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Full-Text Articles in Law
Essay -- Preemption, Agency Cost Theory, And Predatory Lending By Banking Agents: Are Federal Regulators Biting Off More Than They Can Chew?, Christopher L. Peterson
Essay -- Preemption, Agency Cost Theory, And Predatory Lending By Banking Agents: Are Federal Regulators Biting Off More Than They Can Chew?, Christopher L. Peterson
ExpressO
A pitched battle is currently being waged for control of the American banking industry. For over a hundred years, the federal and state governments have maintained a complex, but relatively stable truce in their contest for power. At the beginning of our republic, state governments were the primary charterers and regulators of banks. In the wake of the Civil War, the National Bank Act created parity between federal and state banks, cementing the notion of a “dual banking system” that endured through the twentieth century. But in the past five years, the federal government has increasingly used its powers under …
Using Capture Theory And Chronology In Eminent Domain Proceedings, John H. Ryskamp
Using Capture Theory And Chronology In Eminent Domain Proceedings, John H. Ryskamp
ExpressO
Capture theory--in which private purpose is substituted for government purpose--sheds light on a technique which is coming into greater use post-Kelo v. New London. That case affirmed that eminent domain use need only be rationally related to a legitimate government purpose. Capture theory focuses litigators' attention on "government purpose." That is a question of fact for the trier of fact. This article shows how to use civil discovery in order to show the Court that private purpose has been substituted for government purpose. If it has, the eminent domain use fails, because the use does not meet minimum scrutiny. This …
Before Competition: Origins Of The Internal Affairs Doctrine, Frederick Tung
Before Competition: Origins Of The Internal Affairs Doctrine, Frederick Tung
ExpressO
To the modern corporate scholar and lawyer, the internal affairs doctrine seems in the natural order of things. Corporate law is state law. Each corporation is formed under the law of its chosen state of incorporation. To ensure consistency and predictability, that law must govern the corporation’s internal affairs. Yet the origin of such a doctrine is puzzling. Respecting the firm’s choice of corporate law, the doctrine forces state legislatures into competition to attract incorporations. But how did legislatures come to concede their traditional territorial regulatory authority, and instead agree to compete? This Article solves this puzzle, offering the first …