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The Defamation Injunction Meets The Prior Restraint Doctrine, Doug Rendleman

Scholarly Articles

In Near v. Minnesota, the Supreme Court added the injunction to executive licensing as a prior restraint. Although the Near court circumscribed the injunction as a prior restraint, it approved criminal sanctions and damages judgments. The prior restraint label resembles a death sentence. This article maintains that such massive retaliation is overkill.

A judge’s injunction that forbids the defendant’s tort of defamation tests Near and prior restraint doctrine because defamation isn’t protected by the First Amendment. Arguing that the anti-defamation injunction has outgrown outright bans under the prior restraint rule and the equitable Maxim that “Equity will not enjoin defamation” …

The Phases And Faces Of The Duke Lacrosse Controversy: A Conversation, Angela J. Davis, James E. Coleman Jr, Michael Gerhardt, K.C. Johnson

Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals

No abstract provided.

In The Matter Of Ottinger V. Non-Party The Journal News, Daniel Haier

NYLS Law Review

No abstract provided.

U.S. Supreme Court Tort Reform: Limiting State Power To Articulate And Develop Its Own Tort Law–Defamation, Preemption, And Punitive Damages, Thomas C. Galligan

ExpressO

U.S. Supreme Court Tort Reform: Limiting State Power to Articulate and Develop Its Own Tort Law–Defamation, Preemption, and Punitive Damages analyzes and critiques the three primary areas in which the U.S. Supreme Court has found federal constitutional limits on a state’s power to articulate, develop, and apply its common law of torts. It is the first piece to consider all three areas together as an emerging body of jurisprudence which Professor Galligan calls U.S. Supreme Court tort reform. After setting forth a modest model of adjudication, the article applies that model to each of the three areas: defamation and related …

Variation On Libel Per Quod, Laurence H. Eldredge

Vanderbilt Law Review

During the nineteenth century it became settled common law in England and in the United States that in any action for libel, as distinct from slander, the plaintiff could recover damages without pleading or proving that he had in fact suffered any damages as a result of the publication. The American Law Institute accepted this as sound law. Volume III of the Restatement of Torts, published in 1938, stated the rule in section 569: "One who falsely, and without a privilege to do so, publishes matter defamatory to another in such a manner as to make the publication a libel …

Torts-Libel-Constitutionality Of Retraction Statute Eliminating General Damages Recovery, John W. Galanis

Michigan Law Review

Following publication of allegedly libelous statements made by defendants during a televised news broadcast, plaintiff commenced an action to recover damages. Defendants' motion to strike the allegations of general and punitive damages was granted by the trial court since the complaint did not allege that defendants intended to defame plaintiff, or that defendants refused to publish a requested retraction of a non-intentional libel, both of which are conditions precedent to recovery of such damages under the Oregon statute. Plaintiff failed to plead further and judgment was entered for defendants. On appeal to the Oregon Supreme Court, held, affirmed. The …