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Full-Text Articles in Law
Federalism And Preemption In October Term 1999, Jonathan D. Varat
Federalism And Preemption In October Term 1999, Jonathan D. Varat
Pepperdine Law Review
No abstract provided.
Rediscovering A Principled Commerce Power , Douglas W. Kmiec
Rediscovering A Principled Commerce Power , Douglas W. Kmiec
Pepperdine Law Review
No abstract provided.
Delegating Supremacy?, David S. Rubenstein
Delegating Supremacy?, David S. Rubenstein
Vanderbilt Law Review
The Supreme Court has long held that federal agencies may preempt state law in much the same way as Congress: either by issuing binding administrative rules that conflict with state law or by asserting exclusive federal control over a regulatory domain. Under this sweeping conception of the Supremacy Clause, agencies wield an extraordinary power in our federalist system. Specifically, agencies may displace the laws of all fifty states without the political and procedural safeguards inhering in the legislative process. The administrative-preemption power rests on the undertheorized doctrinal assumption that Congress may, in effect, "delegate supremacy" to agencies.
This Article challenges …
Inside Agency Preemption, Catherine M. Sharkey
Inside Agency Preemption, Catherine M. Sharkey
Michigan Law Review
A subtle shift has taken place in the mechanics of preemption, the doctrine that determines when federal law displaces state law. In the past, Congress was the leading actor, and courts and commentators focused almost exclusively on the precise wording of its statutory directives as a clue to its intent to displace state law. Federal agencies were, if not ignored, certainly no more than supporting players. But the twenty-first century has witnessed a role reversal. Federal agencies now play the dominant role in statutory interpretation. The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized the ascendancy of federal agencies in preemption disputes-an ascendancy …