Law Commons^™

Immigration Policing And Federalism Through The Lens Of Technology, Surveillance, And Privacy, Anil Kalhan

Anil Kalhan

With the deployment of technology, federal programs to enlist state and local police assistance with immigration enforcement are undergoing a sea change. For example, even as it forcefully has urged invalidation of Arizona’s S.B. 1070 and similar state laws, the Obama administration has presided over the largest expansion of state and local immigration policing in U.S. history with its implementation of the “Secure Communities” program, which integrates immigration and criminal history database systems in order to automatically ascertain the immigration status of every individual who is arrested and booked by state and local police nationwide. By 2012, over one fifth …

Who Should Be The ‘Decider’ On Keeping Our Secrets?, Stephen E. Henderson

Stephen E Henderson

Anonymity Is The Battlefield: Practical And Legal Considerations In The Fight For Free Expression On The Web, Dan Massoglia

Dan Massoglia

No abstract provided.

Addressing The Harm Of Total Surveillance: A Reply To Professor Neil Richards, Danielle Citron, David Gray

David C. Gray

In his insightful article The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934 (2013), Neil Richards offers a framework for evaluating the implications of government surveillance programs that is centered on protecting "intellectual privacy." Although we share his interest in recognizing and protecting privacy as a condition of personal and intellectual development, we worry in this essay that, as an organizing principle for policy, "intellectual privacy" is too narrow and politically fraught. Drawing on other work, we therefore recommend that judges, legislators, and executives focus instead on limiting the potential of surveillance technologies to effect programs of broad and indiscriminate …

Has Skinner Killed The Katz? Are Society's Expectations Of Privacy Reasonable In Today's Techological World?, Jason Forcier

Jason Forcier

The right to privacy has and will remain a hotly contested debate about American liberties. In 2012, a 3-0 decision by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, in United States v. Melvin Skinner, the court held that there is no “reasonable expectation of privacy in the data given off by. . . cellphone[s].” Given today’s explosion of cellular technology and use of smart phones, is it unreasonable to believe a person should remain secure in their "person" and “effects," as guaranteed under the Fourth Amendment, from unreasonable searches and seizures? Furthermore, with police requiring only a subpoena to a obtain …

Contextual Expectations Of Privacy, Andrew Selbst

Andrew Selbst

Fourth Amendment search jurisprudence is nominally based on a “reasonable expectation of privacy,” but actual doctrine is detached from society’s conception of privacy. Courts rely on various binary distinctions: Is a piece of information secret or not? Was the observed conduct inside or outside? While often convenient, none of these binary distinctions can adequately capture the complicated range of ideas encompassed by “privacy.” Privacy theorists have begun to understand that a consideration of social context is essential to a full understanding of privacy. Helen Nissenbaum’s theory of contextual integrity, which characterizes a right to privacy as the preservation of expected …

Amicus Brief: State V. Glover (Maine Supreme Judicial Court), Adam Lamparello, Charles Maclean

Adam Lamparello

When law enforcement seeks to obtain a warrantless, pre-arrest DNA sample from an individual, that individual has the right to say “No.” If silence is to become a “badge of guilt,” then the right to silence—under the United States and Maine Constitutions—might become a thing of the past. Allowing jurors to infer consciousness of guilt from a pre-arrest DNA sample violates the Fourth Amendment to the United States and Maine Constitutions.

The Davis Good Faith Rule And Getting Answers To The Questions Jones Left Open, Susan Freiwald

Susan Freiwald

The Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Jones clearly established that use of GPS tracking surveillance constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment. But the Court left many other questions unanswered about the nature and scope of the constitutional privacy right in location data. A review of lower court decisions in the wake of Jones reveals that, rather than begin to answer the questions that Jones left open, courts are largely avoiding substantive Fourth Amendment analysis of location data privacy. Instead, they are finding that officers who engaged in GPS tracking and related surveillance operated in good faith, based …