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Jurisprudence

Selected Works

Mark Fenster

Articles 1 - 5 of 5

Full-Text Articles in Law

The Symbols Of Governance: Thurman Arnold And Post-Realist Legal Theory, Mark Fenster Dec 2014

The Symbols Of Governance: Thurman Arnold And Post-Realist Legal Theory, Mark Fenster

Mark Fenster

This article is an effort to provide both the intellectual context of Thurman Arnold's work and, through his work, a better sense of where and how the study of law turned after realism. The article is in five parts. Part I describes Arnold's relationship with legal realism, looking at the earliest part of his academic career when, as a mainstream realist, he performed empirical studies of local and state court systems. Part II is Arnold's proposed field of "Political Dynamics," an interdisciplinary approach to the symbols of law, politics, and economics. Part III considers Arnold's authorial voice in Symbols and …

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The Dramas Of Criminal Law: Chapter [?] Of The Symbols Of Governance: Thurman Arnold And Post-Realist Legal Theory, Mark Fenster Dec 2008

The Dramas Of Criminal Law: Chapter [?] Of The Symbols Of Governance: Thurman Arnold And Post-Realist Legal Theory, Mark Fenster

Mark Fenster

This essay is a chapter of a book-in-progress on the legal and cultural theory of the legal realist Thurman Arnold, who was prominent as a Yale law professor from 1932 until he joined the Justice Department as head of its antitrust division in 1938. Arnold's work focused on the symbolic role of law in governance, both as a means by which the state gains legitimacy and as a means by which those who oppose a political majority attempt to frame their opposition. As public law that defines and enforces substantive prohibitions, criminal law and procedure allowed Arnold to develop some …

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The Stubborn Incoherence Of Regulatory Takings, Mark Fenster Dec 2008

The Stubborn Incoherence Of Regulatory Takings, Mark Fenster

Mark Fenster

Lingle v. Chevron (2005), the Supreme Court's most recent effort to sort the complex federal constitutional regulatory takings doctrine, resulted in what commentators have praised as a relatively unified and coherent "takings jurisprudence" and two-step adjudicatory roadmap for federal and state courts. This article reviews Lingle more than three years after its issuance to see the extent to which the Court succeeded in taming and explaining regulatory takings. It notes Lingle's successes, especially in disentangling the worst confusions regarding the relationship between regulatory takings and the substantive due process and in providing an understandable process by which state and lower …

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The Takings Clause, Version 2005: The Legal Process Of Constitutional Property Rights, Mark Fenster Dec 2006

The Takings Clause, Version 2005: The Legal Process Of Constitutional Property Rights, Mark Fenster

Mark Fenster

The three takings decisions that the Supreme Court issued at the end of its October 2004 Term marked a stunning reversal of the Court’s efforts the past three decades to use the Takings Clause to define a set of constitutional property rights. The regulatory takings doctrine, which once loomed as a significant threat to the modern regulatory state, now appears after Lingle v. Chevron to be a relatively tame, if complicated, check on exceptional instances of regulatory abuse. At the same time, the Public Use Clause, formerly an inconsequential limitation on the state’s eminent domain authority, now appears ripe for …

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The Birth Of A "Logical System": Thurman Arnold And The Making Of Modern Administrative Law, Mark Fenster Dec 2003

The Birth Of A "Logical System": Thurman Arnold And The Making Of Modern Administrative Law, Mark Fenster

Mark Fenster

Much of what we recognize as contemporary administrative law emerged during the 1920s and 1930s, a period when a group of legal academics attempted to aid Progressive Era and New Deal regulatory efforts by crafting a legitimating system for the federal administrative state. Their system assigned competent, expert institutions—most notably administrative agencies and the judiciary—well-defined roles: Agencies would utilize their vast, specialized knowledge and abilities to correct market failures, while courts would provide a limited but crucial oversight of agency operations. This Article focuses both on this first generation of administrative law scholarship, which included most prominently Felix Frankfurter and …

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