Law Commons^™

Florida's Removal Of Safeguards For Defendants On Death-Row: Comparative Proportionality Review, Loana Nardoni

Florida State University Law Review

No abstract provided.

Getting To Death: Race And The Paths Of Capital Cases After Furman, Jeffrey A. Fagan, Garth Davies, Ray Paternoster

Faculty Scholarship

Decades of research on the administration of the death penalty have recognized the persistent arbitrariness in its implementation and the racial inequality in the selection of defendants and cases for capital punishment. This Article provides new insights into the combined effects of these two constitutional challenges. We show how these features of post-Furman capital punishment operate at each stage of adjudication, from charging death-eligible cases to plea negotiations to the selection of eligible cases for execution and ultimately to the execution itself, and how their effects combine to sustain the constitutional violations first identified 50 years ago in Furman …

Capital Punishment And The Bifurcated Trial System, Alexandra Michalak

Grawemeyer Colloquium Papers

Capital punishment is a long-debated issue in United States public policy, with arguments ranging from complete abolition of the penalty to continuing the punishment in states that wish to do so. Regardless of evolving public opinion, numerous landmark Supreme Court cases have ruled capital punishment as constitutional under the Eighth Amendment, which outlaws cruel and unusual punishment. In Furman v. Georgia (1972), the court ruled in a 5-4 decision that certain applications of the death penalty were unconstitutional, vacating the current processes of capital punishment. After this decision, Georgia then adopted the bifurcated trial system to attempt to practice capital …

A Comparative Study On Death Penalty Statutes And Their Effects On Certain Minority Groups In Light Of Furman V. Georgia, Analise Nuxoll

Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary

Part One of this comment will address the recent history of the death penalty in the United States, focusing on Furman v. Georgia, which placed a four-year moratorium on the death penalty in 1972. Part Two examines which states still have death penalty statutes and the reasons for choosing the selected states for further analysis. Part Two also addresses the difference between facial and as-applied attacks on the state statutes and the reason for analyzing the statutes under as applied unconstitutionality. Part Three explains the thought behind choosing to examine the death penalty’s effect on racial minorities, low socio-economic classes, …

Judges Do It Better: Why Judges Can (And Should) Decide Life Or Death, Andrew R. Ford

Dickinson Law Review (2017-Present)

Following its decision in Furman v. Georgia, the Supreme Court of the United States has attempted to standardize procedures that states use to subject offenders to the ultimate penalty. In practice, this attempt at standardization has divided capital sentencing into two distinct parts: the death eligibility decision and the death selection decision. The eligibility decision addresses whether the sentencer may impose the death penalty, while the selection decision determines who among that limited subset of eligible offenders is sentenced to death. In Ring v. Arizona, the Court held for the first time that the Sixth Amendment right to …

Remember Not To Forget Furman: A Response To Professor Smith, Sam Kamin, Justin F. Marceau

Sturm College of Law: Faculty Scholarship

Professor Robert J. Smith encourages readers, lawyers, and courts to forget Furman v. Georgia and to focus instead on death penalty challenges grounded in the diminished culpability of nearly all capital defendants. We applaud Professor Smith’s call to focus on the mental and emotional characteristics that reduce the blameworthiness of so many of those charged with capital crimes; recognizing diminished culpability as the rule rather than the exception among capital defendants conveys a reality that rarely finds its way into reported cases. We are troubled, however, by Professor Smith’s call to “forget Furman.” We believe the title and the …

When Lightning Strikes Back: South Carolina's Return To The Unconstitutional Standardless Capital Sentencing Regime Of The Pre-Furman Era, John H. Blume, Sheri Johnson, Emily C. Paavola, Keir M. Weyble

Sheri Lynn Johnson

No abstract provided.

Post-Mccleskey Racial Discrimination Claims In Capital Cases, John H. Blume, Theodore Eisenberg, Sheri Lynn Johnson

Sheri Lynn Johnson

In federal habeas corpus proceedings, Earl Matthews, an African American, South Carolina death row inmate, alleged that his death sentence was the result of invidious racial discrimination that violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. To support his contention, Matthews presented statistical evidence showing that in Charleston County, where a jury convicted him and sentenced him to death, the prosecutor was far more likely to seek a death sentence for a Black defendant accused of killing a white person than for any other racial combination of victims and defendants, and also that such a Black defendant was more …

Probing "Life Qualification" Through Expanded Voir Dire, John H. Blume, Sheri Lynn Johnson, A. Brian Threlkeld

Sheri Lynn Johnson

The conventional wisdom is that most trials are won or lost in jury selection. If this is true, then in many capital cases, jury selection is literally a matter of life or death. Given these high stakes and Supreme Court case law setting out standards for voir dire in capital cases, one might expect a sophisticated and thoughtful process in which each side carefully considers which jurors would be best in the particular case. Instead, it turns out that voir dire in capital cases is woefully ineffective at the most elementary task--weeding out unqualified jurors. Empirical evidence reveals that many …

Expert Testimony In Capital Sentencing: Juror Responses, John H. Montgomery, J. Richard Ciccone, Stephen P. Garvey, Theodore Eisenberg

Stephen P. Garvey

The U.S. Supreme Court, in Furman v. Georgia (1972), held that the death penalty is constitutional only when applied on an individualized basis. The resultant changes in the laws in death penalty states fostered the involvement of psychiatric and psychologic expert witnesses at the sentencing phase of the trial, to testify on two major issues: (1) the mitigating factor of a defendant’s abnormal mental state and (2) the aggravating factor of a defendant’s potential for future violence. This study was an exploration of the responses of capital jurors to psychiatric/psychologic expert testimony during capital sentencing. The Capital Jury Project is …

Death-Innocence And The Law Of Habeas Corpus, Stephen P. Garvey

Stephen P. Garvey

The legal space between a sentence of death and the execution chamber is occupied by an intricate network of procedural rules. On average, it currently takes between six and seven years to traverse this space, but this interval is expected to shrink. Federal habeas corpus, an important part of this space, is studded more and more with procedural obstacles that bar the federal courts from entertaining the merits of a defendant's claims. By design, these barriers foreclose federal review in order to protect the state's interests in the finality of its criminal convictions, as well as to display healthy respect …

When Lightning Strikes Back: South Carolina's Return To The Unconstitutional Standardless Capital Sentencing Regime Of The Pre-Furman Era, John H. Blume, Sheri Johnson, Emily C. Paavola, Keir M. Weyble

John H. Blume

No abstract provided.

Post-Mccleskey Racial Discrimination Claims In Capital Cases, John H. Blume, Theodore Eisenberg, Sheri Lynn Johnson

John H. Blume

In federal habeas corpus proceedings, Earl Matthews, an African American, South Carolina death row inmate, alleged that his death sentence was the result of invidious racial discrimination that violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. To support his contention, Matthews presented statistical evidence showing that in Charleston County, where a jury convicted him and sentenced him to death, the prosecutor was far more likely to seek a death sentence for a Black defendant accused of killing a white person than for any other racial combination of victims and defendants, and also that such a Black defendant was more …

Probing "Life Qualification" Through Expanded Voir Dire, John H. Blume, Sheri Lynn Johnson, A. Brian Threlkeld

John H. Blume

The conventional wisdom is that most trials are won or lost in jury selection. If this is true, then in many capital cases, jury selection is literally a matter of life or death. Given these high stakes and Supreme Court case law setting out standards for voir dire in capital cases, one might expect a sophisticated and thoughtful process in which each side carefully considers which jurors would be best in the particular case. Instead, it turns out that voir dire in capital cases is woefully ineffective at the most elementary task--weeding out unqualified jurors. Empirical evidence reveals that many …

Challenging The Death Penalty With Statistics: Furman, Mccleskey And A Single County Case Study, Steven Shatz, Teresa Dalton

Steven F. Shatz

Byron White-Hero And Scholar: Reflections About Punishment, Political Speech, And Public Liability, Justice John Paul Stevens

University of Colorado Law Review

No abstract provided.

Time To Kill The Death Penalty, John J. Donohue

John Donohue

Forty years ago this week, the U.S. Supreme Court in Furman v. Georgia struck down the death penalty on the ground that it was applied in an arbitrary manner. Four years later, the Supreme Court accepted the constitutionality of “new and improved” death penalty statutes that were supposed to eliminate the defects condemned in Furman. In bringing back the death penalty in 1976, the Court also cited studies suggesting that executions save lives.

Four decades later, there is plenty of evidence that the death penalty continues to be applied in an unfair manner and not a shred of evidence that …

Constitutional Concerns About Capital Punishment: The Death Penalty Statute In New York State, Richard Klein

Richard Daniel Klein

No abstract provided.

The Folly - And Faith - Of Furman, John H. Blume, Sheri Lynn Johnson

The Journal of Appellate Practice and Process

No abstract provided.

The Slow Wheels Of Furman's Machinery Of Death, Brent E. Newton

The Journal of Appellate Practice and Process

No abstract provided.

Does New York's Death Penalty Statute Violate The New York Constitution? (Symposium: New York State Constitutional Law: Trends And Developments), Richard Klein, Hon. Stewart F. Hancock, Jr., Christopher Quinn

Richard Daniel Klein

No abstract provided.

History Repeats Itself: The Post-Furman Return To Arbitrariness In Capital Punishment, Lindsey S. Vann

Law Student Publications

Part I of this comment provides a brief review of Furman and the circumstances leading to the decision. Part II discusses the factors indicating current arbitrariness and other recurring fac-tors surrounding the American death penalty. Part III examines the development of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause since Furman. Finally, Part IV discusses how the Supreme Court should apply its contemporary Eighth Amendment doctrine to the current circumstances surrounding the imposition of the death penalty.

The Constitutionality Of Collateral Post-Conviction Claims Of Actual Innocence Comment., Craig M. Jacobs

St. Mary's Law Journal

The notion that the state can punish innocent people disrupts public confidence in the usefulness of the criminal justice system. If, by legislative design, the criminal justice system is not concerned with or is accepting of situations where innocent people are punished by the state, should courts take immediate action? Once criminal defendants exhaust the appellate process, Supreme Court Justices have stated, federal courts should not hear claims of actual innocence. Such statements are supported by the federal habeas corpus statute as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). AEDPA requires federal habeas courts to …

The Impact Of Civilian Aggravating Factors On The Military Death Penalty (1984-2005): Another Chapter In The Resistance Of The Armed Forces To The Civilianization Of Military Justice, Catherine M. Grosso, David C. Baldus, George Woodworth

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

In 1984, the U.S. Armed Forces amended its capital punishment system for death eligible murder to bring it into compliance with Furman v. Georgia. Those amendments were modeled after death penalty legislation prevailing in over thirty states. After a brief period between 1986 and 1990, the charging decisions of commanders and the conviction and sentencing decisions of court martial members (jurors) transformed the military death penalty system into a dual system that treats two classes of death eligible murder quite differently. Since 1990, a member of the armed forces accused of a killing a commissioned officer or murder with a …

When Lightning Strikes Back: South Carolina's Return To The Unconstitutional Standardless Capital Sentencing Regime Of The Pre-Furman Era, John H. Blume, Sheri Johnson, Emily C. Paavola, Keir M. Weyble

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Furman'S Mythical Mandate, Scott W. Howe

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

This Article argues for the rescue and reform of Supreme Court doctrine regulating capital sentencing trials under the Eighth Amendment. Many legal commentators, both liberal and conservative, including several members of the Supreme Court, have concluded that the Court's regulation of capital sentencing trials is a disaster. The repeated criticisms rest on a commonly accepted view about a principal goal of capital sentencing regulation. The prevailing account, fueled by the rhetoric of the Justices, stems from the notion that Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 208 (1972), revealed a mandate of consistency in the use of the death penalty that …

Furman Fundamentals, Corinna Barrett Lain

Law Faculty Publications

For the first time in a long time, the Supreme Court's most important death penalty decisions all have gone the defendant's way. Is the Court's newfound willingness to protect capital defendants just a reflection of the times, or could it have come even without public support for those protections? At first glance, history allows for optimism. Furman v. Georgia, the 1972 landmark decision that invalidated the death penalty, provides a seemingly perfect example of the Court's ability and inclination to protect capital defendants when no one else will. Furman looks countermajoritarian, scholars have claimed it was countermajoritarian, and even …

Categorical Exclusions From Capital Punishment: How Many Wrongs Make A Right?, Dora W. Klein

Faculty Articles

The two categorical exclusions of age and mental capacity will impact not only those offenders who are excluded from the death penalty, but also those offenders who remain subject to this punishment. The Supreme Court’s decisions in Roper v. Simmons and Atkins v. Virginia raise the issue that a capital-punishment-limiting decision possesses wrongs of its own. Both decisions limit the death penalty—Roper excludes from this punishment offenders who committed their crimes before they were eighteen years old and Atkins excludes offenders who are mentally retarded. But in both cases, the Supreme Court overstated the uniformity and universality of traits associated …

Putting The Guesswork Back Into Capital Sentencing, Sean O'Brien

Faculty Works

In 1972, in Furman v. Georgia, the Supreme Court deemed it "incontestable" that a death sentence is cruel and unusual if inflicted "by reason of [the defendant's] race, religion, wealth, social position, or class, or if it is imposed under a procedure that gives room for the play of such prejudices." Arbitrary and discriminatory patterns in capital sentencing moved the Court to strike down death penalty statutes that required judges or juries to cast thumbs-up or thumbs-down verdicts against offenders found guilty of capital crimes. The issue of innocence was barely a footnote in Furman; the Court's concerns focused on …

Expert Testimony In Capital Sentencing: Juror Responses, John H. Montgomery, J. Richard Ciccone, Stephen P. Garvey, Theodore Eisenberg

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

The U.S. Supreme Court, in Furman v. Georgia (1972), held that the death penalty is constitutional only when applied on an individualized basis. The resultant changes in the laws in death penalty states fostered the involvement of psychiatric and psychologic expert witnesses at the sentencing phase of the trial, to testify on two major issues: (1) the mitigating factor of a defendant’s abnormal mental state and (2) the aggravating factor of a defendant’s potential for future violence. This study was an exploration of the responses of capital jurors to psychiatric/psychologic expert testimony during capital sentencing. The Capital Jury Project is …