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Full-Text Articles in Law

“Nationwide” Injunctions Are Really “Universal” Injunctions And They Are Never Appropriate, Howard Wasserman May 2018

“Nationwide” Injunctions Are Really “Universal” Injunctions And They Are Never Appropriate, Howard Wasserman

Howard M Wasserman

Federal district courts are routinely issuing broad injunctions prohibiting the federal government from enforcing constitutionally invalid laws, regulations, and policies on immigration and immigration-adjacent issues. Styled “nationwide injunctions,” they prohibit enforcement of the challenges laws not only against the named plaintiffs, but against all people and entities everywhere.

The first problem with these injunctions is one of nomenclature. “Nationwide” suggests something about the “where” of the injunction, the geographic scope in which it protects. The better term is “universal injunction,” which captures the real controversy over the “who” of the injunction, as courts purport to protect the universe of all …


African Courts And Separation Of Powers: A Comparative Study Of Judicial Review In Uganda & South, Joseph M. Isanga Mar 2018

African Courts And Separation Of Powers: A Comparative Study Of Judicial Review In Uganda & South, Joseph M. Isanga

Joseph Isanga

Achieving political stability in a transitional democracy is a fundamental goal, the resoluteness of which is in part maintained by courts of judicial review that are independent from political bias and devoid of deference to traditionally more powerful branches of government. The recent democratic transitions occurring in the African nations of South Africa and Uganda provide a unique, contemporary insight into the formation of a constitutional jurisprudence. This study is an examination of pivotal cases decided by the Constitutional Courts of South Africa and Uganda, the roles that these decisions play in political stability, and the potential for political bias …


African Judicial Review, The Use Of Comparative African Jurisprudence, And The Judicialization Of Politics, Joseph M. Isanga Mar 2018

African Judicial Review, The Use Of Comparative African Jurisprudence, And The Judicialization Of Politics, Joseph M. Isanga

Joseph Isanga

This Article examines African constitutional courts’ jurisprudence—that is, jurisprudence of courts that exercise judicial review—and demonstrates the increasing role of sub-Saharan Africa’s constitutional courts in the development of policy, a phenomenon commonly referred to as 'judicialization of politics' or a country’s 'judicialization project.' This Article explores the jurisprudence of constitutional courts in select African countries and specifically focuses on the promotion of democracy, respect for human rights, and the rule of law, and presupposes that although judges often take a positivist approach to adjudication, they do impact policy nevertheless. The use of judicial review in Africa has been painfully slow, …


“Nationwide” Injunctions Are Really “Universal” Injunctions And They Are Never Appropriate, Howard Wasserman Jan 2018

“Nationwide” Injunctions Are Really “Universal” Injunctions And They Are Never Appropriate, Howard Wasserman

Faculty Publications

Federal district courts are routinely issuing broad injunctions prohibiting the federal government from enforcing constitutionally invalid laws, regulations, and policies on immigration and immigration-adjacent issues. Styled “nationwide injunctions,” they prohibit enforcement of the challenges laws not only against the named plaintiffs, but against all people and entities everywhere.

The first problem with these injunctions is one of nomenclature. “Nationwide” suggests something about the “where” of the injunction, the geographic scope in which it protects. The better term is “universal injunction,” which captures the real controversy over the “who” of the injunction, as courts purport to protect the universe of all …


Still Living After Fifty Years: A Census Of Judicial Review Under The Pennsylvania Constitution Of 1968, Seth F. Kreimer Jan 2018

Still Living After Fifty Years: A Census Of Judicial Review Under The Pennsylvania Constitution Of 1968, Seth F. Kreimer

All Faculty Scholarship

The year 2018 marked the fiftieth anniversary of the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1968. The time seems ripe, therefore, to explore the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s exercise of judicial review under the 1968 Pennsylvania Constitution. This Article constitutes the first such comprehensive exploration.

The Article begins with an historical overview of the evolution of the Pennsylvania Constitution, culminating in the Constitution of 1968. It then presents a census of the 372 cases in which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has vindicated distinctive Pennsylvania Constitutional rights under the Constitution of 1968.

Analysis of these cases leads to three conclusions:

1. Exercise of independent constitutional …


Rights As Trumps?, Jamal Greene Jan 2018

Rights As Trumps?, Jamal Greene

Faculty Scholarship

Rights are more than mere interests, but they are not absolute. And so two competing frames have emerged for adjudicating conflicts over rights. Under the first frame, rights are absolute but for the exceptional circumstances in which they may be limited. Constitutional adjudication within this frame is primarily an interpretive exercise fixed on identifying the substance and reach of any constitutional rights at issue. Under the second frame, rights are limited but for the exceptional circumstances in which they are absolute. Adjudication within this frame is primarily an empirical exercise fixed on testing the government’s justification for its action. In …


Judicial Review And Non-Enforcement At The Founding, Matthew Steilen Nov 2017

Judicial Review And Non-Enforcement At The Founding, Matthew Steilen

Matthew Steilen

This Article examines the relationship between judicial review and presidential non-enforcement of statutory law. Defenders of non-enforcement regularly argue that the justification for judicial review that prevailed at the time of the founding also justifies the president in declining to enforce unconstitutional laws. The argument is unsound. This Article shows that there is essentially no historical evidence, from ratification through the first decade under the Constitution, in support of a non-enforcement power. It also shows that the framers repeatedly made statements inconsistent with the supposition that the president could refuse to enforce laws he deemed unconstitutional. In contrast, during this …


Unreasonable Disagreement?: Judicial–Executive Exchanges About Charter Reasonableness In The Harper Era, Matthew A. Hennigar Oct 2017

Unreasonable Disagreement?: Judicial–Executive Exchanges About Charter Reasonableness In The Harper Era, Matthew A. Hennigar

Osgoode Hall Law Journal

Assessments of “reasonableness” are central to adjudicating claims under several Charter rights and the section 1 “reasonable limits” clause. By comparing Supreme Court of Canada rulings to facta submitted by the Attorney General of Canada to the Court, this article examines the federal government’s success under Prime Minister Harper at persuading the Supreme Court of Canada that its Charter infringements in the area of criminal justice policy are reasonable, and when they fail to do so, on what grounds. The evidence reveals that the Conservative government adopted a consistently defensive posture in court, never conceding that a law was unreasonable, …


Chevron In The Circuit Courts: The Codebook Appendix, Kent H. Barnett, Christopher J. Walker Oct 2017

Chevron In The Circuit Courts: The Codebook Appendix, Kent H. Barnett, Christopher J. Walker

Scholarly Works

For our empirical study on the use of Chevron deference in the federal courts of appeals, we utilized the following Codebook. This Codebook draws substantially from the codebook appended to William Eskridge and Lauren Baer's pathbreaking study of administrative law's deference doctrines at the Supreme Court. Our research assistants and we followed the instructions below when coding judicial decisions. To address questions as they arose and to ensure consistent coding, we maintained close contact with each other and our research assistants throughout the project and clarified the Codebook to address additional issues. Further details concerning our methodology (and its limitations) …


Can Courts Save Us From Unconstitutional Government Conduct?, John M. Greabe Aug 2017

Can Courts Save Us From Unconstitutional Government Conduct?, John M. Greabe

Law Faculty Scholarship

[Excerpt] "We are living in a troubled time. Across the political spectrum, there is a great deal of concern that government officials have been derelict in honoring their oaths to support and defend the Constitution."


High-Stakes Interpretation, Ryan D. Doerfler Mar 2017

High-Stakes Interpretation, Ryan D. Doerfler

All Faculty Scholarship

Courts look at text differently in high-stakes cases. Statutory language that would otherwise be ‘unambiguous’ suddenly becomes ‘less than clear.’ This, in turn, frees up courts to sidestep constitutional conflicts, avoid dramatic policy changes, and, more generally, get around undesirable outcomes. The standard account of this behavior is that courts’ failure to recognize ‘clear’ or ‘unambiguous’ meanings in such cases is motivated or disingenuous, and, at best, justified on instrumentalist grounds.

This Article challenges that account. It argues instead that, as a purely epistemic matter, it is more difficult to ‘know’ what a text means—and, hence, more difficult to regard …


Soft Supremacy, Corinna Barrett Lain Jan 2017

Soft Supremacy, Corinna Barrett Lain

Law Faculty Publications

The debate over judicial supremacy has raged for more than a decade now, yet the conception of what it is we are arguing about remains grossly oversimplified and formalistic. My aim in this symposium contribution is to push the conversation in a more realistic direction; I want those who claim that judicial supremacy is antidemocratic to take on the concept as it actually exists. The stark truth is that judicial supremacy has remarkably little of the strength and hard edges that dominate the discourse in judicial supremacy debates. It is porous, contingent- soft. And the upshot of soft supremacy is …


From Parliamentary To Judicial Supremacy: Reflections In Honour Of The Constitutionalism Of Justice Moseneke, Peter G. Danchin Jan 2017

From Parliamentary To Judicial Supremacy: Reflections In Honour Of The Constitutionalism Of Justice Moseneke, Peter G. Danchin

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.


Republicanism And Natural Rights At The Founding, Jud Campbell Jan 2017

Republicanism And Natural Rights At The Founding, Jud Campbell

Law Faculty Publications

Today we tend to think about natural rights as non-positivist claims to limits on governmental authority — typically claims derived from religion, morality, or logic. These “rights,” by their very definition, exist independent of governmental control. Indeed, that is what makes them “natural.” This Essay, responding to Randy Barnett's Our Republican Constitution, sketches a different view of Founding-Era natural rights, their relationship to governmental authority, and their enforceability. With the exception of certain “rights of the mind,” natural rights were not really “rights” at all, in the sense of being determinate legal privileges or immunities. Rather, embracing natural rights meant …


Doing Gloss, Curtis A. Bradley Jan 2017

Doing Gloss, Curtis A. Bradley

Faculty Scholarship

It is common for courts, the political branches, and academic commentators to look to historical governmental practices when interpreting the separation of powers. There has been relatively little attention, however, to the proper methodology for invoking such “historical gloss.” This Essay contends that, in order to gain traction on the methodological questions, we need to begin by considering the potential justifications for crediting gloss. For judicial application of gloss, which is this Essay’s principal focus, there are at least four such justifications: deference to the constitutional views of nonjudicial actors; limits on judicial capacity; Burkean consequentialism; and reliance interests. As …


An Empirical Study Of Implicit Takings., James E. Krier, Stewart E. Sterk Oct 2016

An Empirical Study Of Implicit Takings., James E. Krier, Stewart E. Sterk

Articles

Takings scholarship has long focused on the niceties of Supreme Court doctrine, while ignoring the operation of takings law "on the ground" in the state and lower federal courts, which together decide the vast bulk of all takings cases. This study, based primarily on an empirical analysis of more than 2000 reported decisions ovcr the period 1979 through 2012, attempts to fill that void. This study establishes that the Supreme Court's categorical rules govern almost no state takings cases, and that takings claims based on government regulation almost invariably fail. By contrast, when takings claims arise out of government action …


Introduction: Is The Supreme Court Failing At Its Job, Or Are We Failing At Ours?, Suzanna Sherry May 2016

Introduction: Is The Supreme Court Failing At Its Job, Or Are We Failing At Ours?, Suzanna Sherry

Vanderbilt Law Review

It is a pleasure and a privilege to write an introduction to this Symposium celebrating Dean Erwin Chemerinsky's important new book, The Case Against the Supreme Court. Chemerinsky is one of the leading constitutional scholars of our time and a frequent advocate before the U.S. Supreme Court. If he thinks there is a case to be made against the Court, we should all take it very seriously indeed. Chemerinsky's thesis may be stated in a few sentences. The primary role of the Supreme Court, in his view, is to "protect the rights of minorities who cannot rely on the political …


Thinking About The Supreme Court's Successes And Failures, Erwin Chemerinsky May 2016

Thinking About The Supreme Court's Successes And Failures, Erwin Chemerinsky

Vanderbilt Law Review

The Supreme Court often has failed at its most important tasks and at the most important times. I set out this thesis at the beginning the book:

To be clear, I am not saying that the Supreme Court has failed at these crucial tasks every time. Making a case against the Supreme Court does not require taking such an extreme position. I also will talk about areas where the Court has succeeded in protecting minorities and in enforcing the limits of the Constitution. My claim is that the Court has often failed where and when it has been most needed. …


Declarations Of Unconstitutionality In India And The U.K.: Comparing The Space For Political Response, Chintan Chandrachud Mar 2016

Declarations Of Unconstitutionality In India And The U.K.: Comparing The Space For Political Response, Chintan Chandrachud

Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law

No abstract provided.


Marbury In Mexico: Judicial Review’S Precocious Southern Migration, M C. Mirow Feb 2016

Marbury In Mexico: Judicial Review’S Precocious Southern Migration, M C. Mirow

M. C. Mirow

In attempting to construct United States-style judicial review for the Mexican Supreme Court in the 1880s, Ignacio Vallarta, president of the court, read Marbury in a way that preceded this use of the case in the United States. Using this surprising fact as a central example, this article makes several important contributions to the field of comparative constitutional law. The work demonstrates that through constitutional migration, novel readings of constitutional sources can arise in foreign fora. In an era when the United States Supreme Court may be accused of parochialism in its constitutional analysis, the article addresses the current controversy …


Incidental Burdens And The Nature Of Judicial Review, Michael C. Dorf Jan 2016

Incidental Burdens And The Nature Of Judicial Review, Michael C. Dorf

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

Activists and scholars contesting the meaning of the Second Amendment argue over a startling number of its twenty-seven words: "regulated," "Militia," "State," "people," "keep," "bear," and "Arms." Heller and McDonald sought to resolve most of these debates, but before Professors Joseph Blocher and Darrell Miller, no one noticed the potential for contestation over the Second Amendment's final word: "infringed." When does the application of a gun-neutral law infringe the right? In that deceptively simple question lurk important future debates over the Second Amendment, the Constitution, and law itself.


What Judges Say And Do In Deciding National Security Cases: The Example Of The State Secrets Privilege, Anthony John Trenga Jan 2016

What Judges Say And Do In Deciding National Security Cases: The Example Of The State Secrets Privilege, Anthony John Trenga

Duke Law Master of Judicial Studies Theses

From the criminal trial of Aaron Burr on charges of treason to modern-day litigation involving the CIA, the state secrets privilege presents a thorny issue for federal judges. Judge Trenga examines the legal issues at the heart of this privilege—separation of powers, non-justiciability, evidentiary privilege, national security interests, and military secrets—and the two primary doctrinal tracks judges invoke. Then, based on interviews with thirty-one federal judges, Judge Trenga offers insights into how judges think about applying the state secrets privilege to sensitive material.


The Challenges Of Fitting Principled Modern Government – A Unified Public Law – To An Eighteenth Century Constitution, Peter L. Strauss Jan 2016

The Challenges Of Fitting Principled Modern Government – A Unified Public Law – To An Eighteenth Century Constitution, Peter L. Strauss

Faculty Scholarship

The papers presented at a fall 2016 conference at Cambridge University, The Unity of Public Law?, generally addressed issues of judicial review in the UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, often from a comparative perspective and the view that unifying impulses in “public law” arose from the common law. Accepting what Justice Harlan Fisk Stone once characterized as the ideal of “a unified system of judge-made and statute law woven into a seamless whole by [judges],” The Common Law in the United States, 50 Harvard L Rev 4 (1936), this paper considers a variety of issues that have complicated maintaining …


Justice-As-Fairness As Judicial Guiding Principle: Remembering John Rawls And The Warren Court, Michael Anthony Lawrence Jan 2016

Justice-As-Fairness As Judicial Guiding Principle: Remembering John Rawls And The Warren Court, Michael Anthony Lawrence

Brooklyn Law Review

The decade-and-a-half period when Earl Warren served as the fourteenth Chief Justice (1953–1969) was marked by numerous landmark rulings in the areas of racial justice, criminal procedure, reproductive autonomy, First Amendment freedom of speech, association, and religion, voting rights, and more. These decisions led to positive, fundamental changes in the lives of millions of less advantaged Americans who had been historically disfavored because of their race, nationality, gender, socioeconomic class, or political views. The legacy of the Warren Court is one of an institution committed to “a dedication in the law to the timeless ideals of ‘human dignity, individual rights, …


Separations Of Wealth: Inequality And The Erosion Of Checks And Balances, Kate Andrias Jan 2016

Separations Of Wealth: Inequality And The Erosion Of Checks And Balances, Kate Andrias

Articles

American government is dysfunctional: Gridlock, filibusters, and expanding presidential power, everyone seems to agree, threaten our basic system of constitutional governance. Who, or what, is to blame? In the standard account, the fault lies with the increasing polarization of our political parties. That standard story, however, ignores an important culprit: Concentrated wealth and its organization to achieve political ends. The only way to understand our current constitutional predicament—and to rectify it—is to pay more attention to the role that organized wealth plays in our system of checks and balances. This Article shows that the increasing concentration of wealth and political …


Constitutional Avoidance As Interpretation And As Remedy, Eric S. Fish Jan 2016

Constitutional Avoidance As Interpretation And As Remedy, Eric S. Fish

Michigan Law Review

In a number of recent landmark decisions, the Supreme Court has used the canon of constitutional avoidance to essentially rewrite laws. Formally, the avoidance canon is understood as a method for resolving interpretive ambiguities: if there are two equally plausible readings of a statute, and one of them raises constitutional concerns, judges are instructed to choose the other one. Yet in challenges to the Affordable Care Act, the Voting Rights Act, the Chemical Weapons Convention, and other major statutes, the Supreme Court has used this canon to adopt interpretations that are not plausible. Jurists, scholars, and legal commentators have criticized …


Constitutional Bad Faith, David E. Pozen Jan 2016

Constitutional Bad Faith, David E. Pozen

Faculty Scholarship

The concepts of good faith and bad faith play a central role in many areas of private law and international law. Typically associated with honesty, loyalty, and fair dealing, good faith is said to supply the fundamental principle of every legal system, if not the foundation of all law. With limited exceptions, however, good faith and bad faith go unmentioned in constitutional cases brought by or against government institutions. This doctrinal deficit is especially striking given that the U.S. Constitution twice refers to faithfulness and that insinuations of bad faith pervade constitutional discourse.

This Article investigates these points and their …


Preliminary Warnings On 'Constitutional' Idolatry, Brian Christopher Jones Dec 2015

Preliminary Warnings On 'Constitutional' Idolatry, Brian Christopher Jones

Brian Christopher Jones

Although contemporary societies covet the notion of a written constitution, the UK still stands as one of the few jurisdictions not in possession such a single document. Yet recently there has been renewed discussion regarding whether the UK should draft its own constitution (or at least entrench some form of constitutional law). A recent House of Commons committee report thoroughly analysed this prospect, and many scholars and practitioners consider such a result inevitable. This piece argues that such a document should not be drafted, but if it is, it should surely not be called a "Constitution". Difficulties arise because over …


The Role Of Courts In Improving The Legislative Process, Ittai Bar-Siman-Tov Nov 2015

The Role Of Courts In Improving The Legislative Process, Ittai Bar-Siman-Tov

Dr. Ittai Bar-Siman-Tov

In recent years, there has been growing and widespread discontent with the state of the legislative process in many legislatures. At the same time, there is an emerging trend of courts exercising judicial review of the legislative process. Against this backdrop, this article explores the question of what can be the role of courts in efforts to improve the legislative process. The article offers a fresh perspective on the problems in the legislative process and their causes. It then develops a novel argument – that does not rest upon a cynical view of legislatures, nor on a rosy picture of …


ג'ון הארט גרוניס?: פסיקתו של הנשיא גרוניס לאור התיאוריה החוקתית של אילי (John Hart Grunis?: The Jurisprudence Of Chief Justice Grunis In Light Of Ely's Constitutional Theory), Ittai Bar-Siman-Tov Nov 2015

ג'ון הארט גרוניס?: פסיקתו של הנשיא גרוניס לאור התיאוריה החוקתית של אילי (John Hart Grunis?: The Jurisprudence Of Chief Justice Grunis In Light Of Ely's Constitutional Theory), Ittai Bar-Siman-Tov

Dr. Ittai Bar-Siman-Tov

This Article analyzes the jurisprudence of CJ Grunis, the President of the Supreme Court of Israel, in light of John Hart Ely's constitutional theory. In an earlier case, during CJ Barak's Presidency, Justice Grunis publicly endorsed Ely's constitutional theory—which has put him at odds with the previous two Presidents of the Court, CJs Barak and Beinisch. Against this backdrop, this Article examines whether (or to what extent) Ely's theory can explain Justice Grunis's decisions as President of the Court. The Article argues that Ely's theory provides a more promising focal-point for evaluating President Grunis's public-law decisions than simplistic characterization such …