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Full-Text Articles in Law
The Power Of Public Concern And First Amendment Values: Insulating Speech In Sports And Entertainment From Tort Liability For Others' Actions, Clay Calvert
UF Law Faculty Publications
When should First Amendment interests in free expression shield speakers from civil liability for harm to others caused by third parties who allegedly followed or otherwise were inspired by the speakers' words? Two recent federal court opinions - Higgins v. Kentucky Sports Radio, LLC involving post-game coverage by sports commentators about a college basketball referee, and Stricklin v. Stefani pivoting on a singer's words to her concert audience - illustrate similar yet distinct methodologies for analyzing this important question. The speech of the commentators in Higgins allegedly "incited the harassment" by listeners and readers of referee John Higgins and his …
Weaponizing Proof Of Harm In First Amendment Cases: When Scientific Evidence And Deference To The Views Of Professional Associations Collide In The Battle Against Conversion Therapy, Clay Calvert
UF Law Faculty Publications
This Article uses the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit’s divided decision in Otto v. City of Boca Raton in late 2020 as a springboard for examining battles in First Amendment jurisprudence over proof of causation of harm and the level of deference owed to the judgments of learned societies. A two-judge majority held in Otto that a pair of local ordinances banning speechbased conversion therapy on minors violated the First Amendment, with those measures failing the rigorous strict scrutiny standard of review. Crucial to the majority’s ruling was its conclusion that insufficient evidence exists that conversion therapy—also …
Transparency And The First, Mark Fenster
Transparency And The First, Mark Fenster
UF Law Faculty Publications
In his book The First: How to Think About Hate Speech, Campus Speech, Religious Speech, Fake News, Post-Truth, and Donald Trump, Stanley Fish neatly reverses the polarity of rights-based claims that the public enjoys, under the First Amendment’s free speech and press rights, a right to government information. Transparency and free speech ideals are indeed related, he concedes, because they share a political vision and conceptual grounding in the notion that robust conceptions of free speech carry a commitment to increase the flow of information. But this is not a good thing, Fish argues—rather, the relationship between the two merely …
Curing The First Amendment Scrutiny Muddle Through A Breyer-Based Blend Up? Toward A Less Categorical, More Values-Oriented Approach For Selecting Standards Of Judicial Review, Clay Calvert
UF Law Faculty Publications
This Article argues that the United States Supreme Court should significantly alter its current categorical approach for discerning standards of judicial review in free-speech cases. The present system should become nondeterminative and be augmented with a modified version of Justice Stephen Breyer’s long-preferred proportionality framework. Specifically, the Article’s proposed tack fuses facets of today’s policy, which largely pivots on distinguishing content-based laws from content-neutral laws and letting that categorization determine scrutiny, with a more nuanced, values-and-interests methodology. A values-and-interests formula would allow the Court to climb up or down the traditional ladder of scrutiny rungs – strict, intermediate or rational …
Scrutiny-Determination Avoidance In First Amendment Cases: Laudable Minimalism Or Condemnable Evasion?, Clay Calvert
Scrutiny-Determination Avoidance In First Amendment Cases: Laudable Minimalism Or Condemnable Evasion?, Clay Calvert
UF Law Faculty Publications
This Article examines the United States Supreme Court’s practice in First Amendment cases of not resolving the precise level of scrutiny that applies to measure a statute’s validity. Rather than opting for one of two tiers of scrutiny — one more rigorous than the other—the Court sometimes dodges the issue. It does this by concluding that a statute would not pass muster under the more lenient standard, thereby rendering it unnecessary to decide which test was, in fact, more appropriate. The Court thus adopts an “assuming-without-deciding” logic in such cases, simply supposing the lesser standard applies without definitively holding as …