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Full-Text Articles in Law

How High Do Cartels Raise Prices? Implications For Optimal Cartel Fines, John M. Connor, Robert H. Lande Dec 2005

How High Do Cartels Raise Prices? Implications For Optimal Cartel Fines, John M. Connor, Robert H. Lande

All Faculty Scholarship

This Article examines whether the current penalties in the United States Sentencing Guidelines are set at the appropriate levels to deter cartels optimally The authors analyze two data sets to determine how high on average cartels raise prices. The first consists of every published scholarly economic study of the effects of cartels on prices in individual cases. The second consists of every final verdict in a US. antitrust case in which a neutral finder of fact reported collusive overcharges. They report average overcharges of 49% and 31% for the two data sets, and median overcharges of 25% and 22%. They …


The Peculiar Challenges Posed By Latent Diseases Resulting From Mass Products, Donald G. Gifford Jan 2005

The Peculiar Challenges Posed By Latent Diseases Resulting From Mass Products, Donald G. Gifford

Faculty Scholarship

Legal actions against manufacturers of products that cause latent diseases, such as asbestos products, cigarettes, lead-pigment, and Agent Orange, are the signature torts of our time. Yet within this rather important subset of tort liability, it is unlikely that the imposition of liability actually results in loss prevention. Three factors, present in varying combinations in the context of latent diseases resulting from product exposure, frustrate the deterrent impact of liability. First, an extended period of time—sometimes decades—passes between the time of the manufacturer’s distribution of the product and the imposition of liability. Second, the accident compensation system frequently is unable …


Remedies In International Human Rights Law (Chapter One), Dinah L. Shelton Jan 2005

Remedies In International Human Rights Law (Chapter One), Dinah L. Shelton

GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works

This book discusses the various approaches to and types of remedies available for violations of international human rights law. The first point is that remedies have both a procedural and substantive component. Procedural remedies means that there is an opportunity to be heard, while the substantive facet refers to the “relief afforded the successful claimant.” The first chapter of the book notes that preliminary requirements are availability of the justice system and discusses the purposes of remedies, including compensating the victim, deterring future crimes, condemnation, retribution, and restorative justice (which aims to find options other than punishment and focusing more …


Attention Felons: Evaluating Project Safe Neighborhoods In Chicago, Andrew V. Papachristos, Tracey L. Meares, Jeffrey Fagan Jan 2005

Attention Felons: Evaluating Project Safe Neighborhoods In Chicago, Andrew V. Papachristos, Tracey L. Meares, Jeffrey Fagan

Faculty Scholarship

This research uses a quasi-experimental design to evaluate the impact of Project Safe Neighborhood (PSN) initiatives on neighborhood level crime rates in Chicago. Four interventions are analyzed: (1) increased federal prosecutions for convicted felons carrying or using guns, (2) the length of sentences associated with federal prosecutions, (3) supply-side firearm policing activities, and (4) social marketing of deterrence and social norms messages through justice-style offender notification meetings. Using an individual growth curve models and propensity scores to adjust for non-random group assignment, our findings suggest that several PSN interventions are associated with greater declines of homicide in the treatment neighborhoods …


The Theory Of Penalties And The Economics Of Criminal Law, Keith N. Hylton Jan 2005

The Theory Of Penalties And The Economics Of Criminal Law, Keith N. Hylton

Faculty Scholarship

This paper presents a model of penalties that reconciles the conflicting accounts optimal punishment by Becker, who argued penalties should internalize social costs, and Posner, who suggested penalties should completely deter offenses. The model delivers specific recommendations as to when penalties should be set to internalize social costs and when they should be set to completely deter offensive conduct. I use the model to generate a positive account of the function and scope of criminal law doctrines, such as intent, necessity, and rules governing the distinction between torts and crimes. The model is also consistent with the history of criminal …