Law Commons^™

Privacy Rights: The Virtue Of Protecting A False Reputation, John A. Humbach

Elisabeth Haub School of Law Faculty Publications

What is the virtue of protecting a false reputation? The thesis of this paper is that there is none. There is none, at least, that justifies the suppression of free speech. Yet, there is a growing trend to see the protection of reputation from truth as a key function of the so-called “right of privacy.”

Unfortunately, people often do things that they are not proud of or do not want others to know about. Often, however, these are precisely the things that others want or need to know. For our own protection, each of us is better off being aware …

Personal Environmental Information: The Promise And Perils Of The Emerging Capacity To Identify Individual Environmental Harms, Katrina Fischer Kuh

Elisabeth Haub School of Law Faculty Publications

This Article begins from the premise that successful regulation of environmentally significant individual behaviors could achieve meaningful environmental benefits and argues that (1) technology is increasingly making information about individual environmental behaviors and associated harms more accessible; (2) better information about environmentally significant individual behaviors could substantially enhance fledgling efforts to regulate those behaviors; and (3) use of technology-enabled personal environmental information in support of regulation will require the resolution of myriad privacy concerns. The Article seeks to generate and inform a discussion about the appropriate balance between access to personal environmental information and privacy by identifying how regulation can …

Privacy And The Right Of Free Expression, John A. Humbach

Elisabeth Haub School of Law Faculty Publications

Nobody likes to be talked about but everybody likes to talk. Trying to stop the dissemination of private information is, however, an impingement on free expression and the freedom to observe. A freestanding “right of privacy” that violates these interests is constitutionally permissible only if it can be justified using one of the standard bases for allowing restrictions on First Amendment rights. The three most likely possibilities are that the law in question: (1) can pass strict scrutiny, (2) fall within a recognized “categorical” exception, or (3) places only an “incidental” burden on First Amendment interests. Of these three, only …