Law Commons^™

"Introduction" (Chapter 1) Of Stories About Science In Law: Literary And Historical Images Of Acquired Expertise (Ashgate 2011), David S. Caudill

David S Caudill

This is the introductory chapter of Stories About Science in Law: Literary and Historical Images of Acquired Expertise (Ashgate, 2011), explaining that the book presents examples of how literary accounts can provide a supplement to our understanding of science in law. Challenging the view that law and science are completely different, I focus on stories that explore the relationship between law and science, and identify cultural images of science that prevail in legal contexts. In contrast to other studies on the transfer and construction of expertise in legal settings, the book considers the intersection of three interdisciplinary projects-- law and …

Lawyers Judging Experts: Oversimplifying Science And Undervaluing Advocacy To Construct An Ethical Duty?, David S. Caudill

David S Caudill

My focus is on an apparent trend at the intersection of the fields of evidentiary standards for expert admissibility and professional responsibility, namely the eagerness to place more ethical responsibilities on lawyers to vet their proffered expertise to ensure its reliability. My reservations about this trend are not only based on its troubling implications for the lawyer’s duty as a zealous advocate, which already has obvious limitations (because of lawyers’ conflicting duties to the court), but are also based on the problematic aspects of many reliability determinations. To expect attorneys - and this is what the proponents of a duty …

Book Review: Carl Cranor, Toxic Torts: Science, Law, And The Possibility Of Justice, David Caudill

David S Caudill

Carl F. Cranor’s Toxic Torts: Science, Law, and the Possibility of Justice is a sustained, comprehensive argument that the Daubert gatekeeping regime has tilted the playing field against injured plaintiffs in toxic tort litigation. More generally, Cranor joins those who argue that the Daubert regime has not fared well in practice. Complex scientific evidence is not handled well in trials because scientific methods, data, and inferential reasoning are not well understood by gatekeeping judges. Cranor’s goal is to help solve this problem by offering a detailed description of the patterns of reasoning, evidence collection, and inference in nonlegal scientific settings. …

From Gridlock To Groundbreaking: Realizing Reliability In Forensic Science, Jessica D. Gabel

Jessica Gabel Cino

In 2009, The National Academy of Sciences published a scathing report announcing that forensic science is broken and needs to be overhauled. Weaknesses have plagued forensic evidence for decades, and the resulting legal challenges have been hard fought but met with few victories. What we do know is a harsh truth: that faulty forensic science has contributed to the conviction of innocent people—and will continue to do so if the status quo persists.

In recent years, the reality of wrongful convictions has become mainstream through the work of the Innocence Project and other organizations. Out of the 305 DNA-based exonerations …

Defying Dna: Rethinking The Role Of The Jury In An Age Of Scientific Proof Of Innocence, Andrea L. Roth

Andrea L Roth

In 1946, public outrage erupted after a jury ordered Charlie Chaplin to support a child who, according to apparently definitive blood tests, was not his. Half a century later, juries have again defied apparently definitive evidence of innocence, finding criminal defendants guilty based on a confession or eyewitness notwithstanding exculpatory DNA test results. One might expect judges in such cases to direct an acquittal, on grounds that the evidence is legally insufficient because no rational juror could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Yet few if any do. Instead, courts defer to juries when they form an actual belief in …

Speaking Science To Law, Deborah Hussey Freeland

Deborah M. Hussey Freeland

involving a strong scientific consensus, the powerful qualities of scientific knowledge are easily lost in translation. Moreover, even prominent scientists who are committed to providing accurate information to legal fact-finders may suffer reputational harm simply for participating in an adversarial process.

This article analyzes the connection between law and science through the expert witness from the perspectives of epistemology and cross-cultural communication, focusing on the distinct ways in which scientists and lawyers know, value and express their knowledge. When a lawyer meets with a scientific expert witness, more confusion attends their interaction than either likely realizes. Linguistic translation is necessary--but …