Law Commons^™

Economic Analysis Of Labor And Employment Law In The New Economy, Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Alan Hyde, Michael Risch, Jagdeep Bhandari, Richard Block

Articles by Maurer Faculty

No abstract provided.

Lost In Translation: The Economic Analysis Of Law In The United States And Europe, Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Carmen L. Brun

Articles by Maurer Faculty

In this Essay, we examine the reasons why the economic analysis of law has not flourished in European countries as it has in the United States. In particular, we focus on three European countries-the United Kingdom, Germany, and France. We argue that differences in culture, the legal system, and the academy have led to differing degrees of success of the law and economics movement in each country. We speculate that, although there is currently less interest in the economic analysis of the law in Europe than in the United States, European interest could dramatically increase if scholars adopt more communitarian …

The Law And Economics Of Development And Environment: An Introduction To The Symposium, Daniel H. Cole

Articles by Maurer Faculty

No abstract provided.

The Interplay Between Norms And Enforcement In Tax Compliance, Leandra Lederman

Articles by Maurer Faculty

What will increase individuals' compliance with the federal income tax? There are rich legal, economic, and sociological literatures examining this question. The traditional answer that increased enforcement will increase compliance is supported by both economic modeling and a number of experiments. However, studies show that appeals to normative beliefs about honesty in taxpaying play an important role as well.

A number of scholars have suggested that vigorous enforcement of the tax laws may be counterproductive because it may suggest that noncompliance is the norm. This article argues, in part, that enforcement and a compliance norm are not inconsistent but rather …

Can Evolutionary Science Contribute To Discussions Of Law?, Jeffrey E. Stake

Articles by Maurer Faculty

Evolutionary Theory can be helpful in understanding the law and determining what it should be. There are two ways in which the evolutionary perspective differs from an economic perspective on law. Not only does the evolutionary approach shift our attention from the world today to the environment of evolutionary adaptation, it shifts our focus from rational individuals to rational genes and from rational behaviors to rational design of mental architecture. Finally, the law of law's leverage makes predictions about the relative elasticities of demand for all sorts of behaviors, including those that did and did not exist in the environment …

Labor Law And Industrial Peace: A Comparative Analysis Of The United States, The United Kingdom, Germany, And Japan Under The Bargaining Model, Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt

Articles by Maurer Faculty

In this Article, Professor Dau-Schmidt provides a comparative analysis of the labor laws of the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Japan for the purposes of identifying which characteristics of a country's labor laws are likely to reduce strike incidence and intensity and promote industrial peace. To identify which characteristics of a country's law are likely to encourage industrial peace, Professor Dau-Schmidt presents game theory arguments based on his analysis of unions and collective bargaining. Dau-Schmidt then provides a simple empirical test as to the relative success of different countries' laws in advancing industrial peace by comparing data on …

On Game Theory And The Law, Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Jeffrey E. Stake, Robert H. Heidt, Eric Rasmusen, Michael Alexeev

Articles by Maurer Faculty

No abstract provided.

A Bargaining Analysis Of American Labor Law And The Search For Bargaining Equity And Industrial Peace, Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt

Articles by Maurer Faculty

No abstract provided.

An Economic Analysis Of The Criminal Law As A Preference-Shaping Policy, Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt

Articles by Maurer Faculty

In this Article I provide an economic analysis of criminal law as a preference-shaping policy. I argue that in addition to creating disincentives for criminal activity, criminal punishment is intended to promote various social norms of individual behavior by shaping the preferences of criminals and the population at large. By taking into account this preference-shaping function, I explain many of the characteristics of criminal law that have heretofore escaped the logic of the economic model. It is also the preference-shaping function and the prerequisite ordering of preferences that distinguish criminal law from tort law. My analysis suggests that society will …