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Judicial review

Constitutional Law

Osgoode Hall Law School of York University

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Unreasonable Disagreement?: Judicial–Executive Exchanges About Charter Reasonableness In The Harper Era, Matthew A. Hennigar Oct 2017

Unreasonable Disagreement?: Judicial–Executive Exchanges About Charter Reasonableness In The Harper Era, Matthew A. Hennigar

Osgoode Hall Law Journal

Assessments of “reasonableness” are central to adjudicating claims under several Charter rights and the section 1 “reasonable limits” clause. By comparing Supreme Court of Canada rulings to facta submitted by the Attorney General of Canada to the Court, this article examines the federal government’s success under Prime Minister Harper at persuading the Supreme Court of Canada that its Charter infringements in the area of criminal justice policy are reasonable, and when they fail to do so, on what grounds. The evidence reveals that the Conservative government adopted a consistently defensive posture in court, never conceding that a law was unreasonable, …


The Supreme Court Of Canada, Charter Dialogue, And Deference, Rosalind Dixon Apr 2009

The Supreme Court Of Canada, Charter Dialogue, And Deference, Rosalind Dixon

Osgoode Hall Law Journal

For those concerned about the democratic legitimacy of Charter review by Canadian courts, the idea of dialogue offers a promising middle path between the extremes of judicial and legislative supremacy. Current dialogue theory, however, largely fails to live up to this promise of compromise. Instead of distinguishing democratic worries associated with US style, strong-form judicial review, it largely endorses the legitimacy of such review. For dialogue to live up to its original promise, a new theory that more clearly distinguishes Canada from the United States is required. This article offers a new theory of dialogue in which the willingness of …


Judicial Review And American Constitutional Exceptionalism, Miguel Schor Jul 2008

Judicial Review And American Constitutional Exceptionalism, Miguel Schor

Osgoode Hall Law Journal

This article challenges the conventional view of the pervasiveness of American-style judicial review. It questions why social movements contest constitutional meaning by fighting over judicial appointments in the United States, and why this strategy makes little sense in democracies that constitutionalized rights in the late twentieth century. The United States has been both a model and an anti-model in the global spread of judicial review, as the hope of Marbury (constitutionalized rights) has been tempered by the fear of Lochner [courts run amok). In reconciling Marbury and Lochner, other polities have adopted stronger mechanisms of judicial accountability that make it …


Taking Dialogue Theory Much Too Seriously (Or Perhaps Charter Dialogue Isn't Such A Good Thing After All), Andrew Petter Jan 2007

Taking Dialogue Theory Much Too Seriously (Or Perhaps Charter Dialogue Isn't Such A Good Thing After All), Andrew Petter

Osgoode Hall Law Journal

This article challenges the thesis of Peter W. Hogg, Allison A. Bushell Thornton, and Wade K. Wright (put forth earlier in this issue) that the frequency of legislative responses to Charter decisions striking down laws, which they refer to as "Charter dialogue," provides evidence that Canada has a weaker form of. judicial review than is thought to exist in the United States. This article also critiques their claim that judicial review is justified by the idea that individuals have rights that cannot be taken away by an appeal to the general welfare'. The author maintains that this claim not only …


Does The Observer Have An Effect?: An Analysis Of The Use Of The Dialogue Metaphor In Canada's Courts, Richard Haigh, Michael Sobkin Jan 2007

Does The Observer Have An Effect?: An Analysis Of The Use Of The Dialogue Metaphor In Canada's Courts, Richard Haigh, Michael Sobkin

Osgoode Hall Law Journal

In "Charter Dialogue Revisited-Or 'Much Ado About Metaphors,"' it is noted that the original idea behind the dialogue metaphor was simply to describe Canada's constitutional structure. Despite this, the metaphor has been criticized for having normative content and influencing courts and legislatures. In this commentary, the authors analyze all Supreme Court of Canada and lower court uses of the dialogue metaphor and conclude that, with some exceptions, the courts have employed the metaphor properly, i.e., descriptively. Since, however, the metaphor can be misapplied-used other than to describe or explain the relationship between the courts and legislatures in Canada-the authors recommend …


Charter Dialogue Revisited: Or "Much Ado About Metaphors", Peter W. Hogg, Allison A. Bushell Thornton, Wade K. Wright Jan 2007

Charter Dialogue Revisited: Or "Much Ado About Metaphors", Peter W. Hogg, Allison A. Bushell Thornton, Wade K. Wright

Osgoode Hall Law Journal

This article is a sequel to the 1997 article "The Charter Dialogue Between Courts and Legislatures (Or Perhaps The Charter of Rights Isn't Such A Bad Thing After All)." In the present article, the authors review various academic critiques of their "dialogue" theory, which postulates that Charter decisions striking down laws are not the last word, but rather the beginning of a "dialogue," because legislative bodies are generally able to (and generally do) enact sequel legislation that accomplishes the main objective of the unconstitutional law. The authors also examine the Supreme Court of Canada's dicta on the "dialogue" phenomenon, and …


Constitutionalism From The Top Down, Grant Huscroft Jan 2007

Constitutionalism From The Top Down, Grant Huscroft

Osgoode Hall Law Journal

Dialogue theory regards judicial interpretation of the Charter as authoritative, and, as a result, denies that continuing disagreement with the courts is legitimate. There is little scope, in other words, for dialogue with the courts in any meaningful sense. The Charter is best understood as establishing strong-form judicial review rather than weak, and legislatures have only as much room to respond to judicial decisions as the courts are prepared to allow.


The Day The Dialogue Died: A Comment On Sauve V. Canada, Christopher P. Manfredi Jan 2007

The Day The Dialogue Died: A Comment On Sauve V. Canada, Christopher P. Manfredi

Osgoode Hall Law Journal

In Sauvé v. Canada (2002) a sharply divided Supreme Court of Canada nullified the inmate disenfranchisement provision of the Canada Elections Act. One of the more important aspects of the majority decision by Chief Justice McLachlin is her refusal to let the concept of dialogue take her down the path of judicial deference. This commentary examines the chief justice's reasons for not taking this path and explores how these reasons reveal the limitations of the dialogue metaphor as originally articulated by Peter Hogg and Allison Bushell. The commentary concludes that any meaningful concept of legislative-judicial dialogue must recognize a coordinate …


Dialogue Theory, Judicial Review, And Judicial Supremacy: A Comment On "Charter Dialogue Revisted", Carissima Mathen Jan 2007

Dialogue Theory, Judicial Review, And Judicial Supremacy: A Comment On "Charter Dialogue Revisted", Carissima Mathen

Osgoode Hall Law Journal

By suggesting that we view the judicial-legislative relationship as a dialogue, the authors of "Charter Dialogue" have greatly influenced constitutional debate in Canada. This commentary offers three observations about the authors' latest contribution. First, it queries the continued usefulness of the term "dialogue." Second, it raises concerns with the idea that section 1 of the Charter promotes dialogue, as the term is now explained by the authors. Finally, it queries the authors' perspective on judicial review and their accompanying terminology.


Sharpening The Dialogue Debate: The Next Decade Of Scholarship, Kent Roach Jan 2007

Sharpening The Dialogue Debate: The Next Decade Of Scholarship, Kent Roach

Osgoode Hall Law Journal

The first part of this commentary examines the roles of coordinate construction in which legislatures act on their own interpretation of the constitution, second look cases in which the courts judge the constitutionality of a legislative reply to a judicial decision, and various constitutional remedies. The second part examines some differences in emphasis between the author's approach to dialogue and that taken by Hogg and his co-authors with respect to the justification of the judicial role in the dialogue, the relation between Charter dialogue and common law constitutionalism, and the proper interpretive approach to section 7 of the Charter. Three …


The Charter Of Rights And Freedoms And The Rebalancing Of Liberal Constitutionalism In Canada, 1982-1997, James B. Kelly Jul 1999

The Charter Of Rights And Freedoms And The Rebalancing Of Liberal Constitutionalism In Canada, 1982-1997, James B. Kelly

Osgoode Hall Law Journal

This article presents a statistical analysis of the first 352 Charter of Rights and Freedoms decisions by the Supreme Court of Canada between 1982 and 1997. The author argues that the emerging approach to Charter review by the Supreme Court of Canada has led to a rebalancing of liberal constitutionalism and to a reconciliation between Charter rights and federalism. This stands in stark contrast to the highly activist approach to Charter review detected in studies by Morton, Russell, and Withey and, to a lesser extent, by Morton, Russell, and Riddell. Several factors illustrate the rebalancing of liberal constitutionalism in Canada. …


The Charter Dialogue Between Courts And Legislatures (Or Perhaps The Charter Of Rights Isn't Such A Bad Thing After All), Peter W. Hogg, Allison A. Bushell Jan 1997

The Charter Dialogue Between Courts And Legislatures (Or Perhaps The Charter Of Rights Isn't Such A Bad Thing After All), Peter W. Hogg, Allison A. Bushell

Osgoode Hall Law Journal

This article responds to the argument that judicial review of legislation under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms is illegitimate because it is undemocratic. The authors show that Charter cases nearly always can be, and often are, followed by new legislation that still accomplishes the same objectives as the legislation that was struck down. The effect of the Charter is rarely to block a legislative objective, but rather to influence the design of implementing legislation. Charter cases cause a public debate in which Charter-protected rights have a more prominent role than they would have if there had been no …


Constitutional Arguments: Interpretation And Legitimacy In Canadian Constitutional Thought, Joel C. Bakan Jan 1989

Constitutional Arguments: Interpretation And Legitimacy In Canadian Constitutional Thought, Joel C. Bakan

Osgoode Hall Law Journal

The author provides an analysis and critique of the various types of arguments advanced by Canadian constitutional jurists to establish formal grounds for the legitimacy of judicial review under the Canadian constitution. He demonstrates how two variables - constitutional truth and trust in the judiciary - are relied upon in past and contemporary debates about constitutional adjudication to construct four different types of argument about the legitimacy of judicial review. Each of these types of argument is then criticized in the context of recent Charter decisions. It is argued that none of them can sustain the burden of legitimating judicial …


Ventriloquism And The Verbal Icon: A Comment On Professor Hogg's "The Charter And American Theories Of Interpretation", Richard F. Devlin Jan 1988

Ventriloquism And The Verbal Icon: A Comment On Professor Hogg's "The Charter And American Theories Of Interpretation", Richard F. Devlin

Osgoode Hall Law Journal

In this brief comment I offer some critical reflections on Professor Hogg's proposed approach to Charter interpretation. I suggest that Professor Hogg's attempt to legitimize and constrain judicial review is an exercise in confession and avoidance. On the one hand, he admits that "interpretivism" is explanatorily inadequate, yet on the other he refuses to accept "non-interpretivism" for he realizes that it has the potential to unmask the politics of law. I argue that Hogg's third way - that Charter interpretation should be progressive and purposive - is incapable of bearing the legitimizing weight which he requires in that it necessitates …