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Full-Text Articles in Law
Is Descartes A Temporal Atomist?, Ken Levy
On The Rationalist Solution To Gregory Kavka's Toxin Puzzle, Ken Levy
On The Rationalist Solution To Gregory Kavka's Toxin Puzzle, Ken Levy
Ken Levy
No abstract provided.
Baumann On The Monty Hall Problem And Single Case Probabilities, Ken Levy
Baumann On The Monty Hall Problem And Single Case Probabilities, Ken Levy
Ken Levy
No abstract provided.
The Solution To The Surprise Exam Paradox, Ken Levy
Why It Is Sometimes Fair To Blame Agents For Unavoidable Actions And Omissions, Ken Levy
Why It Is Sometimes Fair To Blame Agents For Unavoidable Actions And Omissions, Ken Levy
Ken Levy
It is generally thought that ought implies can. If this maxim is correct, then my inability to do otherwise entails that I cannot be blamed for failing to do otherwise. In this article, however, I use Harry Frankfurt’s famous argument against the "Principle of Alternative Possibilities" (PAP) to show that the maxim is actually false, that I can be blamed for failing to do otherwise even in situations where I could not have done otherwise. In these situations, I do not act otherwise not because I cannot act otherwise but because I choose not to act otherwise.
The Main Problem With Usc Libertarianism, Ken Levy
The Main Problem With Usc Libertarianism, Ken Levy
Ken Levy
Libertarians like Robert Kane believe that indeterminism is necessary for free will. They think this in part because they hold both ( 1) that my being the ultimate cause of at least part of myself is necessary for free will and (2) that indeterminism is necessary for this "ultimate self-causation". But seductive and intuitive as this "USC Libertarianism" may sound, it is untenable. In the end, no metaphysically coherent (not to mention empirically valid) conception of ultimate self-causation is available. So the basic intuition motivating the USC Libertarian is ultimately impossible to fulfill.