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Full-Text Articles in Law
Corporate And Business Law, Laurence V. Parker Jr.
Corporate And Business Law, Laurence V. Parker Jr.
University of Richmond Law Review
No abstract provided.
Understanding The Law Of Evidence Through The Lens Of Signal-To-Noise, Alex Stein
Understanding The Law Of Evidence Through The Lens Of Signal-To-Noise, Alex Stein
Alex Stein
No abstract provided.
Are People Probabilistically Challenged? Book Review Of Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast And Slow (2011), Alex Stein
Are People Probabilistically Challenged? Book Review Of Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast And Slow (2011), Alex Stein
Alex Stein
Daniel Kahneman’s recent book, Thinking, Fast and Slow, is a must-read for any scholar and policymaker interested in behavioral economics. Thus far, behavioral economists did predominantly experimental work that uncovered discrete manifestations of people’s bounded rationality: representativeness, availability, anchoring, overoptimism, base-rate neglect, hindsight bias, loss aversion, and other misevaluations of probability and utility. This work has developed no causal explanations for these misevaluations. Kahneman’s book takes the discipline to a different level by developing an integrated theory of bounded rationality’s causes and characteristics. This theory holds that humans use two distinct modes of reasoning, intuitive (System 1) and deliberative (System …
Evidence, Probability, And The Burden Of Proof, Ronald J. Allen, Alex Stein
Evidence, Probability, And The Burden Of Proof, Ronald J. Allen, Alex Stein
Alex Stein
This Article analyzes the probabilistic and epistemological underpinnings of the burden-of-proof doctrine. We show that this doctrine is best understood as instructing factfinders to determine which of the parties’ conflicting stories makes most sense in terms of coherence, consilience, causality, and evidential coverage. By applying this method, factfinders should try—and will often succeed—to establish the truth, rather than a statistical surrogate of the truth, while securing the appropriate allocation of the risk of error. Descriptively, we argue that this understanding of the doctrine—the “relative plausibility theory”—corresponds to our courts’ practice. Prescriptively, we argue that the relative-plausibility method is operationally superior …