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Full-Text Articles in Law

Market Power In Power Markets: The Filed-Rate Doctrine And Competition In Electricity, Sandeep Vaheesan Apr 2013

Market Power In Power Markets: The Filed-Rate Doctrine And Competition In Electricity, Sandeep Vaheesan

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

State and federal initiatives have opened the American electric power industry to competition over the past four decades. Although the process has not occurred uniformly across the country, wholesale electricity markets exist everywhere today. Independent power producers can construct generation facilities and sell their output to utilities and industrial customers through bilateral contracts. In many regions, centralized power markets now facilitate the sale of billions of dollars in electricity annually through auctions. Although market forces have replaced direct price regulation in electricity, antitrust enforcement has not expanded its role commensurately. A lack of competition has been a serious problem in …


Private Equity & Private Suits: Using 10b-5 Antifraud Suits To Discipline A Transforming Industry, Kenneth J. Black Jan 2013

Private Equity & Private Suits: Using 10b-5 Antifraud Suits To Discipline A Transforming Industry, Kenneth J. Black

Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review

This note demonstrates why private equity will no longer be able to avoid private investor suits as it has (mostly) done in the past and explores the industry’s response to a growing number of investor suits. Notably, the industry has already begun to shift its strategy from regulatory avoidance to regulatory capture, at least in part to avoid investor suits. Given these changes, this note proposes that the best way to maintain discipline in the transforming private equity market is to protect the ability of investors to bring private suits.


Regulation Of Private Equity In Brazil: Policy Questions Presented And Critique, Shannon Guy Jan 2013

Regulation Of Private Equity In Brazil: Policy Questions Presented And Critique, Shannon Guy

Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review

In this note, I explore some of the policy questions affecting Brazil’s private equity industry that the country must tackle. In Part II, Section A, I begin by asking the threshold question of whether the Brazilian government should play an active role in encouraging the growth of the private equity industry. I resolve that Brazil should play an active role in encouraging the industry’s growth to encourage several possible benefits to the real economy. Private equity may benefit the economy by providing job growth and job preservation, improved access to credit for firms that would not otherwise have funds, and …


Private Regulation Of Insider Trading In The Shadow Of Lax Public Enforcement: Evidence From Canadian Firms, Laura Nyantung Beny, Anita Anand Jan 2013

Private Regulation Of Insider Trading In The Shadow Of Lax Public Enforcement: Evidence From Canadian Firms, Laura Nyantung Beny, Anita Anand

Articles

Like firms in the United States, many Canadian firms voluntarily restrict trading by corporate insiders beyond the requirements of insider trading laws (i.e., super-compliance). Thus, we aim to understand the determinants of firms’ private insider trading policies (ITPs), which are quasi-contractual devices. Based on the assumption that firms that face greater costs from insider trading (or greater benefits from restricting insider trading) ought to be more inclined than other firms to adopt more stringent ITPs, we develop several testable hypotheses. We test our hypotheses using data from a sample of firms included in the Toronto Stock Exchange/Standard and Poor’s (TSX/S&P) …


Persuasion Treaties, Melinda (M.J.) Durkee Jan 2013

Persuasion Treaties, Melinda (M.J.) Durkee

Scholarship@WashULaw

All treaties formalize promises made by national parties. Yet there is a fundamental difference between two kinds of treaty promise. This difference divides all treaties into two categories: treaties that govern the behavior of state parties and their agents fall in one category; treaties in the second category—those I call “persuasion” treaties—commit state parties to changing the behavior of non-state actors as well. The difference is important because the compliance problems for the two sets of treaties sharply diverge. Persuasion treaties merit our systematic attention because they are both theoretically and practically significant. In areas such as international environmental affairs, …