Law Commons^™

Proportionalities, Youngjae Lee

Notre Dame Law Review Reflection

“Proportionality” is ubiquitous. The idea that punishment should be proportional to crime is familiar in criminal law and has a lengthy history. But that is not the only place where one encounters the concept of proportionality in law and ethics. The idea of proportionality is important also in the self-defense context, where the right to defend oneself with force is limited by the principle of proportionality. Proportionality plays a role in the context of war, especially in the idea that the military advantage one side may draw from an attack must not be excessive in relation to the loss of …

Neoclassical Administrative Law, Jeffrey Pojanowski

Journal Articles

This Article introduces an approach to administrative law that reconciles a more formalist, classical understanding of law and its supremacy with the contemporary administrative state. Courts adopting this approach, which I call “neoclassical administrative law,” are skeptical of judicial deference on questions of law, tend to give more leeway to agencies on questions of policy, and attend more closely to statutes governing administrative procedure than contemporary doctrine does. As a result, neoclassical administrative law finds a place for both legislative supremacy and the rule of law within the administrative state, without subordinating either of those central values to the other. …

The Place Of Force In General Jurisprudence, Jeffrey A. Pojanowski

Journal Articles

This essay reviews Frederick Schauer’s book, The Force of Law (2015). Schauer argues that coercion is central to legal practice and should be no less important in legal theory. In doing so, Schauer presents formidable challenges to standard versions of legal positivism—and does so from within the positivist framework. Much of Schauer’s criticism on that score is sound. His analysis of the role coercion can play in accomplishing law’s moral tasks is also welcome and important. Nevertheless, Schauer’s jurisprudential framework comes up short in its inability to distinguish law from other social practices that also use force. The Force of …

Grounds Of Law And Legal Theory: A Response, John M. Finnis

Journal Articles

Linking theses of Plato, Wittgenstein and Weber, section I argues that identification of central cases and settling of focal meanings depend upon the theorist's purpose(s) and, in the case of theory about human affairs - theory adequately attentive to the four irreducible orders in which human persons live and act - upon the purposes for which we intelligibly and intelligently act. Among these purposes, primacy (centrality) is to be accorded (by acknowledgement, not fiat) to purposes which are, as best the theorist can judge, reasonable and fit to be adopted by anyone, the theorist included. Section II defends the reasonableness …

Federal Criminal Law: The Need, Not For Revised Constitutional Theory Or New Congressional Statutes, But The Exercise Of Responsible Prosecutive Discretion, G. Robert Blakey

Journal Articles

My basic point is that major aspects of systems of legal justice deal with antisocial behavior. That an aspect of these systems may be categorized as “criminal,” “civil,” “state,” “federal,” or “international,” is relevant principally to a question of legal theory or governmental organization, which is fundamentally secondary to the character of the behavior itself. In short, we have to look at the behavior first–and only then ask questions of legal theory or governmental organization.

We should not be talking about “federalization.” That is a constitutional question to which we now have a fairly clear constitutional answer. Little or no …

Legal Enforcement Of "Duties To Oneself": Kant Vs. Neo-Kantians, John M. Finnis

Journal Articles

This Article considers writings by modern scholars including Rawls, Dworkin, and D.A.J. Richards on the topic of Kant's discussion of the neutrality principle and the harm principle.