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Full-Text Articles in Law
States’ Evolving Role In The Supplemental Nutritional Assistance Program, David A. Super
States’ Evolving Role In The Supplemental Nutritional Assistance Program, David A. Super
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
States have always been crucial to the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP, formerly food stamps). Even though the federal government has paid virtually all the program’s benefit costs, state administration has always been indispensable for several reasons. State and local governments pay their staff considerably less than the federal government, making state administration less expensive. States already administer other important antipoverty programs, notably family cash assistance and Medicaid, allowing them to coordinate the programs and minimize repetitive activities. And states have somewhat lower, and less polarizing, political footprints than does the federal government, moderating criticism of the program. In addition, …
Depoliticizing Federalism, Louis Michael Seidman
Depoliticizing Federalism, Louis Michael Seidman
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
In his great biography of President Andrew Jackson, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. celebrated Jackson’s defense of the rights of states and opposition to federal power. Yet as a mid-twentieth century liberal, Schlesinger was a strong supporter of the federal government and an opponent of states’ rights. Was Schlesinger’s position inconsistent? He did not think so, and neither does the author. In Jackson’s time, an entrenched economic elite controlled the federal government and used federal power to dominate the lower classes. State governments served as a focal point for opposition to this domination. By mid-twentieth century, the federal government was an engine …
The Vertical Separation Of Powers, Victoria Nourse
The Vertical Separation Of Powers, Victoria Nourse
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
Standard understandings of the separation of powers begin with the concept of function. The author argues that function alone cannot predict important changes in structural incentives and thus serves as a poor proxy for assessing real risks to governmental structure. To illustrate this point, the article returns to proposals considered at the Constitutional Convention and considers difficult contemporary cases such as Morrison v. Olson, Clinton v. Jones, and the Supreme Court's more recent federalism decisions. In each instance, function appears to steer us wrong because it fails to understand separation of powers questions as ones of structural incentive …