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Full-Text Articles in Law
Judging Opportunity Lost: Assessing The Viability Of Race-Based Affirmative Action After Fisher V. University Of Texas, Austin, Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Mario Barnes, Erwin Chemerinsky
Judging Opportunity Lost: Assessing The Viability Of Race-Based Affirmative Action After Fisher V. University Of Texas, Austin, Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Mario Barnes, Erwin Chemerinsky
Faculty Scholarship
In this Article, Mario Barnes, Erwin Chemerinsky, and Angela Onwuachi-Willig examine and analyze one recent, affirmative action case, Fisher v. University of Texas, Austin, as a means of highlighting why the anti-subordination or equal opportunity approach, as opposed to the anti-classification approach, is the correct approach for analyzing equal protection cases. In so doing, these authors highlight several opportunities that the U.S. Supreme Court missed to acknowledge and explicate the way in which race, racism, and racial privilege operate in society and thus advance the anti-subordination approach to equal protection. In the end, the authors suggest that, with regard to …
From Outsider Status To Insider And Outsider Again: Interest Convergence Theory And Normalization Of Lgbt Identity, Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Alexander Nourafshan
From Outsider Status To Insider And Outsider Again: Interest Convergence Theory And Normalization Of Lgbt Identity, Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Alexander Nourafshan
Faculty Scholarship
After the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Windsor, which declared the federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) unconstitutional,and after the granting of certiorari in Obergell v. Hodges, where the Supreme Court will decide whether the Fourteenth Amendment requires states to provide a marriage license to same-sex couples, national marriage equality seems like a legal inevitability.However, Windsor and Obergell, along with other state-level advances toward marriage equality, are not equally promising for all members of the lesbian and gay community. Although Windsor and the revolution of cases that have led to Obergell hold significant promise for one privileged subset …
From Romer V. Evans To United States V. Windsor: Law As A Vehicle For Moral Disapproval In Amendment 2 And The Defense Of Marriage Act, Linda C. Mcclain
From Romer V. Evans To United States V. Windsor: Law As A Vehicle For Moral Disapproval In Amendment 2 And The Defense Of Marriage Act, Linda C. Mcclain
Faculty Scholarship
This article considers the intertwined fates of Romer v. Evans and the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), which both date back to 1996. In United States v. Windsor, Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, struck down Section 3 of DOMA, using Romer as a template. This article reflects on Romer as it bears on the use of law as a vehicle to express morality, in particular, “moral disapproval of homosexuality” and moral approval -- and the defense and nurture -- of “traditional, heterosexual marriage.” Proponents of Amendment 2 (struck down in Romer, in an opinion written by Justice Kennedy) and …
Constitutional Borrowing, Robert L. Tsai, Nelson Tebbe
Constitutional Borrowing, Robert L. Tsai, Nelson Tebbe
Faculty Scholarship
Borrowing from one domain to promote ideas in another domain is a staple of constitutional decisionmaking. Precedents, arguments, concepts, tropes, and heuristics all can be carried across doctrinal boundaries for purposes of persuasion. Yet the practice itself remains underanalyzed. This Article seeks to bring greater theoretical attention to the matter. It defines what constitutional borrowing is and what it is not, presents a typology that describes its common forms, undertakes a principled defense of borrowing, and identifies some of the risks involved. Our examples draw particular attention to places where legal mechanisms and ideas migrate between fields of law associated …
Undercover Other, Angela Onwuachi-Willig
Undercover Other, Angela Onwuachi-Willig
Faculty Scholarship
This Essay argues in favor of legally recognizing same-sex marriages by exploring the similarities in passing between members of same-sex marriages/relationships and interracial marriages/relationships. Specifically, this Essay unpacks the claim that the ability of gays and lesbians to pass as heterosexual distinguishes the ban on same-sex marriages from former bans on interracial marriages. Part I of this Essay first describes policy-based critiques of a Loving-based argument for legalizing same-sex marriage, or as one scholar has coined, of playing the Loving card by analogizing the racism that motivated anti-miscegenation statues that the Supreme Court struck down in 1967 to the anti-gay …