Law Commons^™

Interpreting The Administrative Procedure Act: A Literature Review, Christopher J. Walker, Scott Macguidwin

Law & Economics Working Papers

The modern administrative state has changed substantially since Congress enacted the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) in 1946. Yet Congress has done little to modernize the APA in those intervening seventy-seven years. That does not mean the APA has remained unchanged. Federal courts have substantially refashioned the APA’s requirements for administrative procedure and judicial review of agency action. Perhaps unsurprisingly, calls to return to either the statutory text or the original meaning (or both) have intensified in recent years. “APA originalism” projects abound.

As part of the Notre Dame Law Review’s Symposium on the History of the Ad- ministrative Procedure Act …

A Response To Professor Choi’S Beyond Purposivism In Tax Law, Reuven S. Avi-Yonah

Law & Economics Working Papers

This response to Professor Choi’s excellent article questions whether the proposals made by the article can solve the tax shelter problem, and argues that a better response is to bolster purposivism with a statutory general anti-abuse rule (GAAR).

Interpreting The Administrative Procedure Act: A Literature Review, Christopher J. Walker

Articles

The modern administrative state has changed substantially since Congress enacted the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) in 1946. Yet Congress has done little to modernize the APA in those intervening seventy-seven years. That does not mean the APA has remained unchanged. Federal courts have substantially refashioned the APA’s requirements for administrative procedure and judicial review of agency action. Perhaps unsurprisingly, calls to return to either the statutory text or the original meaning (or both) have intensified in recent years. “APA originalism” projects abound.

As part of the Notre Dame Law Review’s Symposium on the History of the Administrative Procedure Act and …

Biden V. Nebraska: The New State Standing And The (Old) Purposive Major Questions Doctrine, Jed Handelsman Shugerman

Faculty Scholarship

Chief Justice Roberts’s majority opinion in Biden v. Nebraska does not sufficiently explain how Missouri has standing under established Article III doctrine, nor how the Court approaches the major questions doctrine as a method of statutory interpretation. Clarification can come from other opinions, even other cases entirely, in which Justice’s counterarguments are suggestive of the real arguments underlying the decisions.

MOHELA may have faced a concrete injury from the student debt waiver, but there was no evidence that Missouri would – and the majority had no answer for how Missouri had standing without an injury. A debate over special state …

Limiting Limited Liability: Requiring More Than Mere Subsequence Under Federal Rule Of Evidence 407, Cynara Hermes Mcquillan

Scholarly Works

Rule 407 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the “Subsequent Remedial Measures” Rule, is troubling. This exclusionary rule of evidence prohibits using subsequent remedial measures to demonstrate negligence, culpable conduct, or product defect. But, other than in the title of the rule, the phrase “subsequent remedial measures” does not appear anywhere in the rule’s text and the rule itself does not expressly define what measures fall within its purview. This omission creates space for different judicial interpretations of the rule’s language and ultimately disparate judicial outcomes. Although the Federal Rules of Evidence lend themselves to fact-specific inquiries that can lead …

Statutory Interpretation And Agency Disgorgement Power, Caprice L. Roberts

Journal Articles

What happens when obstacles foreclose claims and threaten to leave parties without adequate relief? Or, when the cause of action escapes conventional classification? Or, when Supreme Court decisions frustrate private litigation causing pressure for public enforcement by agencies? Or, when individuals engage in novel forms of wrongdoing that the law may fail to reach? It becomes hard to resist the siren call of equity and its powerful remedies. This trend includes sweeping national injunctions, constructive trusts, and more. Disgorgement is also one such remedy, and its popularity is rising in terms of private and public applications and challenges. It is …

The Elastics Of Snap Removal: An Empirical Case Study Of Textualism, Thomas O. Main, Jeffrey W. Stempel, David Mcclure

Scholarly Works

This article reports the findings of an empirical study of textualism as applied by federal judges interpreting the statute that permits removal of diversity cases from state to federal court. The “snap removal” provision in the statute is particularly interesting because its application forces judges into one of two interpretive camps—which are fairly extreme versions of textualism and purposivism, respectively. We studied characteristics of cases and judges to find predictors of textualist outcomes. In this article we offer a narrative discussion of key variables and we detail the results of our logistic regression analysis. The most salient predictive variable was …

Bostock Was Bogus: Textualism, Pluralism, And Title Vii, Mitchell N. Berman, Guha Krishnamurthi

All Faculty Scholarship

In Bostock v. Clayton County, one of the blockbuster cases from its 2019 Term, the Supreme Court held that federal antidiscrimination law prohibits employment discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity. Unsurprisingly, the result won wide acclaim in the mainstream legal and popular media. Results aside, however, the reaction to Justice Neil Gorsuch’s majority opinion, which purported to ground the outcome in a textualist approach to statutory interpretation, was more mixed. The great majority of commentators, both liberal and conservative, praised Gorsuch for what they deemed a careful and sophisticated—even “magnificent” and “exemplary”—application of textualist principles, while …

Snap Removal: Concept; Cause; Cacophony; And Cure, Jeffrey W. Stempel, Thomas O. Main, David Mcclure

Scholarly Works

So-called “snap removal” – removal of a case from state to federal court prior to service on a forum state defendant – has divided federal trial courts for 20 years. Recently, panels of the Second, Third and Fifth Circuits have sided with those supporting the tactic even though it conflicts with the general prohibition on removal when the case includes a forum state defendant, a situation historically viewed as eliminating the need to protect the outsider defendant from possible state court hostility.

Consistent with the public policy underlying diversity jurisdiction – availability of a federal forum to protect against defending …

Backdoor Purposivism, Anita S. Krishnakumar

Faculty Publications

It has become standard among statutory interpretation commentators to declare that, “We are all textualists now.” The comment stems from the observation that in the modern, post-Scalia era, all of the Justices on the U.S. Supreme Court pay significant attention to statutory text when construing statutes and, relatedly, that legislative history use by the Court as a whole has declined since its heyday in the 1970s. The account of textualism’s triumph is so prevalent that some scholars have declared purposivism—or at least traditional purposivism—essentially defunct. Two prominent textualist scholars in particular have suggested that there is a “new purposivism” at …

High-Stakes Interpretation, Ryan D. Doerfler

All Faculty Scholarship

Courts look at text differently in high-stakes cases. Statutory language that would otherwise be ‘unambiguous’ suddenly becomes ‘less than clear.’ This, in turn, frees up courts to sidestep constitutional conflicts, avoid dramatic policy changes, and, more generally, get around undesirable outcomes. The standard account of this behavior is that courts’ failure to recognize ‘clear’ or ‘unambiguous’ meanings in such cases is motivated or disingenuous, and, at best, justified on instrumentalist grounds.

This Article challenges that account. It argues instead that, as a purely epistemic matter, it is more difficult to ‘know’ what a text means—and, hence, more difficult to regard …

Purposivism In The Executive Branch: How Agencies Interpret Statutes, Kevin M. Stack

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

After decades of debate, the lines of distinction between textualism and purposivism have been carefully drawn with respect to the judicial task of statutory interpretation. Far less attention has been devoted to the question of how executive branch officials approach statutory interpretation. While scholars have contrasted agencies interpretive practices from those of courts, they have not yet developed a theory of agency statutory interpretation. This Article develops a purposivist theory of agency statutory interpretation on the ground that regulatory statutes oblige agencies to implement the statutes they administer in that manner. Regulatory statutes not only grant powers but also impose …

The Interpretive Dimension Of Seminole Rock, Kevin M. Stack

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

A lively debate has emerged over the deferential standard of review courts apply when reviewing an agency's interpretation of its own regulations. That standard, traditionally associated with Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co. and now more frequently attributed to Auer v. Robbins, states that a court must accept an agency's interpretation of its own regulations unless the interpretation is "plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation." This Article argues that a court's choice of method for interpreting regulations” including how it determines which agency interpretations are inconsistent with the regulation ” may be just as important, if not more …

King V. Burwell And The Triumph Of Selective Contextualism, Jonathan H. Adler, Michael F. Cannon

Faculty Publications

King v. Burwell presented the question of whether the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA) authorizes the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to issue tax credits for the purchase of health insurance through Exchanges established by the federal government. The King plaintiffs alleged an IRS rule purporting to authorize tax credits in federal Exchanges was unlawful because the text of the ACA expressly authorizes tax credits only in Exchanges “established by the State.” The Supreme Court conceded the plain meaning of the operative text, and that Congress defined “State” to exclude the federal government. The Court nevertheless disagreed …

Judging Statutes, Peter L. Strauss

Faculty Scholarship

Chief Judge Robert Katzmann has written a compelling short book about statutory interpretation. It could set the framework for a two- or three-hour legislation class, supplemented by cases and other readings of the instructor's choosing. Or it might more simply be used as an independent reading assignment as law school begins, to apprise 21st-century law students just how important the interpretation of statutes will prove to be in the profession they are entering, and how unsettled are the judiciary's means of dealing with them. It should be required reading for all who teach in the field.

Decision Theory And Babbitt V. Sweet Home: Skepticism About Norms, Discretion, And The Virtues Of Purposivism, Victoria Nourse

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

In this writing, the author applies a “decision theory” of statutory interpretation, elaborated recently in the Yale Law Journal, to Professor William Eskridge’s illustrative case, Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon. In the course of this application, she takes issue with the conventional wisdom that purposivism, as a method of statutory interpretation, is inevitably a more virtuous model of statutory interpretation. First, the author questions whether we have a clear enough jurisprudential picture both of judicial discretion and legal as opposed to political normativity. Second, she argues that, under decision theory, Sweet Home is …

A Textualist Approach To Purposivism In The Regulatory Arena, Linda Jellum

Articles

No abstract provided.

Interpreting Regulations, Kevin M. Stack

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

The age of statutes has given way to an era of regulations, but our jurisprudence has fallen behind. Despite the centrality of regulations to law, courts have no intelligible approach to regulatory interpretation. The neglect of regulatory interpretation is not only a shortcoming in interpretive theory but also a practical problem for administrative law. Canonical doctrines of administrative law ” Chevron, Seminole Rock/Auer, and Accardi ” involve interpreting regulations, and yet courts lack a consistent approach. This Article develops a method for interpreting regulations and, more generally, situates regulatory interpretation within debates over legal interpretation. It argues that a purposive …

Misunderstanding Congress: Statutory Interpretation, The Supermajoritarian Difficulty, And The Separation Of Powers, Victoria Nourse

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Every lawyer's theory of statutory interpretation carries with it an idea of Congress, and every idea of Congress, in turn, carries with it an idea of the separation of powers. In this article, the author critiques three dominant academic theories of statutory interpretation--textualism, purposivism, and game theory--for their assumptions about Congress and the separation of powers. She argues that each academic theory fails to account for Congress's dominant institutional features: "the electoral connection," the "supermajoritarian difficulty," and the "principle of structure-induced ambiguity." This critique yields surprising conclusions, rejecting both standard liberal and conservative views on statutory interpretation.

"Plain" meaning, it …

Substantive Canons And Faithful Agency, Amy Coney Barrett

Journal Articles

Federal courts have long employed substantive canons of construction in the interpretation of statutes. For example, they apply the rule of lenity, which directs that ambiguous criminal statutes be interpreted in favor of the defendant, and the avoidance canon, which directs that statutes be interpreted in a manner that prevents the court from having to address serious constitutional questions. They also apply so-called “clear statement” rules — for example, absent a clear statement from Congress, a federal court will not interpret a statute to abrogate state sovereign immunity. While some commentators have attempted to rationalize these and other substantive canons …

Formalism And Realism In Ruins (Mapping The Logics Of Collapse), Pierre Schlag

Publications

After laying out a conventional account of the formalism vs. realism debates, this Article argues that formalism and realism are at once impossible and entrenched. To say they are impossible is to say that they are not as represented--that they cannot deliver their promised goods. To say that they are entrenched is to say that these forms of thought are sedimented as thought and practice throughout law's empire. We live thus amidst the ruins of formalism and realism. The disputes between these two great determinations of American law continue today, but usually in more localized or circumscribed forms. We see …

The Common Law And Statutes, Peter L. Strauss

Faculty Scholarship

Controversies about statutory interpretation and the proper roles for judges in interpretation are particularly noticeable in the Supreme Court but have penetrated downward throughout the judicial system. What I mean to explore here are some implications of our common law heritage and the presuppositions of a common law system for these controversies, that seem rarely noticed in the ongoing debates. I mean by this not only common law judging, but also what we might call common law legislating – that is, the practice of creating statutes to achieve marginal changes in existing law in response to perceived deficiencies, rather than …

An American Lawyer's Reflections On Pepper V. Hart, Michael P. Healy

Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

Pepper v. Hart gave American lawyers a number of insights into the English law of statutory interpretation. For example, English law as described by the case was not as tidy as had been thought. To be sure, the case does state what Americans had believed was true about English law: “[u]nder present law, there is a general rule that references to parliamentary material as an aid to statutory construction is not permissible (the exclusionary rule).” Notwithstanding that rule, however, Pepper recognized that the rule of exclusion had an important and long-standing exception. This exception applies when the legislative materials identify …

Statutory Interpretation In Securities Jurisprudence: A Failure Of Textualism, Ediberto Román

Faculty Publications

This Article critiques the development of textualist theory in securities jurisprudence and analyzes the Central Bank decision as an example of the defects inherent in the application of a textualist approach. It demonstrates how the development of textualist securities jurisprudence stemmed from decisions that casually rejected precedent and mischaracterized existing law, thereby resulting in a distortion of the legislature’s intent. An analysis of the Securities Exchange Act demonstrates how the Central Bank Court’s approach towards statutory interpretation led to its failure to analyze other relevant Exchange Act provisions, including the most relevant provision – Section 20(a). The first section of …

Federal Preemption Of State Products Liability Doctrines, Richard C. Ausness

Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

Federal agencies now regulate the manufacture, design, and labeling of hundreds of consumer products. For example, the Consumer Product Safety Commission promulgates "consumer product safety standards" for a number of consumer products. Likewise, the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 authorizes the National Highway Transportation Safety Administration to develop safety standards for automobiles and other motor vehicles. Additionally, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) exercises extensive control over prescription drugs, biologics, medical devices, and over-the-counter drugs. The FDA also regulates food labeling.6 Finally, Congress has established statutory labeling requirements for cigarettes, smokeless tobacco products, and alcoholic beverages. …

The Rehnquist Court, Statutory Interpretation, Inertial Burdens, And A Misleading Version Of Democracy, Jeffrey W. Stempel

Scholarly Works

No one theory or school of thought consistently dominates judicial application of statutes, but the basic methodology employed by courts seems well-established if not always well-defined. Most mainstream judges and lawyers faced with a statutory construction task will look at (although with varying emphasis) the text of the statute, the legislative history of the provision, the context of the enactment, evident congressional purpose, and applicable agency interpretations, often employing the canons of construction for assistance. Although orthodox judicial thought suggests that the judge's role is confined to discerning textual meaning or directives of the enacting legislature, courts also often examine …