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Articles 1 - 6 of 6
Full-Text Articles in Law
Identifying And (Re)Formulating Prophylactic Rules, Safe Harbors, And Incidental Rights In Constitutional Criminal Procedure, Susan R. Klein
Identifying And (Re)Formulating Prophylactic Rules, Safe Harbors, And Incidental Rights In Constitutional Criminal Procedure, Susan R. Klein
Michigan Law Review
The Miranda conundrum runs something like this. If the Miranda decision represents true constitutional interpretation, and all unwarned statements taken during custodial interrogation are "compelled" within the meaning of the Self-Incrimination Clause, the impeachment and "fruits" exceptions to Miranda should fall. If it is not true constitutional interpretation, than the Court has no business reversing state criminal convictions for its violation. I offer here what I hope is a satisfying answer to this conundrum, on both descriptive and normative levels, that justifies not only Miranda but a host of similar Warren, Burger, and Rehnquist Court decisions as well. In Part …
'The Question Is Which Is To Be Master - That's All': Cunningham, Claiborne, Rita And The Sixth Amendment Muddle, Frank O. Bowman Iii
'The Question Is Which Is To Be Master - That's All': Cunningham, Claiborne, Rita And The Sixth Amendment Muddle, Frank O. Bowman Iii
Faculty Publications
Three things are clear from the Supreme Court's opinion in Cunningham v. California, in which the Court struck down California's sentencing law as violative of the Sixth Amendment, and from the briefs in the pending cases involving post-Booker federal sentencing, Claiborne v. United States and Rita v. United States. First, the Supreme Court has plunged Sixth Amendment sentencing law deep down the rabbit hole. Second, both the government and petitioners in Claiborne and Rita have adopted indefensible positions. Third, neither the parties nor the amici in Rita and Claiborne have offered the Court any real help in crafting a sensible …
Free-Standing Due Process And Criminal Procedure: The Supreme Court's Search For Interpretive Guidelines, Jerold H. Israel
Free-Standing Due Process And Criminal Procedure: The Supreme Court's Search For Interpretive Guidelines, Jerold H. Israel
Articles
When I was first introduced to the constitutional regulation of criminal procedure in the mid-1950s, a single issue dominated the field: To what extent did the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment impose upon states the same constitutional restraints that the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Eighth Amendments imposed upon the federal government? While those Bill of Rights provisions, as even then construed, imposed a broad range of constitutional restraints upon the federal criminal justice system, the federal system was (and still is) minuscule as compared to the combined systems of the fifty states. With the Bill of Rights provisions …
A Claim For Third Party Standing In America's Prisons, N. Jeremi Duru
A Claim For Third Party Standing In America's Prisons, N. Jeremi Duru
Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals
No abstract provided.
Dna Typing: Emerging Or Neglected Issues, David H. Kaye, Edward J. Imwinkelried
Dna Typing: Emerging Or Neglected Issues, David H. Kaye, Edward J. Imwinkelried
Journal Articles
DNA typing has had a major impact on the criminal justice system. There are hundreds of opinions and thousands of cases dealing with DNA evidence. Yet, at virtually every stage of the process, there are important issues that are just emerging or that have been neglected.
At the investigative stage, courts have barely begun to focus on the legal limitations on the power of the police to obtain samples directly from suspects and to use the data from DNA samples in various ways. Issues such as the propriety of "DNA dragnets" (in which large numbers of individuals in a geographic …
Confronting The Reluctant Accomplice, John G. Douglass
Confronting The Reluctant Accomplice, John G. Douglass
Law Faculty Publications
The Supreme Court treats the Confrontation Clause as a rule of evidence that excludes unreliable hearsay. But where the hearsay declarant is an accomplice who refuses to testify at defendant's trial, the Court's approach leads prosecutors and defendants to ignore real opportunities for confrontation, while they debate the reliability of hearsay. And even where the Court's doctrine excludes hearsay, it leads prosecutors to purchase the accomplice's testimony through a process that raises equally serious questions of reliability. Thus, the Court's approach promotes neither reliability nor confrontation. This Article advocates an approach that applies the Confrontation Clause to hearsay declarants in …