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Full-Text Articles in Law
Does The Criminal Enforcement Of Federal Environmental Law Deter Environmental Crime? The Case Of The U.S. Resource Conservation And Recovery Act, Dr. Joshua Ozymy, Dr. Melissa L. Jarrell
Does The Criminal Enforcement Of Federal Environmental Law Deter Environmental Crime? The Case Of The U.S. Resource Conservation And Recovery Act, Dr. Joshua Ozymy, Dr. Melissa L. Jarrell
Environmental and Earth Law Journal (EELJ)
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Department of Justice are tasked with the investigation and prosecution of hazardous waste crimes occurring under the U.S. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA). For criminal sanctions to be effective, the probability of detection and severity of punishment must be significant enough to raise the cost to benefit ratio to deter environmental crimes. While research examines sanctioning under RCRA, little work examines the plausibility of the deterrent effect of criminal sanctions. Through content analysis of all environmental crime prosecutions resulting from EPA criminal investigations, 1983-2019, we explore the probability of detection and …
Cartel Criminalization In Europe: Addressing Deterrence And Institutional Challenges, Francesco Ducci
Cartel Criminalization In Europe: Addressing Deterrence And Institutional Challenges, Francesco Ducci
Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law
This Article analyzes cartel criminalization in Europe from a deterrence and institutional perspective. First, it investigates the idea of criminalization by putting it in perspective with the more general question of what types of sanctions a jurisdiction might adopt against collusive behavior. Second, it analyzes the institutional element of criminalization by (1) discussing the compatibility of administrative enforcement with the potential de facto criminal nature of administrative fines under European law and (2) evaluating the trade-offs between an administrative and a criminal model of enforcement. Although a "panoply" of sanctions against both corporations and individuals may be necessary under a …
Admit Or Deny: A Call For Reform Of The Sec's "Neither-Admit-Nor-Deny" Policy, Priyah Kaul
Admit Or Deny: A Call For Reform Of The Sec's "Neither-Admit-Nor-Deny" Policy, Priyah Kaul
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
For four decades, the SEC’s often-invoked policy of settling cases without requiring admissions of wrongdoing, referred to as the “neither-admit-nor-deny” policy, went unchallenged by the courts, the legislature, and the public. Then in 2011, a harshly critical opinion from Judge Jed Rakoff in SEC v. Citigroup incited demands for reform of this policy. In response to Judge Rakoff’s opinion, the SEC announced a modified approach to settlements. Under the modified approach, the Commission may require an admission of wrongdoing if a defendant’s misconduct was egregious or if the public markets would benefit from an admission. Many supporters of the neither-admit-nor-deny …
Unfit For Prime Time: Why Cable Television Regulations Cannot Perform Trinko's 'Antitrust Function', Keith Klovers
Unfit For Prime Time: Why Cable Television Regulations Cannot Perform Trinko's 'Antitrust Function', Keith Klovers
Michigan Law Review
Until recently, regulation and antitrust law operated in tandem to safeguard competition in regulated industries. In three recent decisions-Trinko, Credit Suisse, and Linkline-the Supreme Court limited the operation of the antitrust laws when regulation "performs the antitrust function." This Note argues that cable programming regulations-which are in some respects factually similar to the telecommunications regulations at issue in Trinko and Linkline-do not perform the antitrust function because they cannot deter anticompetitive conduct. As a result, Trinko and its siblings should not foreclose antitrust claims for damages that arise out of certain cable programming disputes.
The Corporate Monitor: The New Corporate Czar?, Vikramaditya Khanna, Timothy L. Dickinson
The Corporate Monitor: The New Corporate Czar?, Vikramaditya Khanna, Timothy L. Dickinson
Michigan Law Review
Following the recent spate of corporate scandals, government enforcement authorities have increasingly relied upon corporate monitors to help ensure law compliance and reduce the number of future violations. These monitors also permit enforcement authorities, such as the Securities & Exchange Commission and others, to leverage their enforcement resources in overseeing corporate behavior. However there are few descriptive or normative analyses of the role and scope of corporate monitors. This paper provides such an analysis. After sketching out the historical development of corporate monitors, the paper examines the most common features of the current set of monitor appointments supplemented by interviews …