Law Commons^™

This Isn't A Reality Show: How Social Media Livestreams Of High-Profile Criminal Trials May Violate One's Right To A Fair Trial, Ryan Fenn

St. John's Law Review

(Excerpt)

Since the invention of television in 1927, the American legal system faced drastic changes. In 1935, the first trial was broadcast to the public in the case of Bruno Hauptmann. During the trial, “[e]laborate telegraph equipment” was installed in the courtroom, with “sound and motion picture equipment . . . plainly visible in the [courtroom] balcony.” From 1935 on, broadcasting technology has been utilized in the courtroom to convey the inner workings of certain courts to the public, which has stimulated debate over whether the use of this technology is conducive to a fair trial under the Sixth and …

Taking The Gavel Away From The Executive Branch: The Indeterminate Sentencing Scheme Under S.B. 201 Is Ripe For Review And Unconstitutional, Jessica Crtalic

Cleveland State Law Review

In 2019, Senate Bill 201, also known as the Reagan Tokes Act, reintroduced an indeterminate sentencing scheme in Ohio whereby sentences are assigned in the form of a range. Under this sentencing scheme, the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction, through the parole board, has discretion to retain an inmate past the presumptive release date. This fails to afford the accused their guaranteed right to a jury trial, improperly places judiciary power in the hands of the executive branch, and scrutinizes the violation of due process such that the defendant is being denied a fair hearing and notice. Not only …

You Have The Right To Remain Silent, And It Can And Will Be Used Against You: Addressing Post-Arrest Pre-Miranda Silence, Maria P. Hirakis

Touro Law Review

The right to remain silent has long been recognized by the Supreme Court as requiring a high degree of protection. Since Miranda v. Arizona was decided in 1966, procedural safeguards have been put in place to inform individuals of this right upon arrest. Yet, a gray area exists when it comes to the use of an individual's silence post-arrest. It may surprise some that a point in time exists when an individual has not yet been read their Miranda rights post-arrest. Several circuit courts have taken the position that any silence that follows arrest but precedes the reading of Miranda …

Judges Do It Better: Why Judges Can (And Should) Decide Life Or Death, Andrew R. Ford

Dickinson Law Review (2017-Present)

Following its decision in Furman v. Georgia, the Supreme Court of the United States has attempted to standardize procedures that states use to subject offenders to the ultimate penalty. In practice, this attempt at standardization has divided capital sentencing into two distinct parts: the death eligibility decision and the death selection decision. The eligibility decision addresses whether the sentencer may impose the death penalty, while the selection decision determines who among that limited subset of eligible offenders is sentenced to death. In Ring v. Arizona, the Court held for the first time that the Sixth Amendment right to …

The New Impartial Jury Mandate, Richard Lorren Jolly

Michigan Law Review

Impartiality is the cornerstone of the Constitution’s jury trial protections. Courts have historically treated impartiality as procedural in nature, meaning that the Constitution requires certain prophylactic procedures that secure a jury that is more likely to reach verdicts impartially. But in Peña- Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855 (2017), the Supreme Court recognized for the first time an enforceable, substantive component to the mandate. There, the Court held that criminal litigants have a Sixth Amendment right to jury decisions made without reliance on extreme bias, specifically on the basis of race or national origin. The Court did not …

Reciprocal Immunity, Colin Miller

Indiana Law Journal

This essay advances a reciprocal rights theory. It argues that the Constitution precludes statutes and rules from providing nonreciprocal benefits to the State when the lack of reciprocity interferes with the defendant’s ability to secure a fair trial, unless reciprocity would implicate a significant state interest. Therefore, unless a significant State interest is involved, a grant of immunity to a prosecution witness should trigger reciprocal immunity to a directly contradictory defense witness.

Mu'min V. Virginia: Sixth And Fourteenth Amendments Do Not Compel Content Questions In Assessing Juror Impartiality, Cheryl A. Waddle

Akron Law Review

This note synopsizes the Supreme Court's prior decisions regarding the adequacy of voir dire in capital cases surrounded by prejudicial pretrial publicity. This note will then discuss Mu'Min and explore the weaknesses in the Court's analogies to its prior decisions. Next, the note will propose arguments in favor of mandating content questioning. Finally, this note will explore possible nonconstitutional reasons for requiring content questioning in cases where juror partiality should be presumed.

Edmonson V. Leesville Concrete Company: Pre-Empting Prejudice, Andrea K. Huston

Akron Law Review

In Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., the United States Supreme Court decided the issue of whether parties in a civil case may use their peremptory challenges to exclude black venirepersons from the jury.

This Note will discuss the various limitations that courts have placed on the use of peremptory challenges, and the position of the Supreme Court. This Note will also discuss the Court's expansion of the state action doctrine, and the impact Edmonson will have on future cases.

Appellate Division, Fourth Department, People V. Mcfarley, Erica R. Borgese

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

Disentangling Symmetries: Speech, Association, Parenthood, Laurence H. Tribe

Pepperdine Law Review

No abstract provided.

Some Effects Of Identity-Based Social Movements On Constitutional Law In The Twentieth Century, William N. Eskridge Jr.

Michigan Law Review

What motivated big changes in constitutional law doctrine during the twentieth century? Rarely did important constitutional doctrine or theory change because of formal amendments to the document's text, and rarer still because scholars or judges "discovered" new information about the Constitution's original meaning. Precedent and common law reasoning were the mechanisms by which changes occurred rather than their driving force. My thesis is that most twentieth century changes in the constitutional protection of individual rights were driven by or in response to the great identity-based social movements ("IBSMs") of the twentieth century. Race, sex, and sexual orientation were markers of …

Identifying And (Re)Formulating Prophylactic Rules, Safe Harbors, And Incidental Rights In Constitutional Criminal Procedure, Susan R. Klein

Michigan Law Review

The Miranda conundrum runs something like this. If the Miranda decision represents true constitutional interpretation, and all unwarned statements taken during custodial interrogation are "compelled" within the meaning of the Self-Incrimination Clause, the impeachment and "fruits" exceptions to Miranda should fall. If it is not true constitutional interpretation, than the Court has no business reversing state criminal convictions for its violation. I offer here what I hope is a satisfying answer to this conundrum, on both descriptive and normative levels, that justifies not only Miranda but a host of similar Warren, Burger, and Rehnquist Court decisions as well. In Part …

Right To Counsel, Supreme Court, Appellate Division Second Department, People V. Taylor

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

Constitutional Constraints On The Admissibility Of Grand Jury Testimony: The Unavailable Witness, Confrontation, And Due Process, Barbara L. Strack

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

Defendants, however, have raised serious constitutional objections to the introduction of grand jury testimony when the witness is unavailable to testify at trial. These claims have focused on the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment and the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. Defendants have contended that the introduction of testimony from a grand jury proceeding which cannot be subjected to cross-examination fatally compromises the defendant's right to a fair trial. Lower courts are split over admitting grand jury testimony in these circumstances, and the Supreme Court has yet to rule on the issue. As a result, …

Right To Counsel In Criminal Cases, Edward T. Haggins

Cleveland State Law Review

"The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law... He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step of the proceedings against him." These words, written in 1932 by Mr. Justice Sutherland for the majority in the famous case of Powell v. Alabama underline the fundamental right of a defendant in American criminal proceeding to have the assistance of counsel.

Betts V. Brady Twenty Years Later: The Right To Counself And Due Process Values, Yale Kamisar

Michigan Law Review

I am quite distressed by talk that the landmark case of Mapp v. Ohio "suggests by analogy" that the Court may now overrule Betts v. Brady. For whether one talks about the fourth or the sixth amendment, there is much to be said for Justice Harlan's dissenting views in Mapp. "[W]hatever configurations ... have been developed in the particularizing federal precedents" should not be "deemed a part of 'ordered liberty,' and as such ... enforceable against the States .... [W]e would not be true to the Fourteenth Amendment were we merely to stretch the general principle [ of …

Beaney: The Right To Counsel In American Courts, William M. Kunstler

Michigan Law Review

A Review of The Right to Counsel in American Courts. By William M. Beaney

Constitutional Law-Due Process Clause-Right Of An Accused To Have Counsel Appointed By The Court, Frank H. Roberts

Michigan Law Review

On May 16, 1932, petitioner, then seventeen years of age, was arraigned, tried, convicted of murder in the first degree and sentenced to life imprisonment. Petitioner was without legal assistance throughout these proceedings, was never advised of his rights to counsel, was never informed of the consequences of a guilty plea and, as disclosed by the record, was considerably confused as to the effect of such plea. In 1945, he moved for leave to file a delayed motion for new trial in the court in which he was convicted, on the ground that there had been serious impairment of his …