Law Commons^™

Judge James A. Wynn, Originalism, And The Juridical/Judicial Role, Michael E. Tigar

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Dysfunction, Deference, And Judicial Review, Barry Friedman, Margaret H. Lemos

Faculty Scholarship

This symposium poses a provocative question: Should judges exercising the power of judicial review defer to the political branches as a means of giving voice to the “will of the people”? The inquiry assumes a connection between majority will and the outputs of the political branches—a connection we argue is frayed, at best, in the current political context.

In the first part of this Essay, we highlight how well-known aspects of our political system—ranging from representational distortions in federal and state governments to the relationship between partisan polarization and the behavior of elected officials—call into question whether political outcomes reliably …

Judges As Superheroes: The Danger Of Confusing Constitutional Decisions With Cosmic Battles, H. Jefferson Powell

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Theorizing The Judicialization Of International Relations, Karen J. Alter, Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, Laurence R. Helfer

Faculty Scholarship

This article introduces a Thematic Section and theorizes the multiple ways that judicializing international relations shifts power away from national executives and legislatures toward litigants, judges, arbitrators, and other nonstate decision-makers. We identify two preconditions for judicialization to occur—(1) delegation to an adjudicatory body charged with applying designated legal rules, and (2) legal rights-claiming by actors who bring—or threaten to bring—a complaint to one or more of these bodies. We classify the adjudicatory bodies that do and do not contribute to judicializing international relations, including but not limited to international courts. We then explain how rights-claiming initiates a process for …

What Judges Say And Do In Deciding National Security Cases: The Example Of The State Secrets Privilege, Anthony John Trenga

Duke Law Master of Judicial Studies Theses

From the criminal trial of Aaron Burr on charges of treason to modern-day litigation involving the CIA, the state secrets privilege presents a thorny issue for federal judges. Judge Trenga examines the legal issues at the heart of this privilege—separation of powers, non-justiciability, evidentiary privilege, national security interests, and military secrets—and the two primary doctrinal tracks judges invoke. Then, based on interviews with thirty-one federal judges, Judge Trenga offers insights into how judges think about applying the state secrets privilege to sensitive material.

How Bayesian Are Judges?, Jack Knight, Mitu Gulati, David F. Levi

Faculty Scholarship

Richard Posner famously modeled judges as Bayesians in his book, How Judges Think? A key element of being Bayesian is that one constantly updates with new information. This model of the judge who is constantly learning and updating, particularly about local conditions, also is one of the reasons why the factual determinations of trial judges are given deference on appeal. But do judges in fact act like Bayesian updaters? Judicial evaluations of search warrant requests for probable cause provides an ideal setting to examine this question because the judges in this context have access to information on how well they …

Simplifying The Standard Of Review In North Carolina Administrative Appeals, Sarah H. Ludington

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

The Conflicted Assumptions Of Modern Constitutional Law, H. Jefferson Powell

Faculty Scholarship

Contribution to Symposium - The Nature of Judicial Authority: A Reflection on Philip Hamburger's Law and Judicial Duty

Piercing The Veil: William J. Brennan's Account Of Regents Of The University Of California V. Bakke, Lee Epstein, Jack Knight

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Judicial Restraint In The Administrative State: Beyond The Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Matthew D. Adler

Faculty Scholarship

Arguments for judicial restraint point to some kind of judicial deficit (such as a democratic or an epistemic deficit) as grounds for limiting judicial review. ("Judicial review" is used in this Article to mean, essentially, the judicial invalidation of statutes, rules, orders and actions in virtue of the Bill of Rights, or similar unwritten criteria.). The most influential argument for judicial restraint has been the Countermajoritarian Difficulty. This is a legislature-centered argument: one that points to features of *legislatures*, as grounds for courts to refrain from invalidating *statutes*. This Article seeks to recast scholarly debate about judicial restraint, and to …

Apartheid And The South African Judiciary, Lawrence G. Baxter

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.