is well settled that independent courts play a vital role in promoting rule-of-law and separation-of-powers norms. At the same time, judicial independence must be reconciled with other values that we also wish to recognize as foundational. Professor Brudney addresses two areas of controversy that are associated with the celebration of judicial autonomy in our legal culture. He first discusses the role of political and personal background factors in shaping judicial selection and influencing judicial outcomes. He explains why both the President and Congress have come to rely increasingly on such background factors when seeking to anticipate the broad contours …

The Joy Of Teaching Legislation, Chai R. Feldblum

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

I am going to talk about teaching legislation, a class I have taught several times at Georgetown University Law Center, as well as teaching a federal legislation clinic, which I founded ten years ago at the law school. Bill Eskridge has done a wonderful job laying out the different ways one can teach a course in legislation; you will see that my approach focuses on teaching the skills that, as Bill also correctly noted, all young lawyers will need when they start practicing.

Linguistics In Law, Alani Golanski

Alani Golanski

The "new textualism" is amenable to the use of linguists in legal cases. New textualists seek to interpret statutes "objectively," according to the "plain meaning" of the statutory terms; these jurists and scholars see plain-meaning analysis as linguistics, and linguistics as science. Law and linguistics pursue different ends, however, and linguists construing statutes will miss legally decisive issues. Modern linguistics theory is an area of central concern to cognitive psychologists as well as philosophers of mind and language. While not hegemonic, Chomsky's psychological program influences modern linguistics, and the linguist's approach often leads in a different direction from that taken …

A New Approach To Statutory Interpretation In Washington, Philip A. Talmadge

Seattle University Law Review

In this article, I will first explore Washington's existing law, both statutory and judicial, on statutory interpretation. I will then evaluate the mechanisms for construing statutes derived from common law and legislative sources. Finally, I will recommend a new paradigm for statutory construction so that legislative intent may be more accurately conveyed to the courts, abandoning many of the time-encrusted canons in favor of principles of interpretation adhering more specifically to the legislature's actual statutory language.

Is The Clean Air Act Unconstitutional?, Cass R. Sunstein

Michigan Law Review

This Article deals with two linked questions. The first involves the future of the Clean Air Act. The particular concern is how the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") might be encouraged, with help from reviewing courts, to issue better ambient air quality standards, and in the process to shift from some of the anachronisms of 1970s environmentalism to a more fruitful approach to environmental protection. The second question involves the role of the nondelegation doctrine in American public law, a doctrine that shows unmistakable signs of revival. I will suggest that improved performance by EPA and agencies in general, operating in …

Judge-Made Insurance That Was Not On The Menu: Schmidt V. Smith And The Confluence Of Text, Expectation, And Public Policy In The Realm Of Employment Practices Liability, Jeffrey W. Stempel

Scholarly Works

In Schmidt v. Smith, the New Jersey Supreme Court caught more than a few observers by surprise. New Jersey courts have generally issued opinions regarded as pro-claimant and pro-policyholders. But everyone's taste for recompense and coverage has limits. In Schmidt, the court exceeded those limits for many observers by holding that despite what it regarded as clear contract language in an exclusion, an insurer providing Employers’ Liability (“EL”) coverage along with Workers' Compensation (“WC”) insurance for the employer was required to provide coverage in a case of blatant sexual harassment bordering on criminal assault. In doing so, the Schmidt court, …

Work Of Knowledge , Abner S. Greene

Faculty Scholarship

Interpretation involves the acquisition of knowledge. We are continually confronted with the results of purposive action. Sometimes these results are written texts, such as statutes or novels. Other times these results are events in the physical world, actions that we observe or the results of actions about which we are told. To make sense of these results of purposive action, that is, to make the results be more than just a jumble of sense impressions, the observer must find a way of organizing the material with which he or she is presented. These methods of organizing the results of purposive …

Where Have You Gone, Karl Llewellyn? Should Congress Turn Its Lonely Eyes To You?, Stephen F. Ross

Vanderbilt Law Review

Over forty years ago, in the Symposium we commemorate today, Professor Karl Llewellyn wrote a devastating critique of the canons of statutory construction. For virtually every canon of construction, he demonstrated that there was another canon that could be employed to reach the opposite result. His point was not to be critical, but to argue proscriptively that the process of statutory construction requires an interpretation in light of a judicial determination of "some assumed purpose."'

Other commentators, both before and after the publication of Llewellyn's magnificent contribution to the Vanderbilt Law Review, have taken a different approach. These observers have …

Modern Statutes, Loose Canons, And The Limits Of Practical Reason: A Response To Farber And Ross, Edward L. Rubin

Vanderbilt Law Review

Daniel Farber' and Stephen Ross, in separate contributions to this Symposium, raise the most crucial question in modern statutory interpretation, a question that exposes the profound triviality of the canons of statutory construction that Karl Llewellyn so effectively attacked. Ross points out that the legislature can control, or at least attempt to control, the judicial use of the canons by the way it drafts the statute and by effective use of supplementary materials such as mark-ups, committee reports, and floor debates. Farber, in his critique of formalism, demonstrates that formalist interpretation is an impediment to effective statutory drafting. Inherent in …

Where Have You Gone, Karl Llewellyn - Should Congress Turn Its Lonely Eyes To You, Stephen F. Ross

Journal Articles

The purpose of this paper is to explore what, if anything, Congress should do about the canons of statutory construction to prevent judges who are more conservative (or perhaps, in a future era, more progressive) than the majority of the legislature from employing those canons to distort or frustrate legislative policy preferences.

Reforming The Law Of Gratuitous Transfers: The New Uniform Probate Code, John H. Langbein, Lawrence W. Waggoner

Articles

In the mid-1980s the Uniform Law Commission undertook a landmark revision of the American law of gratuitous transfers. These reforms culminated in a drastically revised Uniform Probate Code ("UPC"). The revisions inspired the Albany Law Review to organize this symposium issue for the purpose of examining the 1990 UPC. In this introductory paper, we point to the main themes of the reform movement, discuss some of the traits and constraints of the uniform law process, and comment on some of the suggestions and insights that appear in the symposium articles.

The Rehnquist Court, Statutory Interpretation, Inertial Burdens, And A Misleading Version Of Democracy, Jeffrey W. Stempel

Scholarly Works

No one theory or school of thought consistently dominates judicial application of statutes, but the basic methodology employed by courts seems well-established if not always well-defined. Most mainstream judges and lawyers faced with a statutory construction task will look at (although with varying emphasis) the text of the statute, the legislative history of the provision, the context of the enactment, evident congressional purpose, and applicable agency interpretations, often employing the canons of construction for assistance. Although orthodox judicial thought suggests that the judge's role is confined to discerning textual meaning or directives of the enacting legislature, courts also often examine …

Reaganist Realism Comes To Detriot, Stephen F. Ross

Journal Articles

Part I of this article discusses Detroit Newspapers and explains how in deferring to the Attorney General's interpretation of the Newspaper Preservation Act, Judge Silberman disregarded every applicable technique of statutory interpretation typically used to resolve the issue. Indeed, each of these techniques suggests that Attorney General Meese's interpretation of the Act was incorrect. This part of the article also demonstrates why deference to Meese was particularly inappropriate in light of the generally accepted justifications for judicial deference to administrative interpretations of statutes.

Part II explains that Detroit Newspapers is one of several opinions by conservative Reagan judicial appointees that …

Legislative Enforcement Of Equal Protection, Stephen F. Ross

Journal Articles

This Article explores the legislative role in enforcing the constitutional guarantee to equal protection. Part I describes the underenforcement principle that explains the restrictive judicial exercise of authority in constitutional matters. The Article then focuses on Congress' role in examining issues relating to the constitutional guarantee of equal protection that the courts have chosen to underenforce. Part II analyzes relevant constitutional provisions that may empower or limit congressional actions. Part III considers ways in which Congress can address state violations of equal protection through directives to the judiciary and through the legislative process. Part IV details how both federal and …

Salute To A Great Legislative Draftsman: Elmer A. Driedger, Q. C., Reed Dickerson

Articles by Maurer Faculty

No abstract provided.