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Full-Text Articles in Law

Boumediene’S Quiet Theory: Access To Courts And The Separation Of Powers., Stephen I. Vladeck Jul 2009

Boumediene’S Quiet Theory: Access To Courts And The Separation Of Powers., Stephen I. Vladeck

Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals

At the core of Justice Kennedy's majority opinion in Boumediene v. Bush are his repeated suggestions that habeas corpus is an integral aspect of the separation of powers, and that, as such, the writ remains relevant even when the individual rights of those who would seek its protections are unclear. And whereas some might view these passages as little more than rhetorical flourishes, it is difficult to understand the crux of Kennedy's analysis - of why the review available to the Guantanamo detainees failed to provide an adequate alternative to habeas corpus - without understanding the significance of his separation-of-powers …


Guantanamo, Boumediene, And Jurisdiction-Stripping: The Imperial President Meets The Imperial Court, Martin J. Katz Jan 2009

Guantanamo, Boumediene, And Jurisdiction-Stripping: The Imperial President Meets The Imperial Court, Martin J. Katz

Sturm College of Law: Faculty Scholarship

This essay argues that the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Boumediene v. Bush, its latest pronouncement on the detainees in Guantanamo Bay, should be understood as a jurisdiction-stripping case. Most of the commentators to address the case so far have seen it as a case about the war on terror, or about the reach of habeas corpus. I argue that this decision takes significant steps toward resolving a debate that has been raging among the giants of constitutional law for more than 50 years: Can Congress “strip” jurisdiction from the federal courts to prevent them from hearing certain important cases? …


Judicial Review, Local Values, And Pluralism, Richard W. Garnett Jan 2009

Judicial Review, Local Values, And Pluralism, Richard W. Garnett

Journal Articles

At the Federalist Society's 2008 National Student Symposium, a panel of scholars was asked to consider the question, does pervasive judicial review threaten to destroy local identity by homogenizing community norms? The answer to this question is yes, pervasive judicial review certainly does threaten local identity, because such review can homogenize[e] community norms, either by dragging them into conformity with national, constitutional standards or (more controversially) by subordinating them to the reviewers' own commitments. It is important to recall, however, that while it is true that an important feature of our federalism is local variation in laws and values, it …


Withdrawal: The Roberts Court And The Retreat From Election Law, Ellen D. Katz Jan 2009

Withdrawal: The Roberts Court And The Retreat From Election Law, Ellen D. Katz

Articles

Last Term the Supreme Court handed down four decisions that upheld diverse efforts by state governments to regulate the electoral process. The Court turned back challenges to New York’s method for nominating judicial candidates, Washington’s modified blanket primary system, Indiana’s voter identification requirement, and Alabama’s use of gubernatorial appointment to fill county commission vacancies in Mobile County. Unlike other recent election decisions, these were not close cases. All nine Justices supported the New York holding, while supermajorities voted in favor of the result in the others. This consensus, moreover, emerged even as the Court voted to reverse unanimous decisions by …


Understanding The Paradoxical Case Of The Voting Rights Act, Luis Fuentes-Rohwer Jan 2009

Understanding The Paradoxical Case Of The Voting Rights Act, Luis Fuentes-Rohwer

Articles by Maurer Faculty

This is an article about the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and its curious handling by the U.S. Supreme Court. When the Court examines the constitutionality of the Act, for example, it blindly defers to the work of Congress, unwilling to subject the statute to any meaningful scrutiny. In contrast, this posture of deference for questions of constitutional law differs greatly from the Court’s posture when interpreting the language of the statute. This is an area where the Court defers to no one, even when the text of the statute or the clear intent of Congress demands a different outcome. …


Against Textualism, William Michael Treanor Jan 2009

Against Textualism, William Michael Treanor

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Modern textualists have assumed that careful attention to constitutional text is the key to the recovery of the Constitution's original public meaning. This article challenges that assumption by showing the importance of nontextual factors in early constitutional interpretation. The Founding generation consistently relied on structural concerns, policy, ratifiers' and drafters' intent, and broad principles of government. To exclude such nontextual factors from constitutional interpretation is to depart from original public meaning because the Founders gave these factors great weight in ascertaining meaning. Moreover, for a modern judge seeking to apply original public meaning, the threshold question is not simply; "How …


From Bush V. Gore To Namudno: A Response To Professor Amar, Ellen D. Katz Jan 2009

From Bush V. Gore To Namudno: A Response To Professor Amar, Ellen D. Katz

Articles

In his Dunwody Lecture, Professor Akhil Amar invites us to revisit the Bush v. Gore controversy and consider what went wrong. This short essay responds to Professor Amar by taking up his invitation and looking at the decision through a seemingly improbable lens, the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision last June in Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District No. One (NAMUDNO) v. Holder. Among its many surprises, NAMUDNO helps illuminate the Court’s fundamental error nine years ago. Professor Amar forcefully argues that the mistrust with which the Justices in the Bush v. Gore majority viewed the Florida Supreme Court was both unjustified …


The Reviewability Of The President's Statutory Powers, Kevin M. Stack Jan 2009

The Reviewability Of The President's Statutory Powers, Kevin M. Stack

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

This Article argues that longstanding doctrines that exclude judicial review of the determinations or findings the President makes as conditions for invoking statutory powers should be replaced. These doctrines are inconsistent with the fundamental constitutional commitment to reviewing whether federal officials act with legal authorization. Where a statute grants power conditioned upon an official making a determination that certain conditions obtain - as statutes that grant power to the President often do - review of whether that power is validly exercised requires review of the determinations the official makes to invoke the power. Review of those determinations is commonplace with …


On The Origins Of Originalism, Jamal Greene Jan 2009

On The Origins Of Originalism, Jamal Greene

Faculty Scholarship

For all its proponents' claims of its necessity as a means of constraining judges, originalism is remarkably unpopular outside the United States. Recommended responses to judicial activism in other countries more typically take the form of minimalism or textualism. This Article considers why. Ifocus particular attention on the political and constitutional histories of Canada and Australia, nations that, like the United States, have well-established traditions of judicial enforcement of a written constitution, and that share with the United States a common law adjudicative norm, but whose political and legal cultures less readily assimilate judicial restraint to constitutional historicism. I offer …


Rulemaking And The American Constitution, Peter L. Strauss Jan 2009

Rulemaking And The American Constitution, Peter L. Strauss

Faculty Scholarship

A Constitution that strongly separates legislative from executive activity makes it difficult to reconcile executive adoption of regulations (that is, departmentally adopted texts resembling statutes and having the force of law, if valid) with the proposition that the President is not ‘to be a lawmaker’. Such activity is, of course, an essential of government in the era of the regulatory state. United States courts readily accept the delegation to responsible agencies of authority to engage in it, what we call ‘rulemaking’, so long as it occurs in a framework that permits them to assess the legality of any particular exercise. …