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Full-Text Articles in Law
Bilski And The Information Age A Decade Later, Michael J. Meurer
Bilski And The Information Age A Decade Later, Michael J. Meurer
Faculty Scholarship
In the years from State Street in 1999 to Alice in 2014, legal scholars vigorously debated whether patents should be used to incentivize the invention of business methods. That attention has waned just as economists have produced important new research on the topic, and just as artificial intelligence and cloud computing are changing the nature of business method innovation. This chapter rejoins the debate and concludes that the case for patent protection of business methods is weaker now than it was a decade ago.
Promoting Progress: A Qualitative Analysis Of Creative And Innovative Production, Jessica Silbey
Promoting Progress: A Qualitative Analysis Of Creative And Innovative Production, Jessica Silbey
Faculty Scholarship
This chapter is based on data collected as part of a larger qualitative empirical study based on face-to-face interviews with artists, scientists, engineers, their lawyers, agents and business partners. Broadly, the project involves the collecting and analysis of these interviews to understand how and why the interviewees create and innovate and to make sense of the intersection between intellectual property law and creative and innovative activity from the ground up. This chapter specifically investigates the concept of “progress” as discussed in the interviews. “Promoting progress” is the ostensible goal of the intellectual property protection in the United States, but what …
The Private And Social Costs Of Patent Trolls, Michael J. Meurer, James Bessen, Jennifer Ford
The Private And Social Costs Of Patent Trolls, Michael J. Meurer, James Bessen, Jennifer Ford
Faculty Scholarship
The emergence of nonpracticing entities (NPEs) — firms that purchase and hold patent rights but neither innovate themselves nor use the patents in the production of goods — is supposed to incentivize innovation by providing a ready market for innovators. We test this idea empirically and find that NPEs produce little returns for innovators or for their own shareholders, but they place significant costs on productive firms that violate patents inadvertently. Indeed, it appears that NPEs — often disparagingly called “patent trolls” — discourage productive firms from innovating for fear that they will then be subject to a patent troll …