Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Law Commons

Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Articles 1 - 5 of 5

Full-Text Articles in Law

A Room Of One's Own: Morality And Sexual Privacy After Lawrence V. Texas, Marybeth Herald Oct 2003

A Room Of One's Own: Morality And Sexual Privacy After Lawrence V. Texas, Marybeth Herald

ExpressO

No abstract provided.


Thermal Imaging And The Fourth Amendment: The Role Of The Katz Test In The Aftermath Of Kyllo V. United States, Gregory Gomez Jan 2003

Thermal Imaging And The Fourth Amendment: The Role Of The Katz Test In The Aftermath Of Kyllo V. United States, Gregory Gomez

NYLS Law Review

No abstract provided.


Six Opinions By Mr. Justice Stevens: A New Methodology For Constitutional Cases?, Robert F. Nagel Jan 2003

Six Opinions By Mr. Justice Stevens: A New Methodology For Constitutional Cases?, Robert F. Nagel

Publications

No abstract provided.


Justice Kennedy's Libertarian Revolution: Lawrence V. Texas, Randy E. Barnett Jan 2003

Justice Kennedy's Libertarian Revolution: Lawrence V. Texas, Randy E. Barnett

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

This brief article explains why Lawrence v. Texas could be a revolutionary case if the Supreme Court follows Justice Kennedy's reasoning in the future. As in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, Justice Kennedy finds a statute to be unconstitutional, not because it infringes a right to privacy (which is mentioned but once), but because it infringes "liberty" (a word he uses at least twenty-five times). In addition, Justice Kennedy's opinion protects liberty without any finding that the liberty being restricted is a "fundamental right." Instead, having identified the conduct prohibited as liberty, he turns to the purported justification for the …


Stubbornness Of Pretexts, Daniel B. Yeager Jan 2003

Stubbornness Of Pretexts, Daniel B. Yeager

Faculty Scholarship

This Article will reflect on (1) how the Whren v. United States failure to acknowledge what counts as a pretext accounts for the residual confusion as to whether or not Whren really has killed off the pretext argument in constitutional criminal procedure, and (2) the extent to which the Court in Sullivan compounded that failure, which I hope to lightly correct here by distinguishing motives from intentions and then by elaborating the role that each plays, or at least should play, in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.