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Individual Academic Freedom: An Ordinary Concern Of The First Amendment, Scott R. Bauries
Individual Academic Freedom: An Ordinary Concern Of The First Amendment, Scott R. Bauries
Law Faculty Scholarly Articles
Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which is of transcendent value to all of us, and not merely to the teachers concerned. That freedom is therefore a special concern of the First Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom.
There is some argument that expression related to academic scholarship or classroom instruction implicates additional constitutional interests that are not fully accounted for by this Court's customary employee-speech jurisprudence. We need not, and for that reason do not, decide whether the analysis we conduct today would apply in the same …
Justifying Academic Freedom, Brian L. Frye
Justifying Academic Freedom, Brian L. Frye
Law Faculty Scholarly Articles
While academic freedom can only be described in relation to academic norms, its justification can and should depend on its contribution to the common good. Academics contribute to the common good by producing scholarship. But scholarship is a means to an end, not an end in itself. Academic freedom is justified not only because enables academics to produce more and better scholarship, but also because it enables academics to challenge academic norms that diminish the quantity or quality of scholarship they produce.
“Testing” Fuller’S Forms And Limits: A Brief Response To Oldfather, Bockhorst, & Dimmer, Scott R. Bauries
“Testing” Fuller’S Forms And Limits: A Brief Response To Oldfather, Bockhorst, & Dimmer, Scott R. Bauries
Law Faculty Scholarly Articles
In Triangulating Judicial Responsiveness, Chad Oldfather, Joseph Bockhorst, and Brian Dimmer give us a methodology by which we can empirically assess (among other things) the effects that argumentation has on judicial decision making. Unlike the vast majority of empirical legal scholarship of judging, the authors do not use this methodology in their current study to compare “legalist” explanations of judging with “realist” explanations of judging. Rather, the study operates almost entirely within the “legalist” frame. This is a welcome development for many reasons, one on which this Response focuses—the authors’ methodology illustrates a way of scientifically “testing” descriptive legal …