Law Commons^™

Pragmatism Rules, Elizabeth G. Porter

Articles

The Roberts Court’s decisions interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are reshaping the litigation landscape. Yet neither scholars, nor the Court itself, have articulated a coherent theory of interpretation for the Rules. This Article constructs a theory of Rules interpretation by discerning and critically examining the two starkly different methodologies the Roberts Court applies in its Rules cases. It traces the roots of both methodologies, explaining how they arise from — and reinforce — structural, linguistic, and epistemological tensions inherent in the Rules and the rulemaking process. Then, drawing from administrative law, it suggests a theoretical framework that accommodates …

Post-Kiobel Procedure: Subject Matter Jurisdiction Or Prescriptive Jurisdiction?, Anthony J. Colangelo, Christopher R. Knight

Faculty Journal Articles and Book Chapters

This essay evaluates whether Alien Tort Statute (ATS) cases involving foreign elements raise questions of prescriptive jurisdiction or subject matter jurisdiction after the Supreme Court’s decision in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum. It concludes that the lower court trend treats Kiobel as going to subject matter jurisdiction, and that this trend is probably correct. It would have been helpful for the Supreme Court to clearly provide guidance on this question — which has major doctrinal and procedural consequences for the law and litigants. The procedural implications of viewing challenges based on Kiobel as going to judicial subject matter jurisdiction are …

An Implausible Standard For Affirmative Defenses, Stephen Mayer

Michigan Law Review

In the wake of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the federal district courts split over whether to apply Twombly’s plausibility standard to the pleading of affirmative defenses. Initially, a majority of district courts extended Twombly to defense pleadings, but recently the courts that have declined to extend the plausibility standard have gained majority status. This Note provides a comprehensive analysis of each side of the plausibility split, identifying several hidden assumptions motivating the district courts’ decisions. Drawing from its analysis of the two opposing positions, this Note responds to the courts that have applied plausibility pleading …

Luddington V. Indiana Bell Telephone: The 1991 Civil Rights Act Is No Help In Pending Cases, William Wright Banks Jr.

Mercer Law Review

In Luddington v. Indiana Bell Telephone, the Seventh Circuit held that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 ("the Act") does not apply to suits pending on the effective date of the Act. In so holding, the court faced conflicts between Supreme Court precedent on the issue of when statutes become effective.

The Supreme Court cases deciding whether statutes are to be applied retroactively have been said to be "'in irreconcilable contradiction.' " In Bradley v. School Board of City of Richmond, the Supreme Court stated that statutes are presumed to apply to cases pending when the statute becomes …

Immunity Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: Interpretive Approach And The Search For The Legislative Will, David J. Achtenberg

Faculty Works

The Supreme Court has long struggled with immunity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 is the principal statutory vehicle used to remedy constitutional violations committed by state and local officials. Expansion or contraction of official immunity under the statute effectively decreases or increases officials' incentives to avoid those violations. A broader immunity doctrine will lead to more constitutional violations. However, it will also lead to a greater willingness to attempt potentially useful innovations whose constitutionality has not yet been determined. A narrower immunity doctrine will reduce the number of constitutional violations. However, it will reduce officials' willingness to experiment. …

The Rehnquist Court, Statutory Interpretation, Inertial Burdens, And A Misleading Version Of Democracy, Jeffrey W. Stempel

Scholarly Works

No one theory or school of thought consistently dominates judicial application of statutes, but the basic methodology employed by courts seems well-established if not always well-defined. Most mainstream judges and lawyers faced with a statutory construction task will look at (although with varying emphasis) the text of the statute, the legislative history of the provision, the context of the enactment, evident congressional purpose, and applicable agency interpretations, often employing the canons of construction for assistance. Although orthodox judicial thought suggests that the judge's role is confined to discerning textual meaning or directives of the enacting legislature, courts also often examine …