Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Law Commons

Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Articles 1 - 5 of 5

Full-Text Articles in Law

Corporate Crime And Punishment: An Empirical Study, Dorothy S. Lund, Natasha Sarin Dec 2021

Corporate Crime And Punishment: An Empirical Study, Dorothy S. Lund, Natasha Sarin

All Faculty Scholarship

For many years, law and economics scholars, as well as politicians and regulators, have debated whether corporate criminal enforcement overdeters beneficial corporate activity or in the alternative, lets corporate criminals off too easily. This debate has recently expanded in its polarization: On the one hand, academics, judges, and politicians have excoriated enforcement agencies for failing to send guilty bankers to jail in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis; on the other, the U.S. Department of Justice has since relaxed policies that encouraged individual prosecutions and reduced the size of fines and number of prosecutions. A crucial and yet understudied …


Full Spectrum Space Deterrence: From Laws To Technology, Joshua Carlson Mar 2021

Full Spectrum Space Deterrence: From Laws To Technology, Joshua Carlson

Honors Theses

Conflict in space is becoming an ever-real possibility, with the potential of rendering the space completely useless for future generations. Current talks are centered around limiting or preventing any weapons deployed to space, but this is not the most effective way of dealing with the issue. The focus should shift to agreeing on how nations should act responsibly in space together instead of preventing nations from acting at all. The best way of accomplishing this goal is by improving satellite design, creating agreed upon and understood rules of engagement, fostering widespread cooperation between nations, and choosing not to be the …


Corporate Crime And Punishment: An Empirical Study, Dorothy S. Lund, Natasha Sarin Jan 2021

Corporate Crime And Punishment: An Empirical Study, Dorothy S. Lund, Natasha Sarin

Faculty Scholarship

For many years, law and economics scholars, as well as politicians and regulators, have debated whether corporate punishment chills beneficial corporate activity or, in the alternative, lets corporate criminals off too easily. A crucial and yet understudied aspect of this debate is empirical evidence. Unlike most other types of crime, the government does not measure corporate crime rates; therefore, the government and researchers alike cannot easily determine whether disputed policies are effectively deterring future incidents of corporate misconduct. In this Article, we take important first steps in addressing these questions. Specifically, we use three novel sources as proxies for corporate …


M&A Advisor Misconduct: A Wrong Without A Remedy?, Andrew F. Tuch Jan 2021

M&A Advisor Misconduct: A Wrong Without A Remedy?, Andrew F. Tuch

Scholarship@WashULaw

Merger and acquisition ("M&A") transactions are among the most high profile of corporate transactions. They are also among the most contentious, with around eighty percent of all completed deals litigated in recent years. And yet investment banks—essential advisors on these deals—have generally succeeded spectacularly in avoiding liability, an anomaly considering the routine nature of deal litigation and the frequency with which they face lawsuits in their other activities. This article examines this anomaly, explaining the doctrinal and practical reasons why it arises. In doing so, it puts in context aiding and abetting liability, a recently-successful shareholder strategy to bring M&A …


Deterrence Theory: Key Findings And Challenges, Alex Raskolnikov Jan 2021

Deterrence Theory: Key Findings And Challenges, Alex Raskolnikov

Faculty Scholarship

This chapter reviews the key findings of the optimal deterrence theory and discusses the remaining challenges. Some of these challenges reflect current modeling choices and limitations. These include the treatment of the offender’s gains in the social welfare function; the design of the damages multiplier in a realistic, multi-period framework; the effects of different types of uncertainty on behavior; and the study of optional, imperfectly enforced, threshold-based regimes – that is, regimes that reflect the most common real-world regulatory setting. Other challenges arise because several key regulatory features and enforcement outcomes are inconsistent with the deterrence theory’s predictions and prescriptions. …