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Full-Text Articles in Law
What's The Difference Between A Conclusion And A Fact?, Howard M. Erichson
What's The Difference Between A Conclusion And A Fact?, Howard M. Erichson
Faculty Scholarship
In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, building on Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, the Supreme Court instructed district courts to treat a complaint’s conclusions differently from allegations of fact. Facts, but not conclusions, are assumed true for purposes of a motion to dismiss. The Court did little to help judges or lawyers understand this elusive distinction, and, indeed, obscured the distinction with its language. The Court said it was distinguishing “legal conclusions” from factual allegations. The application in Twombly and Iqbal, however, shows that the relevant distinction is not between law and fact, but rather between different types of factual assertions. This …
The Changing Odds Of The Chancery Lottery, Marianna Wonder
The Changing Odds Of The Chancery Lottery, Marianna Wonder
Fordham Law Review
Delaware is home to the majority of shareholder class action litigations related to mergers and acquisitions (M&A). These cases usually result in settlements that provide shareholders with only disclosure in exchange for a broad release of future claims, which encompasses unknown and federal security claims. The Delaware Court of Chancery must review and approve these settlements under Delaware Rule 23(e), which has been interpreted as creating a fiduciary duty for the court to protect the interests of absent shareholders. Nevertheless, Delaware has a history of routinely approving disclosure-only settlements with laxity. Recently, members of the court have begun discussing the …
Elected Judges And Statutory Interpretation, Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Ethan J. Leib
Elected Judges And Statutory Interpretation, Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Ethan J. Leib
Faculty Scholarship
This Article considers whether differences in methods of judicial selection should influence how judges approach statutory interpretation. Courts and scholars have not given this question much sustained attention, but most would probably embrace the “unified model,” according to which appointed judges (such as federal judges) and elected judges (such as many state judges) are supposed to approach statutory text in identical ways. There is much to be said for the unified model—and we offer the first systematic defense of it. But the Article also attempts to make the best case for the more controversial but also plausible contrary view: that …