Law Commons^™

The Primacy Of Political Actors In Accommodation Of Religion, William K. Kelley

Journal Articles

This article focuses on the relationship between freedom of religion and the norm against non-establishment of religion in the context of government efforts to accommodate religious practices. It analyzes First Amendment doctrine in this area, and concludes that the Supreme Court has consistently been generous in permitting accommodations of religion when they are the product of judicial decisions; in other words, at least until recently the Court has been open to mandatory accommodations so long as they are ordered by judges. By contrast, the Court has long been suspicious of - and far from generous in permitting - accommodations as …

Is The New York Times "Actual Malice" Standard Really Necessary? A Comparative Perspective, Geoffrey Bennett, Russell L. Weaver

Journal Articles

In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the United States Supreme Court extended First Amendment guarantees to defamation actions. Many greeted the Court's decision with joy. After the decision, many years elapsed during which "there were virtually no recoveries by public officials in libel actions."

The most important component of the New York Times decision was its "actual malice" standard. This standard provided that, in order to recover against a media defendant, a public official must demonstrate that the defendant acted with "malice." In other words, the official must show that the defendant knew that the defamatory statement was false …

Protecting Religious Liberty: Judicial And Legislative Responsibilities, Gerard V. Bradley

Journal Articles

Is the First Amendment hostile to religion? Answering that question requires at least the usual professorial ration of caveats. I assure you that I will directly answer the question. I submit, though, that the caveats constitute a more important, deeper response, a response which questions the question itself. Were I more radical in my intellectual sympathies, I would propose to deconstruct the question.

The Meaning Of "Religion" In The School Prayer Cases, Charles E. Rice

Journal Articles

It is not my purpose here to discuss the possible extensions of the school prayer decisions. Rather, I am concerned only with the thought that the unqualified incorporation of the broad definition of religion into the establishment clause is perhaps the root fallacy in the Court's reasoning. In order to avoid an institutionalization of agnosticism as the official public religion of this country, the Court ought to acknowledge that nontheistic religions are not entitled to such unqualified recognition under the establishment clause as to bar even a simple governmental affirmation that in fact the Declaration of Independence is true when …