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Punishment

2011

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Articles 1 - 28 of 28

Full-Text Articles in Law

Perceptions Of Punishment And Rehabilitation Among Inmates In A Medium Security Prison, Steven Patrick, Robert Marsh Dec 2011

Perceptions Of Punishment And Rehabilitation Among Inmates In A Medium Security Prison, Steven Patrick, Robert Marsh

Robert L. Marsh

Inmate perceptions are examined in relation to punishment and rehabilitation as goals of prison. The results from a random sample of inmates in a medium security prison appear to show that inmate perceptions of punishment and rehabilitation are independent of one another but are simultaneously related to different types of inmate relationships with others in the prison. Additionally, inmate perceptions of punishment appear to be related to the physical environment of the prison. This paper discusses structural and policy implications of these findings. It seems that, because perceptions of punishment and rehabilitation are independent it may be possible to increase …


Prevention And Imminence, Pre-Punishment And Actuality, Gideon Yaffe Dec 2011

Prevention And Imminence, Pre-Punishment And Actuality, Gideon Yaffe

San Diego Law Review

In a variety of circumstances, it is justified to harm persons, or deprive them of liberty, in order to prevent them from doing something objectionable. We see this in interactions between individuals--think of self-defense or defense of others--and we see it in large-scale interactions among groups--think of preemptive measures taken by countries against conspiring terrorists, plotting dictators, or ambitious nations. We can argue, of course, about the details. Under exactly what conditions is it justified to inflict harm or deprive someone of liberty for reasons of prevention? But in having such arguments we agree on the fundamental idea: there are …


Prevention As The Primary Goal Of Sentencing: The Modern Case For Indeterminate Dispositions In Criminal Cases, Christopher Slobogin Dec 2011

Prevention As The Primary Goal Of Sentencing: The Modern Case For Indeterminate Dispositions In Criminal Cases, Christopher Slobogin

San Diego Law Review

This Article contends that properly constituted, indeterminate sentencing is both a morally defensible method of preventing crime and the optimal regime for doing so, at least for crimes against person and most other street crimes.

More specifically, the position defended in this Article is that, once a person is convicted of an offense, the duration and nature of sentence should be based on a back-end decision made by experts in recidivism reduction, within broad ranges set by the legislature. Compared to determinate sentencing, the sentencing regime advanced in this Article relies on wider sentence ranges and explicit assessments of risk, …


Lifting The Cloak: Preventive Detention As Punishment, Douglas Husak Dec 2011

Lifting The Cloak: Preventive Detention As Punishment, Douglas Husak

San Diego Law Review

Most of the scholarly reaction to systems of preventive detention has been hostile. Negative judgments are especially prevalent among penal theorists who hold nonconsequentialist, retributivist rationales for criminal law and punishment. Surely their criticisms are warranted as long as we confine our focus to the existing systems of preventive detention that flagrantly disregard fundamental principles of legality and desert. Nonetheless, I believe that many of their more sweeping objections tend to rest too uncritically on doctrines of criminal theory that are not always supported by sound arguments even though they are widely accepted. I will contend that we cannot fully …


Punitive Damages--Developments In Section 1983 Cases, Eileen Kaufman, Martin A. Schwartz Jun 2011

Punitive Damages--Developments In Section 1983 Cases, Eileen Kaufman, Martin A. Schwartz

Martin A. Schwartz

No abstract provided.


Teshuva: A Look At Repentance, Forgiveness And Atonement In Jewish Law And Philosophy And American Legal Thought, Samuel J. Levine May 2011

Teshuva: A Look At Repentance, Forgiveness And Atonement In Jewish Law And Philosophy And American Legal Thought, Samuel J. Levine

Samuel J. Levine

Professor Levine examines the atonement model and its relevance to American law. He outlines and explains the necessary steps by the wrongdoer for atonement: repentance, apology, reparation and penance. The wronged party then has the obligation of reconciliation for the process to be complete. Despite the prominent position it has held for millennia in religious thinking, the atonement model is relatively new to American legal theory. Professor Stephen Garvey's attempt to offer a systematic depiction and analysis of the process of atonement and its possible relevance to American law appears to represent the most extensive effort to date. Any application …


Memory And Punishment, O. Carter Snead May 2011

Memory And Punishment, O. Carter Snead

Vanderbilt Law Review

Developments in cognitive neuroscience-the science of how the brain enables the mind--continue to prompt profound scholarly debate and reflection on the practice and theory of criminal law. Advances in the field have raised vexing questions relating to lie detection, interrogation methods, the Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination, competency to stand trial, defenses to guilt (such as diminished capacity and insanity), sentencing, and the relationship between moral responsibility and punishment. Similarly, for the past decade, philosophers, scientists, clinicians, and legal scholars have been engaged in a major debate about the cognitive neuroscience of memory and new capacities to modify it …


Torture, Customary International Law, Promulgative Articulation, And Jus Cogens: Why And How Some United States Government Conduct Violates International And United States Law, Christopher L. Blakesley Mar 2011

Torture, Customary International Law, Promulgative Articulation, And Jus Cogens: Why And How Some United States Government Conduct Violates International And United States Law, Christopher L. Blakesley

Christopher L. Blakesley

This essay exposes the confusion over the meaning of customary international law and jus cogens that infests the writing of many international jurists, including scholars, and judges, especially those from the Common Law world. The essay shows how the essential idea behind customary international law, especially jus cogens in relation to crime is basic and easy to grasp, although some scholars claim that it is impenetrable. On the edges, of course, there is valuable disputation over nuance and the breath of the concepts. At bottom, however, the essence of the concepts is as basic as the deepest and most dearly …


Punitive Damages--Developments In Section 1983 Cases, Eileen Kaufman, Martin A. Schwartz Mar 2011

Punitive Damages--Developments In Section 1983 Cases, Eileen Kaufman, Martin A. Schwartz

Eileen Kaufman

No abstract provided.


Comments On [Israeli] Proposal For Structuring Judicial Discretion In Sentencing, Paul H. Robinson Mar 2011

Comments On [Israeli] Proposal For Structuring Judicial Discretion In Sentencing, Paul H. Robinson

All Faculty Scholarship

In this essay, Professor Robinson supports the current Israeli proposal for structuring judicial discretion in sentencing, in particular its reliance upon desert as the guiding principle for the distribution of punishment, its reliance upon benchmarks, or “starting-points,” to be adjusted in individual cases by reference to articulated mitigating and aggravating circumstances, and the proposal’s suggestion to use of an expert committee to draft the original guidelines.


Beyond Experience: Getting Retributive Justice Right, Dan Markel, Chad Flanders, David C. Gray Feb 2011

Beyond Experience: Getting Retributive Justice Right, Dan Markel, Chad Flanders, David C. Gray

David C. Gray

How central should hedonic adaptation be to the establishment of sentencing policy? In earlier work, Professors Bronsteen, Buccafusco, and Masur (BBM) drew some normative significance from the psychological studies of adaptability for punishment policy. In particular, they argued that retributivists and utilitarians alike are obliged on pain of inconsistency to take account of the fact that most prisoners, most of the time, adapt to imprisonment in fairly short order, and therefore suffer much less than most of us would expect. They also argued that ex-prisoners don't adapt well upon re-entry to society and that social planners should consider their post-release …


Retributivism For Progressives: A Response To Professor Flanders, David C. Gray, Jonathan Huber Feb 2011

Retributivism For Progressives: A Response To Professor Flanders, David C. Gray, Jonathan Huber

David C. Gray

In his engaging article "Retributivism and Reform," published in the Maryland Law Review, Chad Flanders engages two claims he ascribes to James Q. Whitman: 1) that American criminal justice is too "harsh," and 2) that Americans’ reliance on retributivist theories of criminal punishment is implicated in that harshness. In this invited response, to which Flanders subsequently replied, we first ask what "harsh" might mean in the context of a critique of criminal justice and punishment. We conclude that the most likely candidate is something along the lines of "disproportionate or otherwise unjustified." With this working definition in hand, we measure …


The Pitfalls Of Professionalized Prosecution: A Response To Josh Bowers's "Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, And The Equitable Decision Not To Prosecute", Stephanos Bibas Jan 2011

The Pitfalls Of Professionalized Prosecution: A Response To Josh Bowers's "Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, And The Equitable Decision Not To Prosecute", Stephanos Bibas

All Faculty Scholarship

This short essay responds to Josh Bowers’ article Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the Equitable Decision Not to Prosecute. While most scholars focus on the most visible injustices in the most serious cases, Bowers rightly notes that this sliver of serious felonies is dwarfed by the mountain of minor, low-visibility misdemeanors and violations. Prosecutors are reasonably good at classifying crimes based on legal guilt and administrative criteria, but are far worse at weighing all the particulars and exercising equitable discretion. Our consistent faith in prosecutors’ expertise, Bowers argues, is not only misguided but backwards; we should value outsiders’ fresh …


Punishing Without Free Will, Luis E. Chiesa Jan 2011

Punishing Without Free Will, Luis E. Chiesa

Journal Articles

Most observers agree that free will is central to our practices of blaming and punishment. Yet the conventional conception of free will is under sustained attack by the so-called determinists. Determinists claim that all of the events that take place in the universe – including human acts – are the product of causally determined forces over which we have no control. If human conduct is really determined by factors that we cannot control, how can our acts be the product of our own unfettered free will and what would that mean for the criminal law? The overwhelming majority of legal …


Collateral Consequences After Padilla V. Kentucky: From Punishment To Regulation, Margaret Colgate Love Jan 2011

Collateral Consequences After Padilla V. Kentucky: From Punishment To Regulation, Margaret Colgate Love

Saint Louis University Public Law Review

This Article analyzes the scope of Padilla v. Kentucky, concluding that its logic extends beyond deportation to many other severe and certain consequences of conviction that are imposed by operation of law rather than by the sentencing court. It proposes a set of reforms that would limit the disruptive effect of these so-called “collateral consequences” on the guilty plea process and make a defense lawyer’s job easier. Part I describes a case currently pending in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court that may yield some important clues about how broadly the Padilla doctrine will be applied to status-generated consequences other than …


Dangerous Psychopaths: Criminally Responsible But Not Morally Responsible, Subject To Criminal Punishment And To Preventive Detention, Ken M. Levy Jan 2011

Dangerous Psychopaths: Criminally Responsible But Not Morally Responsible, Subject To Criminal Punishment And To Preventive Detention, Ken M. Levy

Journal Articles

How should we judge psychopaths, both morally and in the criminal justice system? This Article will argue that psychopaths are generally not morally responsible for their bad acts simply because they cannot understand, and therefore be guided by, moral reasons.

Scholars and lawyers who endorse the same conclusion automatically tend to infer from this premise that psychopaths should not be held criminally punishable for their criminal acts. These scholars and lawyers are making this assumption (that just criminal punishment requires moral responsibility) on the basis of one of two deeper assumptions: that either criminal punishment directly requires moral responsibility or …


Beyond Experience: Getting Retributive Justice Right, Dan Markel, Chad Flanders, David C. Gray Jan 2011

Beyond Experience: Getting Retributive Justice Right, Dan Markel, Chad Flanders, David C. Gray

Faculty Scholarship

How central should hedonic adaptation be to the establishment of sentencing policy? In earlier work, Professors Bronsteen, Buccafusco, and Masur (BBM) drew some normative significance from the psychological studies of adaptability for punishment policy. In particular, they argued that retributivists and utilitarians alike are obliged on pain of inconsistency to take account of the fact that most prisoners, most of the time, adapt to imprisonment in fairly short order, and therefore suffer much less than most of us would expect. They also argued that ex-prisoners don't adapt well upon re-entry to society and that social planners should consider their post-release …


A Punishing Court Docket, Stephen Wermiel Jan 2011

A Punishing Court Docket, Stephen Wermiel

Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals

No abstract provided.


Modal Retributivism: A Theory Of Sanctions For Attempts And Other Criminal Wrongs, Anthony M. Dillof Jan 2011

Modal Retributivism: A Theory Of Sanctions For Attempts And Other Criminal Wrongs, Anthony M. Dillof

University of Richmond Law Review

Rather than building the case for modal retributivism from the ground up, this article takes the existing components of retributive thought and reassembles them into a sounder structure. The cogency of the argument against harm-based retributivism andthe appeal of modal retributivism will likely be strongest forthose who allow reason, as opposed to intuition, a leading role in resolving moral issues.


Can They Do That To Me - Does The Eighth Amendment Protect Children's Best Interests, Maryam Ahranjani University Of New Mexico Jan 2011

Can They Do That To Me - Does The Eighth Amendment Protect Children's Best Interests, Maryam Ahranjani University Of New Mexico

South Carolina Law Review

No abstract provided.


Punishing Without Free Will, Luis E. Chiesa Jan 2011

Punishing Without Free Will, Luis E. Chiesa

Elisabeth Haub School of Law Faculty Publications

This Article will argue that there are good moral reasons to conclude that the scientific plausibility of determinism ought to lead us to abandon the notion of free will. Contra P. F. Strawson and Moore, this Article suggests that rejecting free will does not undermine the human experience, and doing so is plausible and attractive because it would likely lead to more humane and efficient institutions of blaming and punishing.


Two Kinds Of Retributivism, Mitchell N. Berman Jan 2011

Two Kinds Of Retributivism, Mitchell N. Berman

All Faculty Scholarship

This essay, written as a contribution to a forthcoming volume on the philosophical foundations of the criminal law, challenges the longstanding dominant framework for classifying justifications for criminal punishment. The familiar binary distinction between consequentialism and retributivism is no longer most perspicuous, I argue, because many recognizably retributivist theories of punishment employ a consequentialist justificatory structure. However, because not all do, it might prove most illuminating to carve the retributivist field in two – distinguishing what we might term “consequentialist retributivism” (perhaps better labeled “instrumentalist retributivism”) from “non-consequentialist retributivism” (“non-instrumentalist retributivism”).

Whether or not it is ultimately persuasive, consequentialist retributivism …


Fictionalized Criminal Law And Youth Legal Consciousness, Avi Brisman Jan 2011

Fictionalized Criminal Law And Youth Legal Consciousness, Avi Brisman

NYLS Law Review

No abstract provided.


Beyond Experience: Getting Retributive Justice Right, Dan Markel, Chad Flanders, David C. Gray Jan 2011

Beyond Experience: Getting Retributive Justice Right, Dan Markel, Chad Flanders, David C. Gray

All Faculty Scholarship

How central should hedonic adaptation be to the establishment of sentencing policy?

In earlier work, Professors Bronsteen, Buccafusco, and Masur (BBM) drew some normative significance from the psychological studies of adaptability for punishment policy. In particular, they argued that retributivists and utilitarians alike are obliged on pain of inconsistency to take account of the fact that most prisoners, most of the time, adapt to imprisonment in fairly short order, and therefore suffer much less than most of us would expect. They also argued that ex-prisoners don't adapt well upon re-entry to society and that social planners should consider their post-release …


Sorting Guilty Minds, Owen D. Jones, Francis X. Shen, Morris B. Hoffman, Joshua D. Greene, Rene Marois Jan 2011

Sorting Guilty Minds, Owen D. Jones, Francis X. Shen, Morris B. Hoffman, Joshua D. Greene, Rene Marois

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

Because punishable guilt requires that bad thoughts accompany bad acts, the Model Penal Code (MPC) typically requires that jurors infer the past mental state of a criminal defendant. More specifically, jurors must sort that mental state into one of four specific categories - purposeful, knowing, reckless, or negligent - which in turn defines the nature of the crime and the extent of the punishment. The MPC therefore assumes that ordinary people naturally sort mental states into these four categories with a high degree of accuracy, or at least can reliably do so when properly instructed. It also assumes that ordinary …


Slavery And The Law In Atlantic Perspective: Jurisdiction, Jurisprudence, And Justice, Rebecca J. Scott Jan 2011

Slavery And The Law In Atlantic Perspective: Jurisdiction, Jurisprudence, And Justice, Rebecca J. Scott

Articles

The four articles in this special issue experiment with an innovative set of questions and a variety of methods in order to push the analysis of slavery and the law into new territory. Their scope is broadly Atlantic, encompassing Suriname and Saint-Domingue/Haiti, New York and New Orleans, port cities and coffee plantations. Each essay deals with named individuals in complex circumstances, conveying their predicaments as fine-grained microhistories rather than as shocking anecdotes. Each author, moreover, demonstrates that the moments when law engaged slavery not only reflected but also influenced larger dynamics of sovereignty and jurisprudence.


Dangerous Psychopaths: Criminally Responsible But Not Morally Responsible, Subject To Criminal Punishment And To Preventive Detention, Ken Levy Dec 2010

Dangerous Psychopaths: Criminally Responsible But Not Morally Responsible, Subject To Criminal Punishment And To Preventive Detention, Ken Levy

Ken Levy

How should we judge psychopaths, both morally and in the criminal justice system? This Article will argue that psychopaths are generally not morally responsible for their bad acts simply because they cannot understand, and therefore be guided by, moral reasons.

Scholars and lawyers who endorse the same conclusion automatically tend to infer from this premise that psychopaths should not be held criminally punishable for their criminal acts. These scholars and lawyers are making this assumption (that just criminal punishment requires moral responsibility) on the basis of one of two deeper assumptions: that either criminal punishment directly requires moral responsibility or …


Rethinking Proportionality Under The Cruel And Unusual Punishments Clause, John F. Stinneford Dec 2010

Rethinking Proportionality Under The Cruel And Unusual Punishments Clause, John F. Stinneford

John F. Stinneford

Although a century has passed since the Supreme Court started reviewing criminal punishments for excessiveness under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, this area of doctrine remains highly problematic. The Court has never answered the claim that proportionality review is illegitimate in light of the Eighth Amendment’s original meaning. The Court has also adopted an ever-shifting definition of excessiveness, making the very concept of proportionality incoherent. Finally, the Court’s method of measuring proportionality is unreliable and selfcontradictory. As a result, a controlling plurality of the Court has insisted that proportionality review be limited to a narrow class of cases. This …