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Full-Text Articles in Law

Myth, Inference And Evidence In Sexual Assault Trials, Lisa Dufraimont Jan 2019

Myth, Inference And Evidence In Sexual Assault Trials, Lisa Dufraimont

Articles & Book Chapters

In sexual assault cases, the ability to distinguish myths and stereotypes from legitimate lines of reasoning continues to be a challenge for Canadian courts. The author argues that this challenge could be overcome by clearly identifying problematic inferences in sexual assault cases as prohibited lines of reasoning, while allowing the defence to bring forward evidence that is logically relevant to the material issues so long as it does not raise these prohibited inferences.

This paper advances that judges should take a broad view of relevance as an evidentiary approach in the adjudication of sexual assault cases. This approach allows for …


What Humility Isn’T: Responsibility And The Judicial Role, Benjamin Berger Jan 2018

What Humility Isn’T: Responsibility And The Judicial Role, Benjamin Berger

Articles & Book Chapters

In recent years, academic literature has given some attention to humility as an important adjudicative principle or virtue. Drawing inspiration from a Talmudic tale, this chapter suggests that the picture of judicial humility painted in this literature is not only incomplete, but even potentially dangerous so. Seeking to complete the picture of what this virtue might entail, this piece explores the idea that humility is found in awareness of one’s position and role in respect of power, and a willingness to accept the burdens of responsibility that flow from this. The chapter examines elements of Chief Justice McLachlin’s criminal justice …


Lost In Translation? The Difference Between Hearsay Rule's Historical Rationale And Practical Application, Christopher Lloyd Sewrattan Sep 2016

Lost In Translation? The Difference Between Hearsay Rule's Historical Rationale And Practical Application, Christopher Lloyd Sewrattan

LLM Theses

An examination of the difference between the hearsay rules historical rationale and current application. The analysis occurs in three steps. In section 1, the historical rationale of the hearsay rule is identified through a reconciliation of competing theories. Section 2 analyses the difference between the hearsay rules historical rationale and the application of the exclusionary hearsay rule. Section 3 analyses the difference between the hearsay rules historical rationale and the application of some categorical hearsay exceptions.

Overall, the thesis finds that the hearsay rules historical rationale has three aspects: concern with the inherent reliability of hearsay evidence, concern with procedural …


Limited Admissibility And Its Limitations, Lisa Dufraimont Jun 2013

Limited Admissibility And Its Limitations, Lisa Dufraimont

Articles & Book Chapters

Among the challenges facing juries and judges in adjudicating cases is the obligation to use evidence for limited purposes. Evidence inadmissible for one purpose is frequently admissible for other purposes, a situation known as "limited admissibility". Where limited admissibility arises in jury trials, courts generally deliver limiting instructions outlining the inferences that can legitimately be drawn from the evidence and identifying prohibited lines of reasoning to be avoided. Limiting instructions represent an expedient solution to limited-admissibility problems, but they create obvious problems of their own. A thoughtful observer might suspect-as psychological studies confirm-that limiting instructions are likely to fail in …


Offence Definitions, Conclusive Presumptions, And Slot Machines, Michael Plaxton Jan 2010

Offence Definitions, Conclusive Presumptions, And Slot Machines, Michael Plaxton

Osgoode Hall Law Journal

Canadian evidence scholars frequently claim that conclusive presumptions are nothing more than substantive offence definitions. This position reflects a persistent confusion, not about the function of legal presumptions in the law of evidence, but about the function of offence definitions beyond the law of evidence. Offence definitions, unlike conclusive presumptions, serve the normative function of defining wrongful conduct for citizens. This commentary argues that the language of conclusive presumptions allows us to distinguish the gravamen of a criminal offence from a means of facilitating proof of that wrong. It is, to that extent, worth preserving the distinction between conclusive presumptions …