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Full-Text Articles in Law

Optimal Deterrence And The Preference Gap, Brook E. Gotberg Jan 2018

Optimal Deterrence And The Preference Gap, Brook E. Gotberg

Faculty Publications

This Article is the first of its kind to argue that preference law is ineffective as a deterrent of collection behavior based on empirical evidence, drawn from interviews of actors within the field-debtors, creditors, and the attorneys who represented them in bankruptcy proceedings. This Article reports on interviews of sampled individuals who participated in successful 7 Chapter 11 reorganization cases involving preference actions. The overwhelming and indisputable conclusion from these interviews is that creditors may adjust their behavior in response to preference law, but not in ways that further the purported goal of preference deterrence. Accordingly, if preference law is …


Brandishing Our Air, Space, And Cyber Swords: Recommendations For Deterrence And Beyond, Mark Reith Jan 2017

Brandishing Our Air, Space, And Cyber Swords: Recommendations For Deterrence And Beyond, Mark Reith

Faculty Publications

This article examines how the nation could better prepare to deter aggressive action in space and cyberspace, and if necessary, prevail should deterrence fail. The key themes throughout this article include a strong need for space and cyber situational awareness, the need for an international attribution and escalation framework, and a national investment in space and cyber education, along with an updated national strategy and military doctrine. Although related, this article focuses on deterrence and avoids the topic of cyber coercion.


Illegal Contacts And Efficient Deterrence: A Study In Modern Contract Theory, Juliet P. Kostritsky Feb 2006

Illegal Contacts And Efficient Deterrence: A Study In Modern Contract Theory, Juliet P. Kostritsky

Faculty Publications

This Article offers a unified theory that explains why courts, despite the compelling argument for deterrence, should not apply the no-effect rule of illegal contracts uniformly and why they should vary the type of relief according to the factual setting. It posits that a graduated relief structure will maximize efficient deterrence. An efficient deterrence scheme will preserve limited personal, judicial and societal resources without burdening legitimate transactions.


Enron's Legislative Aftermath: Some Reflections On The Deterrence Aspects Of The Sarbanes-Oxley Act Of 2002, Michael A. Perino Jan 2002

Enron's Legislative Aftermath: Some Reflections On The Deterrence Aspects Of The Sarbanes-Oxley Act Of 2002, Michael A. Perino

Faculty Publications

Since Enron's implosion, an astounding string of accounting scandals have stunned the securities markets. Global Crossing, WorldCom, Adelphia, and a host of other companies have seen plummeting share prices and SEC and criminal investigations. Congress's reaction has been equally stunning and surprisingly swift. It passed with near unanimity the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (the "SOA" or the "Act"), and President Bush quickly signed it into law. The President billed the Act as one of the "the most far-reaching reforms of American business practices since the time of Franklin Delano Roosevelt." While the SOA is certainly lengthy, with eleven titles and …


Proportional Liability: Statistical Evidence And The Probability Paradox, David A. Fischer Oct 1993

Proportional Liability: Statistical Evidence And The Probability Paradox, David A. Fischer

Faculty Publications

Three major policies underlie tort liability: deterrence, compensation, and corrective justice. A primary justification for proportional liability is its alleged superiority in advancing the tort policy of deterrence. This Article demonstrates a significant flaw in this claim by showing that the use of tort liability in multiple cause cases involving statistical evidence in fact serves the policy of deterrence quite poorly.


Deterrence And Desert In Tort: A Comment, David G. Owen May 1985

Deterrence And Desert In Tort: A Comment, David G. Owen

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.