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The Second Dimension Of The Supreme Court, Joshua B. Fischman, Tonja Jacobi Aug 2015

The Second Dimension Of The Supreme Court, Joshua B. Fischman, Tonja Jacobi

Tonja Jacobi

Describing the justices of the Supreme Court as ‘liberals’ and ‘conservatives’ has become so standard—and the left-right division on the Court is considered so entrenched—that any deviation from that pattern is treated with surprise. Attentive Court watchers know that the justices are not just politicians in robes, deciding each case on a purely ideological basis. Yet the increasingly influential empirical legal studies literature assumes just that—that a left-right ideological dimension fully describes the Supreme Court. We show that there is a second, more legally-focused dimension of judicial decision-making. A continuum between legalism and pragmatism also divides the justices, in ways …


Ideological Voting Applied To The School Desegregation Cases In The Federal Courts Of Appeals From The 1960’S And 70’S, Joe Custer Feb 2013

Ideological Voting Applied To The School Desegregation Cases In The Federal Courts Of Appeals From The 1960’S And 70’S, Joe Custer

Joe Custer

This paper considers a research suggestion from Cass Sunstein to analyze segregation cases from the 1960's and 1970's and whether three hypothesis he projected in the article "Ideological Voting on Federal Courts of Appeals: A Preliminary Investigation," 90 Va. L. Rev. 301 (2004), involving various models of judicial ideology, would pertain. My paper considers Sunstein’s three hypotheses in addition to other judicial ideologies to try to empirically determine what was influencing Federal Court of Appeals Judges in regard to Civil Rights issues, specifically school desegregation, in the 1960’s and 1970’s.


Taking The Measure Of Ideology: Empirically Measuring Supreme Court Cases, Tonja Jacobi, Matthew Sag Feb 2009

Taking The Measure Of Ideology: Empirically Measuring Supreme Court Cases, Tonja Jacobi, Matthew Sag

Tonja Jacobi

Empirical legal studies have become increasingly popular and influential, but empirical analysis is only as good as its tools. Until recently, no sophisticated measure of case outcomes existed. Jacobi (2009) developed three possible measures of case outcomes, based on three common theories of how Justices balance the trade-off between outcome optimization and coalition maximization. This Article extends Jacobi’s earlier theoretical work by empirically testing those competing measures of case outcomes.

The competing measures are initially assessed against a dataset of over 8000 Supreme Court cases decided between 1953 and 2006. The measures are also assessed in a more targeted fashion …


The Intersection Of Judicial Attitudes And Litigant Selection Theories: Explaining U.S. Supreme Court Decision Making, Jeff L. Yates, Elizabeth Coggins Jan 2009

The Intersection Of Judicial Attitudes And Litigant Selection Theories: Explaining U.S. Supreme Court Decision Making, Jeff L. Yates, Elizabeth Coggins

Jeff L Yates

Two prominent theories of legal decision making provide seemingly contradictory explanations for judicial outcomes. In political science, the Attitudinal Model suggests that judicial outcomes are driven by judges' sincere policy preferences -- judges bring their ideological inclinations to the decision making process and their case outcome choices largely reflect these policy preferences. In contrast, in the law and economics literature, Priest and Klein's well-known Selection Hypothesis posits that court outcomes are largely driven by the litigants' strategic choices in the selection of cases for formal dispute or adjudication -- forward thinking litigants settle cases where potential judicial outcomes are readily …


Diabolical Frivolity Of Neoliberal Fundamentalism, Sefik Tatlic Jan 2009

Diabolical Frivolity Of Neoliberal Fundamentalism, Sefik Tatlic

Sefik Tatlic

Today, we cannot talk just about plain control, but we must talk about the nature of the interaction of the one who is being controlled and the one who controls, an interaction where the one that is “controlled” is asking for more control over himself/herself while expecting to be compensated by a surplus of freedom to satisfy trivial needs and wishes. Such a liberty for the fulfillment of trivial needs is being declared as freedom. But this implies as well the freedom to choose not to be engaged in any kind of socially sensible or politically articulated struggle.