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James Wilson And The Moral Foundations Of Popular Sovereignty, Ian C. Bartrum

Ian C Bartrum

This paper explores the moral philosophy underlying the constitutional doctrine of popular sovereignty. In particular, it focuses on the Scottish sentimentalism that informed James Wilson’s understanding of that doctrine. Wilson, a transplanted Scotsman, was perhaps the nation’s preeminent lawyer in the middle 1780s. He was one of the most important delegates to the Constitutional Convention, one of the nation’s first law professors, and served as Associate Justice on the first Supreme Court. In these capacities, he developed the most sophisticated and coherent account of popular sovereignty among the founding generation. My initial effort is to enrich our understanding of Wilson’s …

Two Dogmas Of Originalism, Ian C. Bartrum

Ian C Bartrum

In the early 1950s, Willlard Quine’s Two Dogmas of Empiricism offered a devastating critique of logical positivism and the effort to distinguish “science” from “metaphysics”. Quine demonstrated that positivists relied on dogmatic oversimplifications of both the world and human practices, and, in the end, suggested that our holistic natural experience cannot be reduced to purely logical explanations. In this piece, I argue that constitutional originalism—which, too, seeks to define a constitutional “science”—relies on similar dogmatisms. In particular, I contend that the “fixation thesis,” which claims that the constitutional judge’s first task is to fix the text’s semantic meaning at a …

The Ministerial Exception And The Limits Of Religious Sovereignty, Ian C. Bartrum

Ian C Bartrum

This paper explores the scope of independent religious sovereignty in the context of the ministerial exception.

The Modalities Of Constitutional Argument: A Primer, Ian C. Bartrum

Ian C Bartrum

This piece is a contribution to Linda Edwards upcoming book Readings In Persuasion: Briefs That Changed the World (forthcoming Wolters Kluwer). In it I offer a short primer on the modalities of constitutional argument, as Philip Bobbitt has described them. As someone who teaches Constitutional Law with the primary goal of educating future practitioners, I have always brought Bobbitt’s very practical (while also very theoretical) work into my classroom discussions. I have regularly used the first chapter of Bobbitt’s Constitutional Interpretation as introductory text on the subject, but I have sometimes found the reading to be too long and/or theoretical …

Constitutional Value Judgments And Interpretive Theory Choice, Ian C. Bartrum

Ian C Bartrum

Philip Bobbitt’s remarkable work describing the ‘modalities’ of constitutional argument is an immense contribution to the study of constitutional law. He describes a typology of six forms of argument alive in our interpretive practice, and offers a limited account of how these modalities interact, and sometimes conflict, in actual constitutional decisions. One of the persistent puzzles Bobbitt’s description leaves open, however, is how we should account for the choice between conflicting modalities in cases where that choice is likely outcome-determinative. Because the modalities are ‘incommensurable’—a term’s meaning in one modality may not be fully translatable into another—there is no internal …

Nonpublic Reasons And Political Paradigm Change, Ian C. Bartrum

Ian C Bartrum

This article was a contribution to the 2010 Religious Legal Theory symposium held at St. John's Law School.

John Rawls famously argued that citizens in a just democracy have a moral duty to ensure that “the principles and policies they advocate and vote for can be supported by the political values of public reason.” This so-called “duty of civility” obligates us to cast our votes on “constitutional questions and matters of basic justice” for reasons that we can explain in terms of the public good and the “ideals and principles expressed by society’s conception of political justice.” Rawls contrasts these …

Constructing The Constitutional Canon: The Metonymic Evolution Of Federalist 10, Ian C. Bartrum

Ian C Bartrum

This paper is part of larger symposium convened for the 2010 AALS annual meeting. In it I adapt some of my earlier constitutional theoretical work to engage the topic of that symposium: the so-called “interpretation/construction distinction”. I make two related criticisms of the distinction: (1) it relies on a flawed conception of linguistic meaning, and (2) while these flaws may be harmless in the “easy” cases of interpretation, they are much more problematic in the difficult cases of most concern. Thus, I doubt the ultimate utility of the distinction as part of a “true and correct” model of constitutional theory. …