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Full-Text Articles in Law
Executive Unilateralism And Individual Rights In A Federalist System, Meredith Mclain, Sharece Thrower
Executive Unilateralism And Individual Rights In A Federalist System, Meredith Mclain, Sharece Thrower
William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal
Presidents have a wide array of tools at their disposal to unilaterally influence public policy, without the direct approval of Congress or the courts. These unilateral actions have the potential to affect a variety of individual rights, either profitably or adversely. Governors too can employ unilateral directives for similar purposes, often impacting an even wider range of rights. In this Article, we collect all executive orders and memoranda related to individual rights issued between 1981 and 2018 at the federal level, and across the U.S. states, to analyze their use over time. We find that chief executives of all kinds …
Federalism And The Limits On Regulating Products Liability Law, 1977-1981., Ian Drake
Federalism And The Limits On Regulating Products Liability Law, 1977-1981., Ian Drake
Department of Political Science and Law Faculty Scholarship and Creative Works
The political movement of the early 1980s that sought to increase manufacturer liability for defective products by converting state tort law into federal law raised core questions about federalism. The effort at wholesale federalization failed, and tort law has been (and largely remains) within the purview of the states. However, the tort federalization movement of the early 1980s, which by the end of that decade would become popularly known as" tort reform, did result in federal legislation affecting tort law in America. This article attempts to explain why tort law was never fully federalized during this period and how the …
Slavery's Constitution: Rethinking The Federal Consensus, Maeve Glass
Slavery's Constitution: Rethinking The Federal Consensus, Maeve Glass
Faculty Scholarship
For at least half a century, scholars of the early American Constitution have noted the archival prominence of a doctrine known as the “federal consensus.” This doctrine instructed that Congress had no power to interfere with the institution of slavery in the states where it existed. Despite its ubiquity in the records, our understanding of how and why this doctrine emerged is hazy at best. Working from a conceptual map of America’s founding that features thirteen local governments coalescing into two feuding sections of North and South, commentators have tended to explain the federal consensus either as a vestige of …