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Federalism

Supreme Court of the United States

1989

Articles 1 - 3 of 3

Full-Text Articles in Law

A Revisionist Theory Of Abstention, Barry Friedman Dec 1989

A Revisionist Theory Of Abstention, Barry Friedman

Michigan Law Review

This article offers a straightforward model for identifying cases in which abstention threatens federal rights - and so is inappropriate and cases in which federal rights are not so threatened and state interests require abstention. Part I provides some background on the abstention doctrines, clarifying· the competing premises that must be reconciled in order to develop a coherent, unified abstention doctrine. Part II then sets out the basis for the revisionist theory and the manner in which it would operate, arguing that a federal trial forum only need be - and only should be - available where necessary to protect …


Untangling The Market-Participant Exemption To The Dormant Commerce Clause, Dan T. Coenen Dec 1989

Untangling The Market-Participant Exemption To The Dormant Commerce Clause, Dan T. Coenen

Michigan Law Review

This article explores the market-participant rule. Part I traces the rule's evolution and shows how it has proven less rigid than some initially feared. Part II probes the roots of the rule by challenging justifications for it suggested by other observers. Part III offers an alternative theory of the market-participant doctrine, arguing in particular that it rests on a cluster of rationales that properly have led· the Court to uphold marketplace preferences as the "general rule." Part IV builds on Part III to advance a new, four-part framework for evaluating market-participant issues. Part V then uses that framework to apply …


Principles, Politics, And Constitutional Law, Mark Tushnet Oct 1989

Principles, Politics, And Constitutional Law, Mark Tushnet

Michigan Law Review

The contrast in Senator Thurmond's performance in hearings concerning Judge Bork, whose nomination he supported, and Justice Marshall, whose nomination he opposed, suggests the apparently cynical view that one's position on the proper scope of senatorial inquiry during a nomination depends upon one's position on the merits of the nomination. Much has been written, usually provoked by controversial nominations, about the proper scope of senatorial inquiry. The press of immediate controversy, however, diverts attention from more fundamental issues about the nature of constitutional government, to which I devote this essay.