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Articles 1 - 3 of 3

Full-Text Articles in Law

In Memoriam: The Honorable Leroy Rountree Hassell, Sr., Hon. Harry L. Carrico Nov 2011

In Memoriam: The Honorable Leroy Rountree Hassell, Sr., Hon. Harry L. Carrico

University of Richmond Law Review

Leroy Rountree Hassell, Sr. passed away on February 9, 2011. News of his death devastated those of us associated with him onthe Supreme Court of Virginia. We had lost a dear friend, one always conscious of the needs of his associates and anxious about making sure they were comfortable. Even more, the court lost its peerless leader, and the people of the Commonwealth of Virginialost a dedicated public servant. He will be sorely missed in allcorners of our great state.


Special Court For Sierra Leone: Achieving Justice?, Charles Chernor Jalloh Apr 2011

Special Court For Sierra Leone: Achieving Justice?, Charles Chernor Jalloh

Michigan Journal of International Law

The creation of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL or the Court) in early 2002 generated high expectations within the international community. The SCSL was generally deemed to herald a new model or benchmark for the assessment of future ad hoc international criminal courts. As the Court completes the trial of former Liberian President Charles Taylor in The Hague-its last-nine years later, this Article offers an early and broad assessment of whether it has fulfilled its promise. More specifically, this Article examines whether the SCSL has achieved, or more accurately-because its trials are still ongoing-whether it is achieving justice. …


Collective Choice, Justin Schwartz Jan 2011

Collective Choice, Justin Schwartz

Justin Schwartz

This short nontechnical article reviews the Arrow Impossibility Theorem and its implications for rational democratic decisionmaking. In the 1950s, economist Kenneth J. Arrow proved that no method for producing a unique social choice involving at least three choices and three actors could satisfy four seemingly obvious constraints that are practically constitutive of democratic decisionmaking. Any such method must violate such a constraint and risks leading to disturbingly irrational results such and Condorcet cycling. I explain the theorem in plain, nonmathematical language, and discuss the history, range, and prospects of avoiding what seems like a fundamental theoretical challenge to the possibility …