Law Commons^™

Yes, Alito, There Is A Right To Privacy: Why The Leaked Dobbs Opinion Is Doctrinally Unsound, Nancy C. Marcus

Faculty Scholarship

On June 24, 2022, the Supreme Court released the final Dobbs majority opinion, which is substantially identical to the draft opinion. Consequently, the critique contained in this essay applies equally to the final Dobbs opinion.

On May 2, 2022, a draft majority opinion dated February 2022 and authored by Justice Alito in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization was leaked to the public. This Essay addresses the doctrinal infirmities of the underlying analysis of the draft Dobbs opinion, as well as the resulting dangers posed for the protection of fundamental privacy rights and liberties in contexts even beyond abortion.

The …

Certain Certiorari: The Digital Privacy Rights Of Probationers, Daniel Yeager

Faculty Scholarship

In a recent oral argument, a judge on the California Court of Appeal told me they had "at least 50" pending cases on the constitutionality of probation conditions authorizing suspicionless searches of digital devices. As counsel of record in three of those cases, I feel positioned to comment on this hot topic within criminal law. My intention here is less to reconcile California's cases on suspicionless searches of probationers' digital devices than to locate them within the precedents of the United States Supreme Court, which is bound before long to pick up a case for the same purpose.

Overcoming Hiddenness: The Role Of Intentions In Fourth Amendment Analysis, Daniel B. Yeager

Faculty Scholarship

This Article rehearses a response to the problems posed to and by the Supreme Court's attempts to work out the meaning and operation of the word "search." After commencing Part II by meditating on the notion of privacy, I take up its relation to the antecedent suspicion or knowledge that Fourth-Amendment law requires as a justification for all privacy invasions. From there, I look specifically at that uneasy relation in Supreme Court jurisprudence, which has come to privilege privacy over property as a Fourth Amendment value. From there, Part III reviews the sources or bases that can tell us what …

Stubbornness Of Pretexts, Daniel B. Yeager

Faculty Scholarship

This Article will reflect on (1) how the Whren v. United States failure to acknowledge what counts as a pretext accounts for the residual confusion as to whether or not Whren really has killed off the pretext argument in constitutional criminal procedure, and (2) the extent to which the Court in Sullivan compounded that failure, which I hope to lightly correct here by distinguishing motives from intentions and then by elaborating the role that each plays, or at least should play, in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.