Law Commons^™

Evidence And The Pursuit Of Truth In The Law, Jeffery L. Johnson

Jeffery L Johnson

Lawyers should be much more concerned with the concepts of truth and evidence. The entire profession depends on truth. It is what police detectives, District Attorneys, juries, trial judges, appellate judges, and academic lawyers offering interpretive theories, are all concerned with. But, since truth is seldom apparent on its sleeve, these legal actors are equally dependent on evidence as the only(?) reliable(?) means of determining truth. I defend a commonsensical theory of [good] evidence. I argue that this view, inference to the best explanation, captures most, if not all, of a lawyer’s appeal to evidence. It is far from clear, …

Back To The Future: The Constitution Requires Reasonableness And Particularity—Introducing The “Seize But Don’T Search” Doctrine, Adam Lamparello, Charles E. Maclean

Adam Lamparello

Issuing one-hundred or fewer opinions per year, the United States Supreme Court cannot keep pace with opinions that match technological advancement. As a result, in Riley v. California and United States v. Wurie, the Court needs to announce a broader principle that protects privacy in the digital age. That principle, what we call “seize but don’t search,” recognizes that the constitutional touchstone for all searches is reasonableness.

When do present-day circumstances—the evolution in the Government’s surveillance capabilities, citizens’ phone habits, and the relationship between the NSA and telecom companies—become so thoroughly unlike those considered by the Supreme Court thirty-four years …

The Piranha Is As Deadly As The Shark: A Case For The Limitation On Deceptive Practices In Dna Collection, Brett A. Bauman

Brett A Bauman

Police deception tactics are utilized throughout the United States as a way to catch unsuspecting criminals. Although criticized in many respects, most deceptive police techniques are not only legal, but are actually encouraged. DNA collection and analysis is no exception—techniques are frequently used by law enforcement officers in an attempt to collect a suspect’s genetic specimen in the interest of solving crimes. While law enforcement officers typically have the best interests of society in mind, the current practices employed by officers to collect suspects’ DNA violate the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment provides protection against unreasonable searches and seizures, and …

Cipa V. State Secrets: How A Few Mistakes Confused Two Important National Security Privileges, Elisa Poteat

Elisa Poteat

No abstract provided.

The System Of Modern Criminal Conspiracy, Steven R. Morrison

Steven R Morrison

Something has changed in the modern system of American criminal conspiracy law compared to its prior iterations. This article explores that change, arguing that the system of modern criminal conspiracy now gives to the government such great discretion to charge and prove a conspiracy that unpopular ideas and the speech that expresses them have become ready subjects of prosecution. At its center, this article defines the system of modern conspiracy law, which is one of uniformity rather than dynamism. Where dynamic systems of law contain distinct components that perform different tasks (proving actus reus and mens rea, for example), the …

Images In/Of Law, Jessica M. Silbey

Jessica Silbey

The proliferation of images in and of law lends itself to surprisingly complex problems of epistemology and power. Understanding through images is innate; most of us easily understand images without thinking. But arriving at mutually agreeable understandings of images is also difficult. Translating images into shared words leads to multiple problems inherent in translation and that pose problems for justice. Despite our saturated imagistic culture, we have not established methods to pursue that translation process with confidence. This article explains how images are intuitively understood and yet collectively inscrutable, posing unique problems for resolving legal conflicts that demand common and …

A Defense Attorney’S Guide To Confrontation After Michigan V. Bryant, Kathryn K. Polonsky

Kathryn K Polonsky

In 1603, the Crown charged Sir Walter Raleigh with high treason in part for plotting to murder King James I. In preparing for trial, Lord Cobham, Raleigh’s alleged co-conspirator, was interrogated and signed a sworn confession. During trial, the King used the Crown-procured ex parte testimony of Cobham against Raleigh. Raleigh demanded Cobham be brought before the court so Raleigh might interrogate him “face to face.” Raleigh was sure Cobham would prove his innocence. After all, Cobham had written a letter stating his charges against Raleigh contained no truth.

The Judges refused to allow Raleigh the use of Cobham’s exonerating …

Silent At Sentencing: Waiver Doctrine And A Capital Defendant's Right To Present Mitigating Evidence After Schriro V. Landrigan, Dale E. Ho

Dale E Ho

The consideration of mitigating evidence—evidence that weighs against the imposition of the death penalty in a capital defendant’s individual case—has been deemed a “constitutionally indispensable” feature of a valid capital sentencing scheme. And yet, Jeffrey Landrigan, like many capital defendants, was sentenced to death without the consideration of any mitigating evidence whatsoever. Landrigan’s trial counsel failed to uncover substantial evidence of Landrigan’s history of severe physical and sexual abuse as a child, and of the possible biological effects of his mother’s alcohol and drug abuse. Every member of the Ninth Circuit en banc panel considering his case deemed his counsel’s …

Counsel And Confrontation, Todd E. Pettys

Todd E. Pettys

Responding to the Court’s recent reworking of its confrontation jurisprudence, I argue that, under the Anglo-American common-law principles that the Confrontation Clause now incorporates, defendants are not entitled to an attorney’s assistance when interrogating witnesses prior to trial. Although the Assistance of Counsel Clause and the Due Process Clauses will pick up the slack in many cases, I contend that there are other instances in which the Constitution now leaves unrepresented defendants responsible for cross-examining witnesses on their own. I suggest that legislative reform may be necessary to ameliorate the new constitutional landscape’s deficiencies.